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ABSTRACT

In “Plato’s Analogical Thought,” I argue that although there is no explicit
discussion of analogy as a philosophical concept in the dialogues, Plato’s thought
operates according to a logic of analogy. The thesis that Plato’s thought is analogical is
demonstrated by means of several analyses of the way that analogical structure takes root
in some of Plato’s most important concepts and discussions. Through careful readings of
the Platonic dialogues, it becomes clear that analogy plays a key role in Plato’s
articulation of the structure of being, the cosmos, and logos.
I begin with an exploration of the meaning attached to analogy and an explanation
of its relation to imaging. From there, I turn to the Republic to demonstrate that the
divided line of Book VI reflects in its own form the analogical structure of Platonic
metaphysics. Next, I turn to Socrates’ discourse on the hypothesis of the forms,
discovering that, by means of the analogy of the eclipsed sun, hypothesis becomes the
logos that mediates truth and ignorance. In the Timaeus, a Pythagorean mathematician
and astronomer (Timaeus) provides an uncharacteristically direct account of the relation
between the way thought is expressed and what is thought in that expression. His
account amounts to claiming that there is an analogy between thought and its expression,
which is implicitly demonstrated by his account of the cosmological principle that
mediates being and becoming: chōra. Finally, I consider the Statesman dialogue, where
the Eleatic Stranger seeks to provide a detailed account of the manner by which a
statesman rules. This account, I show, is premised on an analogy with the art of weaving,
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which is itself an image of the Stranger’s own method. Hence, Platonic methodology is
itself also tied to the structure of analogy.
These analyses support the conclusion that Plato’s thought is thoroughly
analogical, thereby anticipating and influencing the philosophical role of the concept of
analogy in later traditions. As a result, however, analogy appears as a sign of the
necessarily incomplete nature of pure thought. In the end, this claim enables us to reflect
upon the predicament of philosophical reflection: that the very structure of a thought
foundational to Western philosophy relies on a concept antithetical to its own prescribed
hierarchy. This reveals not a flaw in Plato’s thinking but a feature endemic to totalizing,
rational accounts. In addition, it is further argued that the analysis of analogy in Plato’s
work reveals the significance of discursive thought to philosophical practice. By
revealing the limits of rational accounts, such considerations of the role of analogy turn
us toward a reassessment of the value of non-thetic expressions of thought.
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Introduction
The difficulty in understanding Plato lies
precisely in this intoxicating mixture of
philosophy and poetry, of science and art; we
cannot always tell in which character of the
dialogue the author speaks, nor in which form;
whether he is literal or speaks in metaphor,
whether he jests or is in earnest. 1
Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy

I

In Book X of the Republic, Socrates reminds Glaucon and Adeimantus of the “old
quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (607b5). As evidence, he quotes several
disparaging remarks made by poets about philosophers, which attack them as shrill,
vapid, overwise and unemployed. In the context in which the claim appears, philosophy
is portrayed as the victim in an overwhelming, popular onslaught perpetrated by the
mythmakers. That is, philosophy is on the defensive, and, in fact, when Socrates
introduces the “old quarrel” he claims it as a defense (apologia) for the harsh critique he
levies against poetry in the figuring of the ideal city. In short, Socrates admits to
retaliation for older and deeper wounds inflicted by poetry on philosophy. While it is a
reversal of the original context of the quote, it is no wonder that Socrates’ statement
about the “quarrel” is almost universally adopted as evidence of philosophy’s antipathy
toward poetry, as though it were philosophy that had struck the first blow. But perhaps
this is just the mythos that philosophy tells about itself. As with any feud, it is difficult to
determine the source of the first act of violence, for loyalty often trumps truth. Similarly,
images and the story that philosophy has to tell about them appear to be inextricable.
1

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926), 21.
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We remember that there is a quarrel, but we often forget that just as Socrates
declares its existence, he softens his position. He offers a truce: if poetry’s defenders can
offer a rational defense of its benefit to the city of logos, it would secure a place within
that city. Plato, the reformed poet, may in fact be that defender, reflecting throughout the
dialogues upon the role of mimesis in the philosopher’s city. His accounts take place
within and through so many images one can scarcely tell who is the better poet, Homer or
Plato. Nevertheless, by engaging images, Plato ensures that images are put in their place.
That is, by recognizing that their power lies in deception and variance from the truth,
Plato limits that very power. In Plato’s hands, imaging is not only made to answer to
philosophy, it is rendered a tool for its own subordination. So, even if the origin of the
feud cannot be determined, namely, whether imaging came before philosophy or
philosophy before imaging, we are called upon to determine the philosophical import of
imaging to Plato’s thinking.
Let us recall that early in the Republic, the deception of the poets is said to consist
in the appearance of literality. The poet, like the actor on stage, gives his voice to the
characters depicted such that, when successful, they are capable of fooling us into
believing that they are real, rendering us like children who believe everything we see as
true. This is the magic of theater, is it not? Indeed, if we do not have this experience, we
are not satisfied with the show. The excellence of the poet consists in the sleight of hand
of making real what is not. But is this conjuring art not also shared by Plato? His lyrical
virtuosity is evident in all his works, from the soul that sprouts feathers in the Phaedrus
to the fleet-footed arguments that, like Daedalus’ statues, are liable to run away in the
Meno, to the aviary of memories in the Theaetetus, to Socrates, the stinging fly on the
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rump of a drowsy Athens in his Apology. And these are not to mention the many
allegories and myths employed throughout the dialogues, like the myth of Er, which, in
the Republic, tells of the hero returned from death to tell of the course of humans’ fates in
the underworld, the myth of reincarnation, told in the Meno, the myth of a divine
demiurge in the Timaeus, the myth of the reversed earth in the Statesman, and the myth
of souls’ migrations in the Phaedo. Plato’s imagination seems never to have been
tethered by the strict cautions suggested by the Republic. For all the dangers of the
misleading nature of images, Plato is sanguine about his own use of them. And this can
only be because there is in fact a place for poetry within philosophy, a place that is
ordered according to the ends of philosophy, of the reflection suggested by the Delphic
oracle’s dictum, gnōthi seauton, know yourself.
Plato aims to give an account of imaging because it threatens the value of the
truth to which philosophy aspires. By making explicit what remains implicit in the
image, philosophy can take the sting out of the image, finally displaying its truth as an
image and as subordinate to that which it images. With such an account, images are
made to appear as images, as “third from the truth,” as fanciful and illusory. However, to
give an account of an image is to provide an image of it, and this is why Plato appears to
violate his own intentions. But that apparent failure is evidence of perhaps the most
Platonic of aporiai: that it is only through images that images might be rendered
intelligible.
Poetry cannot merely be banished, for it is too dear to us, too much a part of what
we take for granted at every moment. We are unable to live constantly within the light of
logos alone; we are ever drawn by the allure of images. And Plato too cannot do without
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images. He must, therefore, purify them, producing the true image, the image that does
not lie, the image that reveals itself as an image. The only image that reveals its own
nature is the account of the image, for it alone addresses its own activity as an image in
its imaging. The philosopher’s apologia of imaging must therefore be a reflection upon
imaging. For this reason, Plato requires an account of imaging that is suited to
reflectivity. That unique form, which reflects the nature of imaging within its own
expression, is analogy.
Analogy is the image of imaging because of its peculiar form as a relation of
relations. Every analogy consists of four terms: one pair standing in a relation to each
other that is the same as the relation between another pair. While this appears to be just a
more complicated kind of image, it is in fact a sort of abstraction of the more direct
relation that any other expression of likeness offers. “Clouds are like the waves of the
sky” is an image that relates clouds to waves, but to think that image, to understand its
meaning, one must engage the analogy that underlies it: that the sky is an analogue of the
ocean. This is because the relationality that is implicit within an image is made explicit
in an analogy, and this is the reason why Plato must have recourse to this particular form
of imaging. He seeks to provide the apologia, the defense of poetry through logos, but
that would require making the act and fact of imaging explicit, and analogy provides the
structure that allows for such reflection.

4

II

This work argues two related points. First, Plato’s dialogues are not merely
decorated with images, tropes, myths, and metaphors, his thinking at all times seeks to
articulate the truth of images, that is, their reflective activity, which is itself a reflection
upon all philosophical inquiry. Second, being a reflection upon this activity of imaging,
Plato’s thought necessarily takes on a character that is demonstrably analogical in
structure. To show this, I offer a reading of Plato’s analogies in their capacity to act upon
the subject under discussion, infusing Plato’s thinking itself with an analogical form. The
task, then, is not to catalogue the manifold appearances of analogies but to expose and
trace the form of thinking that underlies all uses of imaging in the dialogues. This
argument has the advantage of relying not upon an assumption about the purpose of any
individual analogy but instead on an analysis of the fundamental structure implied in the
making and use of any analogy or image.
To show that this is the case, I look to four key sites within the dialogues where
Plato offers a reflection upon the philosophical issue of imaging: the relation of the
visible and intelligible in the Republic, the soul’s relation to logos in the Phaedo, the
relation of being to becoming in the Timaeus, and the relation between the use of a
method and reflection upon that use in the Statesman. In each case, I argue that where
Plato offers an image in order to articulate a mimetic relationship, the ensuing
explanation of that image reveals a thinking of the problem of imaging that is itself
analogical. As I have noted, because analogy is a relation of relations, it is the only
structure by which a reflection upon imaging might be articulated and necessarily shows
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itself in Plato’s thinking—not only in the use of analogies but, more importantly, in the
analogical structure of Plato’s thought.

III

I begin my analysis with a review of the nature of analogy, its implication in
Plato’s dialogues and its relation to imaging as the form of its abstraction. In my first
chapter, I set out to develop a clear account of the form of analogy, both rhetorically and
philosophically. First, I disambiguate the various rhetorical forms from analogy, arguing
that every other form of imaging can be understood only by reference to an analogy
implicit to the image. From this, I move on to argue that the mimetic work of analogy as
a relation of relations serves as a guide to the structure of abstraction and that this
anticipates the way that analogy figures philosophically in the thinking of the dialogues.
Finally, I argue that analogy is implicated in the philosophical account of mediation
because it is a figure that maintains a reference both to similarity and difference,
subordinating neither.
While each of my analyses of Plato’s texts provides its own demonstration of the
pervasiveness of analogy in Plato’s encounter with imaging, the Republic offers an
opportunity to witness the way that analogy is incorporated into Plato’s thought through
the uniquely analogical image of the divided line. I begin, then, with the Republic, a
dialogue that offers an extensive view of Plato’s response to the role of images. In its
arguments for an unequivocal ground of being (the good), the Republic takes refuge in
images, and, in each attempt to justify and explain an image, the thinking expressed in the
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dialogue takes on an analogical structure. That is, when Socrates’ images are explained,
they demonstrate the image’s original reliance upon an analogical relation. I argue that
this occurs because when giving an account of a similarity one must in effect articulate an
analogy that holds between the relations expressed in the image and those of the likeness’
referent. Since Platonic metaphysics is mimetic, i.e., based on the relationship of image
to original that holds between a form and the participant of that form, 2 the account or
explanation (logos) of this relation will necessarily involve an analogical framework
because analogy is a relation of relations. My analysis of the Republic, therefore, reveals
that Plato’s metaphysics is necessarily portrayed through analogy. In particular, in an
analysis of the sun and the good analogy and its explanation through the divide line, it
will become clear that Plato’s thought appropriates the formal qualities of analogy into
the conceptual framework of his metaphysics.
I then turn to the Phaedo, for it is there that Plato introduces two key discussions:
the hypothesis of the forms and the “second sailing.” Whereas the Republic merely
asserts the hypothesis of the forms, Socrates in the Phaedo offers two different
perspectives, both trying to articulate the logos of the relation between the forms and
their instances. In addition, Socrates offers his account of the need for a “second sailing,”
the philosophical path that proceeds through logoi, images of the sensible world. Using
the analogy of the safe apprehension of an eclipse, Socrates claims that because logoi are
images of the sensible world, they do not threaten to blind our souls. Since the sensible
world is an image of the intelligible world, however, logoi themselves are images of

2

Some of Aristotle’s sharpest critique is leveled against Plato’s employment of the metaphorical language
of a “participation (metechein)” of things in “model forms (paradeigmata)”—he calls these explanations
“empty speaking” and “poetic metaphors” (Metaphysics, Vol. I, W. D. Ross, ed. [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1924], 991a21-22, my translation).
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images. As a result, we conclude that an account of the cause of things’ being must
proceed by a relation of relation, that is, analogy. Identifying this method of logoi with
hypothetical method, I then reflect back upon Socrates’ investigation of the metaphysical
hypothesis of the Republic, concluding that Socrates’ performance of an account (logos)
of hypothesis is demonstrably analogical. My analysis of the Phaedo thus demonstrates
the work of an implicit concept and method of analogy.
Having deferred the question of the origin of the distinction between the sensible
and the intelligible in the Phaedo, Socrates “owes” a discussion of this cause. Nothing
less than a cosmology is required. The Timaeus appears to be an attempt to repay that
debt. 3 However, it is not Socrates who provides the account; Timaeus instead speaks of
cosmogenesis as the epilogue to Socrates’ own recitation of the dialogue of the Republic.
The Timaeus is an uncommonly explicit account of generation, something Socrates
(given his profession of ignorance and his account in the Phaedo of his incapacity with
regard to such speculations) could have never provided.
Although its accounts are direct, the Timaeus is nevertheless complicated by
having three distinct accounts of the origin of the kosmos, the singular whole of being and
becoming, ordered by intellect in accordance with the good. At the heart of the Timaeus’
cosmology appears an account of the principle that negotiates the mediation of being
(eternal forms) and becoming (sensible instances). This principle must be formless and
insensible, yet it is the ground for and possibility of both form and sensibility. This
enigmatic third kind is named in many ways and given many likenesses, but in the end it
is called chōra, the limitless vessel that contributes nothing but the meeting place for the

3

None of these “exchanges” are explicit in the dialogues and are clearly a literary device of Plato’s to
create some consistency among the dialogues’ themes.
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interaction of being and becoming. This holding cell for generation is dependent upon an
appeal to feminized images and is capable of conceptualizing the non-conceptual only by
relying upon this subaltern feminine. This sub-concept, chōra, operates is by way, again,
of an analogical relation between being and becoming, and it therefore stands as an image
of analogy that underlies and gives form to the Platonic thinking of analogy.
Analogy describes a relation between two sets of relations, and this is what makes
it integral to any account of similarity, since explaining similarity requires the unearthing
of the implicit relation between two sets of relations. That is, analogy has the same
formal structure as giving an account of the similarity between, for example, the good
and its image, the sun. This is why each subsequent image marshaled as an explanation
of the relation between the philosophical subject and its didactic representation takes on
the quality of an analogy. That is, analogy is the structure through which Plato’s thought
relates to what it thinks. And, since methodology is the account of how thought relates to
its being thought, it seems the best site to test the validity of this argument within Plato’s
thought. Indeed, we will find that the question of method recurs at each point where the
structure of analogy has insinuated itself into the content of the thinking expressed
through it.
While methodology is lurking seemingly everywhere in the dialogues, the
Statesman offers the most elaborated and explicit account of methodology there. When
the main speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, embarks upon an explanation of the role of
paradeigma in philosophical exposition and inquiry, he does so by offering his own
example in order to clarify the very idea of example. This paradeigmatic reflection on
paradigm is meant to provide an explanation of the use of images to clarify philosophical
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thought, and, given what has been said before, we should rightly expect it to have an
analogical form. Accordingly, the example that the Stranger goes on to choose in order
to highlight the statesman’s tropos, or manner of ruling, is the art of weaving. With this,
we see an image of the integration of similarity and difference essential to the form of
analogy. In a sense, the demiurge of the Timaeus becomes the statesman/philosopher, a
weaver of similarity and difference, but, rather than being a weaver of physical natures,
he is a weaver of souls. The same talent and method that allows the philosopher to think
dialectically is what allows the statesman to direct and guide the polis towards its most
fruitful ends, but all of these tropoi are reliant upon methods that are formally analogical
and share an origin in dianoia. We may conclude on the basis of the entire analysis, then,
that although its aim is for the non-relational ground of all relation, Plato’s thought
remains suffused by relational structures at the same time as it effects an account of this
very form and its philosophical implementation.
My examination stands as testimony to the philosophical significance of analogy
to Plato’s thought as well as the ensuing philosophical history of that concept and
method. This work, then, is to be taken as a contribution in three ways. It provides, first,
a systematic reading of the nature and bases of Plato’s thought, second, a philosophical
pre-history of the concept and method of analogy, and, third, a study in the role of figures
of mediation in philosophy. With regard to mediation in particular, my study of the role
of analogy in philosophical methodology reveals an important conclusion about
philosophy’s limits, especially with regard to accounting for the means of self-reflection.
Though philosophy aims for completion, an account of everything, it cannot accomplish
this through its “safer,” purified means alone. The dark world of the imagination is a
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necessary supplement, like a mirror’s backing—invisible to us so as to make us visible to
ourselves.

11

Chapter One

Perspectives on Analogy in Plato’s Dialogues
Analogy and imagery, on the other hand, are
much used but very little discussed.4
Richard Robinson

1 – Platonic Analogy

In addressing the subject of Plato’s use of analogy, we must note first of all that
Plato, the disillusioned poet, had at his disposal a host of literary devices. His dialogues
are valued in a diverse history of commentary on account of their accessibility and
beauty. The Republic alone is a wonder of tropes, myths, allusion, and imagery. All the
dialogues (though some more and some less) 5 have this literary and rhetorical panache,
and Plato is clearly a writer with an impressive arsenal of persuasive, didactic, and
affective tools. Analogy appears to be just one among many in that toolbox. How, then,
could analogy—more than myth, more than metaphor, more than allegory, or even
example—take on a peculiarly philosophical role? Isn’t analogy simply one among
many didactic and illustrative methods for illuminating an unfamiliar idea by means of

4

Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 209.

5

Richard Robinson has noted that Plato’s “middle” dialogues are the most richly imagistic: “What the
middle dialogues really rely upon, in order to persuade us and apparently also in order to intuit the truth, is
analogy and imagery” (Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 204-205).
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other, more familiar ones? 6 In order to address this challenge, we need to determine both
what analogy is as well as how it relates to Plato’s other rhetorical tools.

1.1 – The Form of Analogy
To begin, we ought to establish a working definition of analogy and of the
rhetorical forms related to it. First, it will be noticed that the purpose to which an
analogy, simile, or metaphor is put must be distinguished from its definition, in so far as
each may be used in many different contexts and discourses. The definition, therefore,
can only be tied to the expressive form each takes. Simile will be taken to refer to any
kind of explicit statement of a relation of similarity between two things. Metaphor will
be taken to refer to an implicit statement of similarity that holds between two things by
way of a copula between them. Finally, analogy will be taken to refer to an either
explicit or implied assertion of similarity between two sets of relations.
In addition to its capacity to express things both implicitly and explicitly, analogy
will have the basic form A:B :: C:D. A few things follow from this. First, although an

6

This is a common claim made about the function of analogy: Harald Höffding states that “Analogy can in
fact transport to a new understanding” (Le Concept d’Analogie, French trans. of the German original by
René Perrin [Paris: J. Vrin, 1931], 10, my translation from the French); G.E.R. Lloyd (borrowing from
Victor Goldschmidt’s Le Paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne [Paris : J. Vrin, 2005]) claims that
paradigms “provide a means whereby we can extend our knowledge from simpler to more complex
subjects” (Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1966], 400, hereafter, Polarity); and Paul Grenet argues, “For, knowledge of
the unknown on the basis of the already known, this is exactly what analogy allows in the first sense of
Lalande’s Vocabulaire [“primitive and proper sense: identity of relation that unites two by two the terms of
two or more couples…”], and the reasoning founded on it…poetic metaphors, scientific theories,
philosophical systematizations, theological illustrations, depend upon a similitude to familiar relations that
two terms present in human experience, and similar relations that present two other terms that, on their
own, escape us” (Les Origines de l’Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon [Paris : Éditions
Contemporaines, Boivin & Cie, 1948] 9-10, my translations, hereafter, Les Origines); and Colin Strang
argues that the analogy of vision and light in Book VI of the Republic is particularly didactic: “The
function of Plato’s analogy is explanatory: to explain the nature of the less familiar intellect and its objects
in terms of the more familiar vision and its objects” (“Plato’s Analogy of the Cave” in Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, vol. IV, Michael Woods, ed. [London: Oxford University Press, 1986] 22).
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analogy contains four term positions, it need not contain four distinct terms. 7 For
example, e.e. cummings writes the following analogy about love: “as yes is to if, love is
to yes.” 8 This is an example of continuous analogy, 9 which, like a sort of rhetorical
syllogism, repeats a “middle” term in each of the two relata, or analogates. 10 In this case,
one term (“yes”) has been repeated, which, by intensifying the links in the analogy, also
artfully reflects the point of the analogy itself: love is a kind of affirmation as far beyond
assent as certainty is beyond possibility. While this repetition changes the effect of the
analogy, it does not change its structure as an analogy. Indeed, we can see the relation
between metaphor and analogy quite clearly in that the former example can be
reformulated as a metaphor: Love is if’s yes. However, this formulation not only loses
the art of the original analogy, it also seems to lose sight of some of the relations.
Nevertheless, the two seem in some sense convertible and differ most specifically with
regard to the form of their expression and not with regard to what is being said by them.
We need now to consider the salient differences between analogy and its fellow rhetorical

7

In the Nicomachean Ethics, during his discussion of equity, Aristotle asserts this general principle: “That
the proportionality of distinct terms is in four things is obvious, but even a continuous proportion
(analogia) is in four things, since it uses one term as two and names it twice, as in ‘as A is to B, so is B to
C.’ The B, then, is mentioned twice, so that, if B is set down twice, there will be four things in proportion”
(Joe Sachs, trans. [Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002] 1131a33-b2).

8

e.e. cummings, “nothing false and possible is love” in i: six nonlectures (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1953) ln. 4.

9

See Tony Preus’ article on the subject of Plato and Aristotle’s use of continuous analogy (“The
Continuous Analogy: The Uses of Continuous Proportions in Plato and Aristotle” Agora 1 (Spring 1970):
21-42. This is in fact Aristotle’s “favorite” kind of analogy, most likely because of its similarity to the
logical structure of syllogism: “Of the four kinds of metaphor the most taking is the proportional kind. Thus
Pericles, for instance, said that the vanishing from their country of the young men who had fallen in the war
was ‘as if the spring were taken out of the year’” (The Rhetoric, in The Rhetoric and Poetics of Arisotle, W.
Rhys Roberts, trans. [New York: Modern Library, 1954] III.x.7, 1411a1-3). We will return to this
connection below.

10

To clarify, I use the term “analogue” to refer to any single term related by an analogy, whereas I use the
term “analogate” to refer to either of the sets of relations that are being compared in an analogy.
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forms as well as the relation it has to them. These will become evident by looking not
only at the differences in their structure but also at the conceptual relations each involves.
Within the sphere of rhetorical uses of analogy, it is already clear that analogy is
something different from metaphor and simile. First of all, metaphor and simile rely
exclusively on a logic of similarity: two things are considered only with respect to their
likeness or equivalence. In the metaphor “Queen Athena—shield of our city” or the
simile “Out he ran like a lightening bolt,” or even the epithet, “Rose-fingered Dawn,” we
are called upon to ignore the differences between the things compared so that we may
properly grasp the similarities that bind them. 11 Indeed, if one were to consider the
difference between a goddess and a defensive tool, the metaphor would be absurd and
would no longer perform the function of a metaphor. In simile or metaphor, as with
comparison, likeness and image, a resemblance is highlighted. This resemblance is
uncomplicated. I mean this in a technical sense: the relation of resemblance directly
relates two things that are otherwise taken as different from each other without the
complication of additional terms. This similarity is directly posited as a quality, attribute,
or form common to both. For example, the lightning bolt simile asserts that celerity, for
instance, belongs both to the lightning bolt and to the warrior. Thus, it is a hallmark of
direct relations of resemblance that there be three terms: the two elements being related
and what relates them as similar in respect of a concept or quality.
Although there are many rhetorical forms that trade on the relation of
resemblance, they all maintain this basic schema of direct relation. Within a
philosophical framework, this kind of relation is the foundation of the ontological relation

11

Iliad 6.360, 13.286, and a common Homeric trope (e.g., 1.569). Robert Fagles, trans. (New York: Viking
Press, 1990).
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of the many and the one; while there are many individual members of a given class, they
are all participants in that class in virtue of a relation of similarity—this similarity is the
one class to which they are related. For example, the numbers three and five, while
denominating differently, are nevertheless directly related as similar by their shared
quality as “odd.” 12 In fact, this similarity is the basis for a formulation of the idea “odd”
as the similarity five and three have, namely, that when they are divided in two, there is
an indivisible remainder. So too, in an ontological register, the similarity noted between
two different species of tree resides in their common form as trees, and this common
form marks the definition of their commonality.
Whereas metaphor and simile perform simple and direct relations, analogy is
complicated. Again, I mean this in a technical sense. There is an indirect relation
performed through analogy that complicates the relation and requires additional elements.
For example, in contrast to rhetorical equivocations that mediate differences through a
purported likeness, analogies mediate likeness through difference by emphasizing the
similarity of two sets of relations while preserving the differences among the
analogates. 13 For example, in the analogy of the city and the soul that begins in Book II
of the Republic, the resemblance posited between the city and soul relies not on some
single property common to both, but upon the similarity between the relation of parts
within each, which is named the justice of each. Thus, the way the artisan class is related
12

This is Socrates’ example in the Phaedo, when discussing the difference between a number (“three” or
“five”), its quality (“odd”) and the form, “one,” which is the cause of both numbers’ being odd (103e105b). We will discuss this again near the end of Chapter Three.

13

In Dialogue sur l’analogie, M. Cazals provides a similar definition of analogy: “What makes analogy
original and what distinguishes it from a partial identity, which is the somewhat banal notion of
resemblance, is that in place of there being a relation of resemblance, it is a resemblance of relation.”
(Bruno de Solages, ed. Dialogue sur L’Analogie [Paris : Aubier, Editions de Montaigne, 1946], 15, my
translation).
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to the guardian class is the same as the way the desiring part of the soul is related to its
calculating part. Analogy is thus defined as a relation of relations, wherein the
comparison does not rely on an exclusion of the differences among the terms. Rather, it
relies upon the strict preservation of those differences so that the relations remain
relational.
Given my analysis here, I substantially follow Paul Grenet, who identifies the
following three characteristics of philosophical analogy:
Besides resemblance mixed with dissemblance, which is already
recognized in popular and vague analogy, it [philosophical analogy]
requires in addition the pertinence of these two terms to two orders of
reality that are heterogeneous, or at the least to two schemas that are not
reducible to intelligibility; finally, it must consist not only in a simple
relation of resemblance, but in a resemblance of relations, which is to say
that it is not a brute similitude of qualities or of things, but a relational or
proportional similitude. 14
While I agree that difference is mixed with similarity and that the relations that
are compared in an analogy must themselves be heterogeneous, there is no
necessity that these be ontologically different orders. To presume this is to
impose upon Plato a metaphysics that is to be established on the basis of just such
analogies. In a sense, Grenet will have been correct, but to define analogy with
reference to the metaphysics that is established by it seems at the very least
anachronistic or proleptic. 15 The most significant part of this definition by far,
however, is the claim that the uniqueness of the form of analogy resides in its
portrayal of a resemblance of relations. Instead of ontological heterogeneity, it is
14

Les Origines, 11, my translation. While Grenet argues that these features constitute a “rigorous analogy
for being,” I do not share such Thomist intimations.

15

This curious quality of analogy’s implication in its own definition will return when we look to Jacques
Derrida’s reading of Plato’s images of the good in the Republic.
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this feature that best locates analogy within the sphere of philosophical thought.
Because analogy is able to represent the resemblance of relations, it functions as
an image of abstraction: the abstraction from particular instances toward a
universal, for example. Now, while this will (in the end) also entail the
metaphysical distinction between particulars and the ideas of which these are
instances, to establish this in advance is to anticipate the effect of analogy rather
than to witness its work. The purpose, then, of my study, is to appreciate the way
analogy is capable of performing this work, which does, in the end, produce an
ontology of heterogeneous being. Let us here begin to adumbrate the peculiarity
of analogy by reference to some of those authors who have attempted to make
sense of analogy both in Plato’s work and in general.
In addition to those who completed the prodigious work of cataloguing a
staggering number of images, examples, comparisons, metaphors, and analogies
in Plato’s work (George Olaf Berg 16 and Pierre Louis 17), more recent
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“Metaphor and Comparison in the Dialogues of Plato” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1903).
Berg, along with many others, seems compelled to rely on the definition of metaphor that Aristotle
provides, but we might note that this, of course, is in a way anachronistic insofar as the definitions of
Aristotle and the rhetoricians that follow Plato are themselves beholden in a certain way to Plato’s own use
of the figures. We too shall make reference to Aristotle’s definition, in particular his use of ana logon in
identifying “proportional” metaphor, but only so as to point out the way that analogy is already implicated
in all other comparative figures. It should be noted too that in his preface Berg acknowledges the work of
D. G. Sihler, whose dissertation “A Study of Metaphor and Comparison in Plato” (Johns Hopkins
University, 1882) was an earlier attempt at a quite similar project.
17

Les Métaphores de Platon (Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1945). Louis states the need
for and the difficulty in establishing a distinct definition of metaphor before he begins: “One may regret
that Plato did not give us a definition of this figure in the Cratylus” (4, my translation). Louis satisfies
himself with combining the definitions of two other philosophers. He paraphrases Hedwig Konrad, from
his Étude sur la Métaphore, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958), saying that he defines this figure as a
“transposition of terms that abstracts from certain differences, applies certain resemblances and responds to
certain intentions” (ibid., my translation). He then cites as an additional claim the definition given by
William Bedell Stanford in Greek Metaphor: Studies in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1936):
“The essence of affective metaphor is a clear and definite understanding of the two constituent ideas
incorporated in the metaphorical term, together with an appreciation of the new concept integrated from
those constituent ideas” (ibid., n. 17). The notion of “transposition,” borrowed from Diès’ Autour de
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commentators have focused on evaluating the argumentative role of analogy
(most prominently, G. E. R. Lloyd, Richard Robinson, Margaret MacDonald, 18
and David Burrell 19). Opposing analogy to deductive argument and dialectic,
these authors nevertheless are required to make some claims about the peculiar
status of analogy as a persuasive and even intuitive tool. Robinson states,
“Analogy seems to be essentially an argument from a single case to a single
case.” 20 Many others make even stronger claims about analogy as an illuminating
and creative force. 21 But all these claims about the action of analogy presume
that the identification and distinction between analogies and other rhetorical forms
is self-evident. Such imprecision is the focus of Colin Strang’s concern: “Some
of the interpretative confusion and disagreement [about the interpretation of, as he
insists, the analogy of the cave] comes from a failure on our part, and now and
again on Plato’s, to keep distinct two ways of likening one thing to
another…They are, briefly: (i) analogical likeness, where x stands for y (xLay) and

Platon (2nd ed. [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1972]) and exploited heavily in Grenet’s treatment of analogy in
Plato’s works is critiqued by Yvon Lafrance for its latent Thomism and occultism: “For P. Grenet and,
thus, L. Paquet have the tendancy if not to identify, then at least to assimilate analogy and transposition.
Thus, unconsciously or not, they interpret Plato in light of Thomas Aquinas” (“L’Usage de l’analogie dans
l’interprétation de Platon,” Dialogue 15 [April 1976]: 282, my translation).
18

“The Philosopher’s Use of Analogy,” in Logic and Language, ed. Antony Flew (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Co., 1965). Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1937/38.

19

Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).

20

Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 207.

21

David Burrell argues that the literary quality of Plato’s work is specially suited to negotiating the peculiar
paradoxical and intuitive thinking that facilitates a dialogue’s capacity to “exhibit its own inadequacy”
(Analogy and Philosophical Language, 47); Harald Höffding states that “Analogy can in fact promote a
new understanding” (Le Concept D’Analogie, translated from German to French by René Perrin [Paris: J.
Vrin, 1931], 10).
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(2) copy/original likeness, or imitation, where x and y are compared (xLcy).” 22
Interestingly enough, Strang’s division of likenesses only goes to point out all the
more the difficulty we have in distinguishing analogy from, in particular,
metaphor. What Strang here outlines as analogy cannot formally be distinguished
from metaphor (except that, in practice, a metaphor will contain no reference to
“y,” but that’s not what is needed, since the distinction of rhetorical formulae is
already quite clear).
We are not entirely without resources to respond to this problem. The
problem of the similarity of likenesses—that is, that so many of the same things
are variously called by the name analogy, image, likeness, metaphor, and simile—
is itself the beginning of an answer. 23 As I see it, the reason why these rhetorical
forms are all so interchangeable when we begin to discuss Plato’s philosophy is
that it matters much less in what way they are expressed (the rhetorical form,
which would be easily determinable) than it does what they are saying. In order
to understand the dialogues’ meaning, we are always forced to perform an
interpretive analysis regarding the sense of any similitude used in the dialogues.
This analysis, I argue, must proceed by way of analogy in the sense that it must
think through the analogy that subtends whatever likeness is being made in order
to grasp the philosophical import. To support my claim, I will now briefly outline
some of the findings of those who attempt to provide a clear definition of analogy.

22

“Plato’s Analogy of the Cave,” 21.

23

I owe a debt to Simone de Beauvoir for this method and articulation of problem resolution. When she
asks the question, “What is a woman?” she immediately responds, “To state the question is, to me to
suggest, at once, a preliminary answer.” Introduction to The Second Sex, H. M. Parshley, trans. (New York:
Vintage Books, 1989), xxi.
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I will then argue that the particular case of metaphor exemplifies the way that the
logic of analogy implicitly subtends all imaging.

2 – Analogy as the Sense of Metaphor

The difficulty of how to identify the salient feature of Plato’s illustrative thinking
is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the commentaries that bear upon this
discussion have as their focus such distinct concepts as analogy, metaphor, image,
comparison, paradigm, and intermediary. It is reasonable to assume, however, that all
these treatments intersect with analogy either because an equivalent analogy is either
contained within them implicitly or can be generated on the basis of what is given in the
original expression. In his critique of what he calls the “comparison view of metaphor,”
Max Black attacks this assumption. 24 Briefly, his account of this view is that it claims
metaphors can be translated into literal terms that expressly articulate what is implicitly
contained within the metaphor’s expression. Thus, the elegant metaphor, “Richard is a
lion,” is rendered by the comparison view as the explicit statement, “Richard is like a lion
because he has in human affairs the same kind of courage, strength, and authority, etc.
that a lion has in animal affairs.” 25 Thus, Black states, “this is a view of metaphor as a
condensed or elliptical simile.” 26
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Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), 35. (Hereafter, Models.) This might
be more strictly identified as a critique of the view of metaphor as metonymy. The “symbolist” view of
analogy is also critiqued of Grenet by one of his reviewers, James F. Anderson in his review of Les
Origines de l’Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon: “Analogy in Plato,” in Review of
Metaphysics IV, No. 1 (September 1950): 111-128.
25

But, by my view, the underlying analogy to any rendering is something along these lines: Richard is to
the British Empire what the lion is to the Sahara.
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In this, Black follows Aristotle, in so far as the privileging that Aristotle accords
metaphor rests principally on the economy of its expression—metaphors are concise and
dense at the same time:
For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the
addition of a word, wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it
does not say that this is that, so that the mind does not even examine this.
Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid
information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes,
meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those
which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those
which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the
meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter
a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the
other. 27
Aristotle is right to note that the metaphor requires more inspection (much like those
phenomena that “summon” (parakaleō) the intellect, which Socrates describes in Book
VII of the Republic), 28 and that this chance for “education” is what makes the metaphor
more pleasant. After all, a simile tells you precisely what the relationship is between the
two terms, whereas metaphor makes you do the work of identifying that relationship
yourself. Given this, though, where does analogy fit in? Analogy is like metaphor in one
way and like simile in another. It makes some things explicit (it identifies a similarity)

26

Models, 35.

27

Rhetoric, 1410b (The “Art” of Rhetoric, John Henry Freese, trans. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1926]). The translation of prosthēsis as “addition of a word,” is a bit reaching, but does seem to be
suggested by the text. The addition of “hōs,” for example, would turn every metaphor into a simile (eikōn).

28

See 523b-524d. Indeed, the example of the three fingers (middle finger, ring finger and pinkie) does not
perplex perception regarding what these given things are—namely, fingers—but about the relations among
those fingers in terms of their qualities: “The soul of the many is not compelled to ask the intellect what a
finger is. For the sight at no point indicates to the soul that the finger is at the same time the opposite of a
finger” (523d). Instead it is the relative status of the ring finger, which is simultaneously perceived as large
(in comparison to the pinkie) and small (in comparison to the middle finger). That this “call to thought”
occurs through relation is not a surprise given my thesis about the relation of analogy to abstraction. (See
below.)
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but it also demands that the hearer/reader investigate the underlying relation that subtends
that similarity. Analogy, therefore, makes explicit what was implicit in metaphor, but it
does this in such a way that the very action of metaphor (the production of a relation of
similarity) is itself the implicit ground of the analogy. That is, the way a metaphor, as
well as a simile, operates (its structure or logic) is represented by the form all analogies
take, which, as we have noted, is to relate two sets of relations. Black’s complaint that
what makes the metaphor a metaphor is lost by the literal “translation” of it seems not to
apply so long as the analogy (not yet a literal expression) that interpolates the metaphor
does not damage the meaning “carried” by it.
Analogy, then, has a kind of privileged position with respect to Plato’s inductive,
didactic, and illustrative toolbox; for it can represent explicitly in its own formulation
both the relation of similarity and of difference that is contained within the thought that is
required to make sense of any of the other rhetorical forms. Analogy demonstrates in its
very structure the thinking that is implied by the use of images. If an image has no useful
application (what Black would call the semantic “frame” of metaphor), 29 neither would it
have a correlative analogy. That is to say, in order for an image to produce thoughtful
effects, it must exist within a context that may be incorporated into an explanatory
analogy.

2.1 – Analogy as a Logic: The Structure of Abstraction
In a sense, this is what Aristotle is saying when he argues that metaphor is the
best of the rhetorical forms. He seems to be saying that it is enthymematic: it implies the
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Models, 28.
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missing middle term of the syllogism. For when we say that Richard is a lion, we are
eliding the middle terms “brave” or “strong” or “authoritative.” Indeed, this may be the
most “pleasant” thing about it. 30 It educates us by bringing a universal and a particular
together that had not otherwise been linked for us, and it can bring a number of universals
together as all related to that particular—in this case, by way of the species “lion.”
“Lion,” then, becomes the figure of the middle term, even though the middle term of the
enthymeme is the series of universals, “brave,” “strong,” “mighty,” etc., because lion is
the means for getting at the middle term, which is then linked to the individual. Because
an enthymeme is missing one or more premises or its conclusion, its sense is often
determined by the suppression of a major or minor term (here, minor). Of course, we can
construct many metaphors, all of which might have different corresponding
enthymematic syllogistic forms. The important thing to notice, however, is that
metaphors, similes, images, and other likenesses, can all be expressed as syllogisms (A is
like B, and B is like C; so, A is like C), differing only in the extent to which they
implicitly state each part of the relation. 31 An analogy, on the other hand, appears more
like the expression of the sense of the syllogism, the making explicit of what remained
implicit to, though indicated by, the relation of similarity.
Consider it this way. How do we get from A to B to C? The logic of the middle
term is itself articulated through the syllogism as having an analogical relation, a
repetitive one, but an analogical relation nonetheless. The middle term, B, relates to A
30

Rhetoric, 1410b.

31

Philibert Secretan agrees that this form is related to the development of the syllogism in Aristotle: “One
sees in addition that by presenting a conjunctive and unifying ‘middle term,’ the Platonic structure of
analogy prefigures Aristotle’s syllogism…” (L’Analogie [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984],
20, my translation).

24

the same way it relates to C; this is why it can be “overlooked” in the statement of the
conclusion, which relates A directly to C. Let’s take the simile (and joke), “Opinions are
like noses.” The sense of this (the relation of resemblance that holds between the two
terms) is contained in the punchline of the joke: “Everybody’s got one.” Now, whether
this is true (or funny) or not matters little. 32 The fact is that there is a middle term that
mediates between the two, a concept that contains the other two in regard to their
likenesses to each other. The analogy that operates here would be found in the syllogistic
rendering of the simile: everybody has noses; everybody has an opinion; opinions are like
noses (everybody’s got one). 33 I have suppressed the punchline because that is a
repetition of the function of the middle term. Even though one of the terms is repeated
(“everyone has one”), there are four positions for terms in the expression of the
syllogism. This is precisely the form of analogy: four terms in a relation of similarity.
The important difference, however, between analogy and simile (and any of the other
rhetorical forms whose sense can be rendered as a syllogism) is that it has the opportunity
to relate four distinct terms all at the same time. And in so doing, it provides a relation of
relations, determining that there is a similarity not merely between distinct terms but also
a similarity between all of their relations. The oak can be said to be like the acorn’s
mother and the acorn like the oak’s child, but whether this is articulated as a metaphor, a
simile, an image or even a myth, the structure of the thought expressed will always be
subtended by an analogy that relates the terms’ relations to each other.

32

Indeed, to determine whether it is true or funny, one must first understand what is being said, and this
requires thinking through the analogy that underlies it.
33

It is important to note that this does not represent a categorical syllogism, and thus, does not follow
Aristotelian logic. However, the sense still stands, and had Aristotle had need to conceive predicate logic,
he would have been able to represent relations of resemblance within the syllogistic.

25

What is important about this feature of analogy is that it achieves a level of
abstraction from the content of the expression in so far as its formal structure displays the
relations as related. Although explicit analogies are not needed in order perceive the
sense of an image, simile, or metaphor, they nevertheless do represent the structure of the
thought that moves among relations of likeness and similarity. This is why Lambros
Couloubaritsis claims that the work of metaphor is the work of abstraction: “The
metaphor of father-son is for Plato nothing but a human way of expressing a complex and
irreducible reality in an analysis that’s exclusively rational.” 34
This kind of interpretation of analogy can lead to the temptation to claim that
analogy is a fundamental form of all thought. I should like to avoid making such a strong
claim, though many others have done so. 35 Instead, I would like to employ this insight
about the form of analogy to analyze the peculiarly philosophical role analogy is able to
play in Plato’s work. Because it mediates between content (the terms of the analogy) and
relation, analogy is well suited to provide a structure for understanding the relation
between Plato’s philosophical positions and the particular forms through which these
ideas come to light.

34

“Le Caractère mythique de l’analogie du bien dans Republique VI,” Diotima 12 (1984): 79, my
translation.
35

Bruno de Solages, for example, claims that “analogy appears like a universal fact that one finds across all
the stages of the real and also between those stages: the real is analogical” (Dialogue sur L’Analogie, 166,
my translation). So too, Grenet concludes his work with the assertion that analogy is a “law of being” as
well as of knowing and acting (Les Origines, 230 ff). Harald Höffding asserts that analogy underpins all the
relative categories: “…it [analogy] is at the base of the reduction of qualitative relations, a reduction that
has a place…in the exact evolution of the concepts of number, time, degree and place. This series is
constituted by intermediaries between the series of absolute identity and the series of qualitatively different
objects and one grasps them as the latter by analogical abstraction (Le Concept D’Analogie, 9, my
translation). Though these positions are defended primarily by Thomists of the early 20th century, this type
of claim resurfaced in a surprisingly structuralist tone in Metaphors We Live by, by George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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3 – The Path to Analogical Philosophy

If it is the case, as I have argued above, that there is an analogical structure that
subtends any use of imagery, this only seems to multiply rather than limit the instances in
Plato’s work that may be worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, the aim of this work is
not to prove that Plato’s thinking is analogical by amassing evidence of the omnipresence
of images in the Platonic dialogues. Instead, I shall show that since the structure of
analogy is required in order to think images, it is also required of any theoretical
framework that would be brought to bear upon the question or problem of imaging, the
relation between the things of becoming and being itself.
As a result of the multiplication of relevant sites for demonstrating this
hypothesis, it is necessary to develop a principle for identifying those images that most
closely interact with the thinking of the dialogues. We must ask, “What are the tropes
that are most embedded in Platonic philosophy?” There are many, but surely none more
canonical than Plato’s use of the metaphorical pair of light and dark to signify the sources
of knowledge and ignorance. On its face, we can already see the analogy: light is to
darkness what knowledge is to ignorance. And this instinct is borne out when we
recognize that to say that light is the source of knowledge includes a relation to the
opposed relational pair of darkness and ignorance. To understand one relation is already,
implicitly, to understand the other. 36 Going, then, to the source of this metaphor, we are
led to the analogy between the sun and the good. We begin, then, with an analysis of the
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This is perhaps the promise that allows Socrates to fend off the nagging doubt of something like Meno’s
paradox. Even if we are submerged in darkness, that very relation between darkness and ignorance calls out
to its partner analogue of light and knowledge.
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Republic—the context of its entanglement in the relation of being to becoming and the
series of images that attend the friends’ discussion of the good. This “metaphysics of
light” 37 is never articulated as a theory; it is seemingly dreamt up by Socrates and
remains always in a hypothetical register.
It is impossible to separate any one strain of philosophical discourse from any
others in Plato’s dialogues—the Republic is as much a source for political theory as it is
for poetics, moral psychology, and metaphysics. That is, all of the dialogues share in
some sense in both theoretical speculations as well as methodological reflections—some
more and some less explicitly. We will do well to remember, then, that it is always a
matter of emphasis rather than exclusivity by which the subjects of the dialogues are to
be identified. The results of this very study, in fact, allow for a consideration of the
necessary inextricability of theory from methodology and the role of analogy in the
attempt to relate these two.

37

This reference may seem somewhat anachronistic, given the fact that this term is applied to later
Platonists rather than to Plato himself, but in so far as the term is not of Platonist origin in the first place,
the anachronism is only being extended so as to account for its origins.
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Chapter Two
The Limits of Imaging and the Antidote of Analogy
White Mythology—metaphysics has erased
within itself the fabulous scene that has
produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains
active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an
invisible design covered over in the
palimpsest. 38
Jacques Derrida

In his conversation with Meno, Socrates proposes a principle for the distinction
between knowledge and right opinion. He uses as a comparison the myth of Daedalus’
statues, known to be so life-like as to abscond if they are not bound. Just as those statues,
like runaway slaves, are of no use unless they are tied down, so too is right opinion made
useful only when it is held fast with the bond (desmō) of the reasoning behind why it is
right (aitias logismō) (97d-e). 39 This is just one among a host of images that Plato uses to
convey his thought. That this comparison and others like it could be useful for thinking
already assumes that there is a meaningful relation between sensible examples and the
ideas they are taken to resemble. But in addition to performing a didactic function,
analogy comes to shape both the expression as well as the subject of what is taken to be
the Platonic doctrine. And because of this relation between the theoretical subject of
thought and its formulation, I argue that while Plato’s metaphysics does not explicitly
include a theory of analogy, his thought is nevertheless formally analogical.
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“White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 213.
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My translation based on the Greek manuscript as established in: Platonis Opera, Vol. 3, John Burnet, ed.
(Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts, 1903).
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I take as a focal point the sixth and seventh books of the Republic because
analogies and images are introduced there in order to provide an account for the very
relation that grounds analogy: the relation between the intelligible and the visible. Using
the evidence of the Republic’s analogy of the sun and the good and its elaboration in the
image of the divided line, I show that the relation between the intelligible and the visible,
which is already the basis of analogical thinking, demonstrates a dependence upon
analogical form. Thus, if it can be shown that there is a conceptual framework for
understanding the relation of the intelligible and the visible that not only depends on
analogy but is itself analogical, it may be affirmed that an abstraction of analogy operates
in Plato’s work even if it remains untheorized. While this conclusion supports the more
general philosophical aim of using Plato’s works to address the relation between the form
of expression and what is thought in it, it also provides a model for identifying the
operation of a logic of analogy at work in other discourses of abstraction. That is, if it
can be shown that the metaphysical thought of the dialogues necessarily resolves itself
into an analogical form, similar analyses of Platonic cosmology and methodology will be
able to show the thoroughgoing conceptual work of analogy in Plato’s thought. In
addition, it will become clear that to distinguish Plato’s use of analogy from the
analogical nature of his thinking is to misunderstand the significance of this very method
for Plato’s thought.
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1 – The Fate of Imaging in Republic VI

As philosophical readers of the complicated images of books VI and VII of
Plato’s Republic, we find ourselves in a strange condition. With each subsequent
discussion, just as with each subsequent transition of the cave’s prisoner toward the lights
above, we find ourselves driven to return to earlier parts of the dialogue, perhaps not so
much in fear, but surely to recover our eyes, to reevaluate, reinterpret, and sometimes
revise our understanding of what has come before in light of later explanations and
implications. Although this experience is especially potent in the central books of the
Republic, this dynamic drives the whole of the dialogue and, perhaps, the dialogue form
itself. 40
Let us attempt to see this recursive feature of the Republic in still sharper contrast
by employing it in order to address an apparent paradox there. The paradox is this: given
the thoroughgoing critique of imaging that takes place in the Republic, is it not troubling
that in order to describe the metaphysical truth that grounds imaging, Socrates is himself
driven to use images in order to address the good? Moreover, these images themselves
offer a characterization of the good as that which has no relation to images. Instead, the
good acts as the basis for all relations and the standard of every comparison—yet we can
only learn this by means of images! The original image of the good as the sun piques our
curiosity, but once we see that the entire metaphysical account depends on images, it is
40

John Sallis argues that the cyclical nature of the text (and, thus, also the reading) of the Republic is
reflected in the persistent trope of Socrates’ Odyssean journey, from the initial katabasis of Book I to the
cave allegory of Book VII and the myth of Er in Book X (Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic
Dialogues, 3rd ed. [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996], 313-320), hereafter Being and
Logos. Similarly, Eva Brann argues that the structure of the Republic is like that of an onion, with a central
heart and two concentric outer layers (The Music of the Republic [Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2004],
117).
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hard not to take the dominance of nous and the forms over the shadow-world of images
as anything more than a sort of puzzle, an artfully constructed aporia. Let us not forget,
however, that aporia is a beginning, not an end. My aim now is to understand why this
paradox is necessary, why the very thing that threatens to destabilize Platonic
metaphysics—its antithesis, in fact—is implicated at a formal level in its very exposition.
Because of the paradox I have just described, we are compelled to revisit each
image in light of what succeeds it, but if we simply do this, we become unable to answer
several important problems that the sun as the image of the good evokes. Let us first
articulate the questions and then consider how these are transformed according to the
path of the discussion of the good. First, what is the status of the image of the sun for the
account of the good? What does it mean that Socrates claims that the opinions he holds
about the good cannot be attained but that, presumably, the image of the sun can? 41 How
does this square with the poverty of images claimed at other points (both earlier and later)
in the Republic? Second, how precisely is the sun an image for the good, which will also
include the complication that the sun is said to appear to be the child (tokos) of the good?
Such well-traversed ground must seem nearly uselessly rutted by now, but these rather
simple questions deserve more detailed consideration. In fact, clarifying these questions
themselves will produce a clearer view of just what is at stake in subsequent articulations
of the good and the role of analogy in them. It will be imperative in our study, then, to
address these questions, in a sense, before they have answers provided by the subsequent
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“But, you blessed, men, let’s leave aside for the time being what the good itself is—for it looks to me as
though it’s out of the range of our present thrust to attain the opinions I now hold about it. But I’m willing
to tell what looks like a child of the good and most similar to it” (The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed., Allan
Bloom, trans. [New York: Basic Books, 1990], 506d8-e4). Unless otherwise noted, as here, all reference to
the text of the Republic are my translation in consultation with Bloom’s and the Oxford Classical Texts
edition of the Greek manuscript (Vol. IV, John Burnet, ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902]).
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images. This is because our aim is to understand the meaning of the relation between
these images themselves and not merely the relation between these images and what they
represent.
In starting out, however, we are halted immediately. The desire to answer these
questions suggests a familiar difficulty: to provide answers to the questions I have
articulated above seems almost impossible without recourse to the refiguring of the sun
and the good in the image of the divided line and the cave allegory. To understand how
the sun is the image of the good requires its unfolding in the divided line, but the line is
the very figure that founds the relations of images to their originals. Thus, an appeal to it
as a way to understand the image of the sun still begs the question of how an image
functions in the first place. Given this, we must ask whether it will be somehow possible
to pause before the anachronism of the line and the determinations of a metaphysical
hierarchy in order to adumbrate the very questions those later views are supposed to
answer. That is, can the problem of imaging be resolved—not in the sense of answered
but in the sense of clarified—by examining the genesis of its appearance as a crisis? If
so, this would require excavating the origins of our misgivings about the introduction of
the sun as an image and discovering why, despite this experience, its presentation seems
entirely unproblematic. If we do this, at the very least we shall acquire some clarity
about the apparent paradox of imaging in the Republic and perhaps even these questions
themselves will come to have different significance, pointing us toward a richer
understanding of the philosophical fate of imaging, and in particular of the imaging of the
good. Following this, we may then return to the images of Books VI and VII to analyze
the work of analogy in Plato’s metaphysics.
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1.1 – The Two Statues and the Critique of Imaging
With Thrasymachus’ strident rebuke looming, 42 Glaucon expresses his concern at
the beginning of Book Two of the Republic that to this point Socrates might only “seem
(dokein) to have persuaded us,” whereas he ought to attempt truly (alēthōs) to persuade
them (357a4-b2). 43 Glaucon has here already introduced the distinction between what
merely seems to be and that which truly is in his demand for a philosophical account
(rather than a charm for the Thrasymachus snake) 44 of justice and injustice. Laying out
the tasks for the account of the just and unjust man, Glaucon requires that in their
rendering the just man receive none of the benefits of appearing to be just, citing
Aeschylus as a witness to the fact that neither appearing just nor appearance as such
ought to pertain to the just man: “…put the just man next to him [the unjust], an
uncomplicated and well-born man, who, according to Aeschylus, wishes not to seem but
to be good. The seeming must be taken away. For if he seems to be just, there would be
honors and gifts for him for seeming to be that way” (361b5-c1). Both Glaucon’s
concern for the effect of the argument as well as the content of the argument presumes
the distinction and valuation of being over appearance. Clearly, this is not a suggestion
Socrates didactically introduces into the dialogue but a common belief any of his
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“‘And how,’ he [Thrasymachus] said, ‘shall I persuade you? If you’re not persuaded by what I’ve just
now said, what more shall I do for you? Shall I take the argument and give your soul a forced feeding?’”
(345b2-4, Bloom).
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On the status of persuasion for Socrates’ interlocutors, Eric Sanday remarks, “The challenge for Socrates
is not to find a stronger argument but to persuade Thrasymachus to be persuadable and to remind Glaucon
that he has already been persuaded” (“Philosophy As the Practice of Musical Inheritance: Book II of
Plato’s Republic,” Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 11, No. 2 [March 1, 2007]: 309).
44

“For, sooner than he should have been, Thrasymachus seems, like a snake, to have been charmed by you;
yet to my mind the proof (apodeixis) about neither of them has yet been made” (358b2-4).
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interlocutors would both accept and anticipate as part of the terms of their discussion.
Indeed, it is Socrates who notices the appeal this distinction has for Glaucon when, in his
one-line response, he compares the quality of Glaucon to a statue polisher: “My, my, dear
Glaucon, how vigorously (errōmenōs) you polish, like a statue, each of the two men for
judgment” (361d4-6). Socrates’ remark draws attention to the highly reflective quality of
Glaucon’s depictions of each man: not just the precision and detail of their description
but Glaucon’s own attention to the reflective quality of each, the way that each (and
Glaucon, too, as their “polisher”) must in some way be implicated in the distinction
between appearing and being, which is presumed by his lengthy description. In addition,
one may note that his logos has a reflective quality—the idea of clarity (and, thereby,
proximity to truth and being) is already one based on reflectivity.
At the same moment that the distinction between appearing and being is
employed, it is also already implicated in the manner in which it is put to work. In
Glacon’s own articulation, the account takes on a concern for appearances. Just as it
would be inadequate to assert that the use of the distinction between appearance and
being is merely performed by Glaucon, neither is it merely the object of the discussion.
The distinction somehow hovers over both the subject of the discussion as well as its
articulation without showing itself. Indeed, it has been assumed by both. This is
evidenced by the fact that both the just and the unjust man must themselves be concerned
with the distinction between their appearance and their being. On the one hand, in order
not to appear to grant the just man any favors of the benefits of a reputation for justice,
the polisher must in fact work to produce the luster of injustice. The statue of the unjust
man, on the other hand, seems to take care of itself. As Glaucon says, it is crucial to the
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unjust man that he himself pursue the appearance of justice, so that he may achieve
perfect injustice: “Aeschylus’ saying is far more correctly said about the unjust person.
For, really, they will say that the unjust person, because he pursues a thing dependent
(echomenon) on truth and does not live according to opinion, wants not to seem unjust
but to be so” (362a3-7). From this perspective, at least, the truth of justice lies in the
distinction between seeming and being, and, ironically, this difference is the greatest
concern of the unjust person as well as that on which his injustice depends. In order to be
unjust, the unjust man must seem just, and to seem just he must know that on which this
seeming relies. That is, he must be familiar with the doxa, or common opinion, of
justice. Thus, the difference between the just and the unjust hangs on appearance and
being, on a likeness as well as that likeness’s difference from truth.
The brothers agree that what is at stake is a true account of the being of the just
and the unjust and that, in order themselves to appear not to be producing a counterfeit or
merely seemingly true account, 45 they must employ the false appearances attaching each
to its opposite—that is, the reputation of the unjust to the just man and the reputation of
the just to the unjust man. We may conclude, then, that for the sake of the truth the
distinction between being and appearing must be addressed, and at the same time it must
also be part of how the truth is preserved, implicating the true account in its appearance
as true.
Continuing his narration of the conversation, Socrates recalls, “And so, Glaucon
and the others in every way asked for help and to not give up on the argument, instead to
determine what each is and the truth about the advantage of each. So I said whatever
45

Socrates has a similar concern when he later presents his image of the good, the “child” of the good, but
warns that they must be careful lest he provide an account of the interest/child (tokos) that is
fraudulent/bastard (kibdēlon) (507a2-5).
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seemed (edoxen) so to me” (368c3-5). Beginning, then, from his opinion, Socrates
introduces a new method of approach. Since the justice of the just man is in some way
obscure and hard to make out, Socrates suggests that they look to a larger version of
something. As an illustration, Socrates likens their situation to the following:
If someone had, for example, ordered men who don’t see very sharply to
read little letters from afar and then someone had the thought that the same
letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place, I suppose
it would look like a godsend to be able to consider the littler ones after
having read these first, if, of course, they do happen to be the same.46
(368d2-7, Bloom)
Here, Socrates has likened not only their condition and difficulty but also his own
methodological suggestion to another, fictional situation in which they must look off first
to the larger in order to better recognize the smaller upon reconsideration. In addition, he
has troubled the value of the analogy by noting that the larger and the smaller might not
actually be the same, even though they may look alike. Is the relation between big justice
(justice in the city) and little justice (justice in the soul) the same as that between a big
alpha and a little alpha? This will remain a haunting question for the rest of the dialogue
and will return when this analogy to letters resurfaces. 47
The trouble with justice, then, is that, in the case of the just person, it looks like
injustice, and what seems like justice is really the clever guise of the unjust person who
knows how to appear like the just. But if the problem concerns the distinction between
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This passage reminds us of the conversation of the Sophist, too, where the truth is best seen when “close
up” (engythen). See 234b8-10 and 236a2-3. This theme is echoed again in the Theaetetus: “It is like coming
close to a scene-painting (skiagraphēmatos). While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something
in it” (208e8-11, Fowler).
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Indeed, this analogy comes back again in a different form in the Statesman dialogue when the Stranger
tries to articulate how examples work and must resort to another example in order to explain it. In that case,
however, proximity is no longer the feature that determines recognition of the truth. Instead, the
comparison of relations, regardless of differences of size, place, or medium, becomes the key to
recognition. Another analogy to letters occurs in the Theaetetus at 202e-205c and in the Sophist at 253a.
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appearing and being, then how can a discussion founded on an analogy, one that may be
inappropriate, ever hope to resolve the issue? And what is worse, this is “only” Socrates’
opinion. His argument was insufficient somehow to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ desires,
so he has been forced to provide a demonstration, and for this reason, to begin from
opinion. This was the demand all along, as the brothers have wanted Socrates to address
the opinion that the many have of justice—viz., that true justice brings no benefit, that it
is just a chore, that it is the will of the weak in their weakness, etc.
This nest of difficulties surrounding appearing and being would seem to be the
basis of any claim that the critique of imaging pervading the text of the Republic fails in
its having assumed the distinction as well as the value of one of the terms in advance of
establishing the ground of the hierarchy of being over appearance. 48 The interlocutors’
accounts of the poets’ lies, banned from the city in speech for the ugliness and
inadequacy of their portraits (377e1-3) and the discussion of the difference between
knowledge and opinion as like to that between waking and sleeping (476c2-d8), both
seem to presuppose the distinction between appearing and being, established from the
start, and both seem to assert a valuation of being over appearing before we achieve the
metaphysical account that justifies all these claims. Furthermore, each of these employs
an analogy (painters and their paintings in the first case 49 and dreamers and their dreams
in the second) in order to clarify the case against imaging. This would not seem to be
such a problem if it were not also the case that the metaphysical account, which grounds

48

G. E. R. Lloyd notes this apparent inconsistency: “In practice, Plato often seems to ignore the
recommendations and warnings which appear in many of the passages in which he discusses the use of
images and likenesses” (Polarity, 401).
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Again in the Republic, at 484c5-d3, Socrates provides a similar analogy to painters, elucidating the
guardian-lawmaker’s work, and, at 488a6-7, he likens himself to a painter of mixed images.
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the inferiority of images, did not seem to require an image in order to be expressed. The
account that would finally lay the ground for Glaucon and Adeimantus’ distrust of
seeming and appearance is told through an image, one that was not only presupposed by
all that came before but also informs and reforms the earlier dialogue in retrospect. What
remains to be considered, then, is how the image of the sun, and what follows as its
elaboration, functions at the same time as both an image and the ground of the critique of
imaging.
With this initial scene of the two statues, then, the problem of the
misidentification of similars, of the counterfeit image, and of the original distinction
between appearance and being are all given a place to be seen on the basis of an analogy.
Here we have the ground of the paradox of imaging described above. In order to address
the distinction between appearance and being, one must in some sense already assume it,
and, to this extent at least, it will come to inform any discussion of it. In what follows,
we will investigate the source of this paradox.

1.2 – The Sun Image
In choosing the account of the good that begins in Book VI as a site for
considering the paradox of imaging, we must note yet another difficulty for our endeavor.
Though we are right to identify it (retrospectively) as such, the sun is never called by the
name of image, or copy, or likeness. As he did when presenting his method of
comparison in Book II, Socrates simply states things as they appear to him: “I am willing
to say what appears to be an offspring of the good and most like it” (506e3-4). Rather
than the subjects of the relations coming into view first, instead the relations themselves
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(namely, of similarity and of parent to child) are first, and this is only reasonable. If
Socrates were to say that the sun is most like the good and appears to be its offspring, his
students would stare, stupefied by an image made useless by its prematurity. Socrates
must introduce the bases of the relation long before he articulates the analogy that “as the
good is in the intelligible region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so
also this [the sun] is in the visible with respect to vision and what is visible” (508b13-c2).
Here I would like to spend some time with the questions and difficulties posed by the
discussion as it takes place, for if we answer the questions too soon and in light of
subsequent explanations we may be incapable of recognizing how those explanations
come to be explanatory, how they are drawn from what is already present in the
discussion, rather than brought from the outside, a claim which would indeed doom the
argument to having assumed the conclusion as a premise. The questions I shall address
are these: a) What is the context of the discussion of the good? b) Why is an image
necessary for an articulation of the good? c) What becomes of the image of the good?

1.2.1 – What is the Context of the Discussion of the Good?
In Book IV, Socrates explains the soul’s four virtues and their relation to the parts
of the city, but he says this is in some way inadequate for finding justice, though it is
appropriate to the form of the discussion at the time: “But know well, Glaucon, that, in
my opinion, we will never grasp it precisely from the methods (methodōs) that we are
now using in our discourse—for there is another longer and greater road leading to it”
(435c9-d5). This passage will be recalled in Book VI, when Socrates says, “In order to
catch sight of those finest things another longer road around (periodos) would be
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needed,” noting that those earlier arguments lacked “precision” (504b1-2, b5). Thus, the
image of the good in Book VI is that “longer way” of accounting for the source of the
virtues but also, recalling the subject of Book II, a longer way of accounting for the
particular virtue that was the original subject of the discussion, justice. These passages
all, in a certain regard, refer back to Socrates’ trepidation in Book II regarding the
method of looking to the larger to better see the smaller. But what is this method, whose
shortcomings Socrates promises the longer account will overcome? When he first
introduces concern about the insufficiency of this method, Socrates has thus far only
discussed the relation of the parts of the soul and their virtues to the city’s divisions and
their virtues. It seems that the method refers to the city-soul analogy proposed in Book
II, immediately after Socrates’ example of getting to know smaller letters by looking at
larger ones first. Socrates hesitates about the exemplarity of the city as a model for the
soul—and he is right. The exemplarity appears to end up running in the opposite
direction: rather than the justice of a city being used as a model for getting to know the
justice of a soul, the soul’s proper education in justice has everything to do with the
justice of the city. This internal tension is perhaps to be expected. After all, Socrates’
justification of the use of this analogy of the city is justified by appeal to another analogy
(the relation between large and small letters). 50
It is not yet clear why the “longer way” will occur by means of an image,
especially given that Socrates has already inserted some concern about a method founded
on an analogy, which may be subject to inaccuracy. On the other hand, the direct
approach is not possible either; this is why Socrates resists Adeimantus and Glaucon’s
50

Again, the recursive features of this inadequate method seem remarkably similar to the “example of
examples” that the Stranger provides in the Statesman dialogue, and we turn to the significance of this kind
of account in the final chapter.
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question, “But which do you say is the good: knowledge, or pleasure, or something else
beside these?” (506b2-4). Socrates capitulates but not before explaining why he is so
reluctant:
But I fear I’ll not be up to it, and in my eagerness I’ll cut a graceless figure
and have to pay the penalty by suffering ridicule. But, you blessed men,
let’s leave aside for the time being what the good itself is—for it looks to
me as though it’s out of the range of our present thrust to attain the
opinions I now hold about it. (506d6-e5, Bloom)
He says he fears ridicule (gelōta), but what is so ridiculous about speaking of the good
directly? 51 It does seem, in keeping with his profession of ignorance, that Socrates would
mock himself as well as his faithful followers in attendance if he were only just now, at
the point when he perhaps stands the most to gain from telling what he does know of the
good, to prove his ignorance false. It would in turn seem even more ridiculous if, having
known all along, Socrates would have stalled with a remarkably long conversation before
telling the truth of the good. If it had been possible to tell what the good is, why would
there have been so much discussion over its effects and what leads us to consider it? If
knowing it were as easy as Socrates telling us from the beginning, something which
Glaucon and Adeimantus did ask him to do at the beginning of Book II, why would he
have waited at all? The only conclusion left to us (and this perhaps on the basis of what
we learn of the good after its images—namely, that it is beyond being) is that the good
cannot be explained or considered directly. 52
Indeed, it is ridiculous to think that the idea of the good could be grasped with any
finite representation, since it is the most universal of things, and each representation is
51

Notably, two additional permutations of this term appear in the discussion that leads up to this section:
“ou geloion” at 504d8 and “mala…geloiōs” at 505b11.
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Socrates’ “second sailing” (deuteros plous) described in the Phaedo refers to this incapacity to directly
address the good. The third chapter analyzes this claim in some detail.
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necessarily particular. 53 It has already been established that the good is the idea that
accounts for every virtue, themselves ideas. The good is at an extra remove even from
our attempt to address the idea of justice in order to evaluate the many instances of justice
by means of the idea of justice. 54 We, like Socrates, must find an alternate route, a
deuteros plous for the good. 55

1.2.2 – Why is an Image Necessary for an Articulation of the Good?
We may already have some hint of an answer to the question of the necessity of
an image in our discussion about the context of the conversation about the good. Recall
that, in order to avoid the possible pitfalls of the analogy of the city and soul, the longer
road must be taken, and we may assume that this path will necessarily provide an account
of the problem of imaging. But how can articulating the problem of imaging get us
closer to understanding the basis of justice? What, again, is the relation between justice
and the distinction between being and appearing? To understand this, we must look back
to the early part of Book VI, when Socrates introduces the ship analogy in order to
explain his view of the predicament of the philosopher.
As usual, Socrates claims that he cannot speak directly to the demand that a
defense be provided for their proposal that philosophers rule, given philosophers’
reputation as useless: “‘You are asking a question,’ I said, ‘that needs to be articulated
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Somehow, we have returned to the Parmenidean doctrine but in reverse: now being, rather than nonbeing, is unspeakable.
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This withdrawal of the good stands in an inverse relation to the poverty of the being of the image. As it is
described in Book X, the painting of the couch is at a third remove from the idea and the true being of it
(602c1-2).
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This is precisely the meaning behind the title of Seth Benardete’s book on the Republic, Socrates’ Second
Sailing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
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through a spoken likeness (eikonos legomenēs)’” (487e4-5). 56 While the use of images is
unproblematic for much of the Republic, Adeimantus here draws attention to and even
pokes fun at Socrates’ habit of using images: “‘And you especially,’ he said, ‘I assume
aren’t used to speaking through images’” (487e6-7). Socrates retorts that the reason he is
in such a difficult position is that the brothers have forced him (at the beginning of Book
II) to tell his opinions about the good of justice, since his initial argument against
Thrasymachus was not enough for them. But Socrates adds something more in his
response. He claims that by means of the image he presents he will have given not only
an apology for the philosopher but one that explains the reason that he is “so stuck on
images” (488a1). 57
With this, the analogy of the ship of state is taken to account for the philosopher’s
implication in the problem of appearance and being. The true philosopher, like the true
pilot, gazes off at what is above, acquainting himself with the truth that makes proper
guidance possible. But he appears to the many to be useless, merely a star-gazer and not
the true pilot. Like the just man polished by Glaucon, the true pilot is condemned to bear
the burden of false appearance, while the false pilot knows how to appear as true. This
analogy thus acts as a defense of the claim that the kallipolis must have a true leader, one
who knows the truth of justice but also that of the condition in which the philosopher will
find himself in the city as it stands. In addition, Socrates shows why he too is stuck on
images: because the whole problem of justice and the philosopher turns on the problem of
56
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appearing and being. As a result, Socrates’ exposition and response to the problem also
hinge on this relation. Rather than claim that all imaging is false, Socrates will give all
imaging and seeming a double valence: there is good imaging and bad, a claim that is
assumed by another apparent paradox: the censorship of the poets and the assertion of the
noble lie. 58 Socrates too must somehow enter into the distinction rather than remain
outside of it. He must demonstrate the difference between good imaging and bad
imaging if there is ever to be hope of reclaiming appearance on behalf of truth. If he
were able to address the problem of false imaging without using true imaging, his
responses would seem somehow hollow and merely ideal. Instead he can only hope to
understand the basis of the difficulty if he begins within it.
With this, we have unseated the authority of the criticism that Socrates’ account
of the hierarchy of being over appearance is a performative contradiction. Instead, we
now have a greater understanding of why the work of distinguishing the image from its
original itself must be played out through imaging and why the performance of imaging
is in fact the heart of the demonstration of what imaging truly is.

1.2.3 – What Becomes of the Image of the Good?
When Socrates begins down the longer road, the sun is not yet named, nor is the
good imaged as such. Both will have been accomplished once his statements are
explained and interpreted. But all of this begins with an appearance: “I am willing to say
what appears to be the offspring of the good and most like it.” Whatever this offspring
will have been, it first of all appears. To this extent, it is already implicated in the

Compare 382aff and 414bff. Note also that this is similar to the distinction between eikastikē and
phantastikē outlined in the Sophist.
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problem of appearance and being, and this will indeed be the ground on which, in
retrospect, we rightfully name the sun the image of the good. Secondly, in appearing,
what appears to Socrates presents a two-fold aspect: on the one hand, it looks like an
offspring of the good, and, on the other hand, it is most like the good. The difficulty here
is to try to understand the relationship between these aspects as well as the ambiguity of
that relationship before they are set into the hierarchical order of causation as a
consequence of the explanation of the image, which takes the form of the divided line and
the cave allegory.
Once the divided line and cave allegory have explained to us that the similarity of
the sun to the good is inseparable from (and to be understood through) its ontological
dependence on the good, there is no room to naïvely question the status of imaging.
Imaging may only be interpreted by means of its metaphysically impoverished status.
There is no doubt that the meaning of the dependence of the sun on the good will have
been that of a thoroughgoing metaphysical dependence, wherein all that appears will
have been the image of invisible, intelligible being. Nevertheless, the value of
encountering the image before it is made the image of imaging in addition to the image of
the good is that we may glimpse imaging before it has been imaged, and before the
ambiguity of appearance has been dispelled as mere appearance. In short, the project set
out in Book II to understand the truth of appearing is only possible before it is completed.
That is, once the image of the good is fully articulated, there is no longer any question of
which things are true and which false. All images are false, and only the ideas are true.
As a result, there is no longer a distinction between true and false appearance: the truth of
appearance is falsity. Without the bi-valence of true and false appearing, however, the
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unjust man is as true an appearing as the just. This is the very real risk of the
metaphysical account: at the same time as it promises access to the truth, it conceals the
truth of falsity. What preserves and memorializes these ambiguities is the mediation that
analogy provides, relating the real ideal and its image offspring. In order to better
understand the significance of analogy in Plato’s metaphysical account, we must look
carefully at the transformation that the image of the sun undergoes as that image becomes
the image that accounts for the good as well as its own likeness to the good. Once the
image structure has been incorporated into the substance of the metaphysical account, we
will be able to see the important role analogy plays in Plato’s metaphysics.
Let us return to the image of the sun. Recall that Socrates has claimed that, while
he cannot speak directly about the good, he can speak about its offspring, the sun. There
is no question that the relation between the offspring of the good and the good itself is
one of ontological dependence: while the parental relation could mean much more, it
certainly cannot mean less. In addition, the relation of similarity between the sun and the
good suggests that there is more than a mere order of being at stake; what is produced by
the good also bears its likeness. Each of these (and the offspring of the good is no
exception) exemplifies the relation of appearance to being, just as the many beautiful
things, which preoccupy the lover of sights, are appearances of the form, to which the
lover of wisdom is entirely devoted. In a certain sense we have already encountered the
performance of the problem of imaging in that these many ways of appearing (as image,
instance, example, as child, and most similar) are each instances of the relation between
appearing and being, i.e., between form (eidos) and image. The offspring of the good,
playing the part of the image, performs the work of imaging and describes that same
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work. Thus it has inherited the difficulty of imaging already broached in Book II,
incorporating this into its articulation as an image.
Socrates’ introduction of the sun as the image of the good is problematic not
because it is an image but because of the parental relation that grounds their likeness—
viz., the sun’s appearing to be like the good is caused by its being the offspring of the
good. This does not seem at first glance to challenge the general framework of imaging
already well-established by the dialogue’s assumption of the deceptiveness of
appearances. However, since the similarity asserted about the sun is explained with
reference to another (more fundamental) relation of the sun to the good, as its offspring,
Socrates has here introduced a metaphysical account, one that uses ontological cause as
the explanation (logos) for phenomenal likeness. Thus, the most undetermined feature of
the sun as the image of the good is that the good is both what is imaged and what grounds
imaging as such. Occupying a position both within and external to the relation, the good
is an absent father and a receding creator. As we will see, when the meaning of this
image is elaborated as an analogy, the good no longer appears within the schema at all: it
necessarily recedes like the plane on which the divided line is sketched.
This problematic of how to interpret the image that gives rise to the possibility of
imaging shares much in common with that of the origin of written speech that is
addressed in the Phaedrus. In his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Jacques Derrida articulates
a problematic common to these two orphans—the written logos and the image (in this
case, that of the sun). Speaking of the origin of the written logos in its father, the spoken
logos, Derrida argues that the problem of self-reflection arises in the text of the
Phaedrus:
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In other words, it is precisely logos that enables us to perceive and
investigate something like paternity. If there were a simple metaphor in
the expression ‘father of logos,’ the first word, which seemed the more
familiar, would nevertheless receive more meaning from the second than it
would transmit to it. The first familiarity is always involved in a relation
of cohabitation with logos. Living-beings, father and son, are announced
to us and related to each other within the household of logos. 59
That this is a problem for the image as much as for logos is clear from the fact that
Derrida refers to the metaphoricity implied by the phrase “father of logos.” Just as the
sun is the “child” of the good and the good its father, this imaging already relies on that
which will have determined the possibility of that image. That there are fathers and sons
and suns as children of the good is already determined in advance of the image that
would attempt to establish that possibility. Indeed, Derrida’s comments on the Phaedrus
are inexorably driven to discuss the familial metaphors employed in the Republic. He
claims in very nearly the same place as the quote above that “The figure of the father, of
course, is also that of the good (agathon). Logos represents what it is indebted to: the
father who is also chief, capital, and good(s). Or rather, the chief, the capital, the
good(s). Patēr in Greek means all that at once” (ibid.). Again, representation is
announced here as the relation that determines this strange recursive feature of logos and,
I submit, imaging.
Let us look at these issues again, but now from a more structural viewpoint. In
this way we might see the way in which the image of the good is necessarily elaborated
as an analogy, and, furthermore, the way this analogy is explained by means of the
divided line, an analogical image. I would like to linger on the relation between the
content of the image, what is being said by it, and its form, the way it is expressed.
Socrates’ image is meant to portray the relation between the sun and the good as a way of
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helping to understand the good indirectly. The image is composed of two elements, or
terms: the sun and the good. But in order to say something about the good, the image
must also express the relation that holds between them, which is as a child to a parent, in
particular, a father. 60 Thus, the content of the image has two terms (sun and good), but
its expression in the form of the simile has three (Sun, Good, and the Filial Relation).
From this we can see that any further explanation of the relation between the sun and the
good will have to take relation itself as one of the terms to be imaged.
Despite the richness of this image, the familial likeness is not the relation Socrates
will spend time investigating. Nevertheless, with this image Socrates has introduced two
things that will accompany, at least as a background, the rest of his adumbration of the
good. First, the comparison he makes will be one concerned with relations, particularly
the relations between a cause or source and what it produces. Indeed, much of the further
elaborations of this comparison take the form of an investigation of the cause on the basis
of its effects. With regard to this first point, it is also worth mentioning that a comparison
of this kind, namely, one that concerns relations, already implies and depends upon an
analogy, for analogy is the relation of relations. 61 The second thing that will accompany
the rest of Socrates’ imaging of the good is that this underdeveloped familial relation will
go on to inform the hierarchical relationship between the visible and the intelligible,
providing ground for the claim that the good is the ontological principle par excellence.
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In the wake of this first image of the good, that there is a relation, one that is
similar to a paternal relation, between the principle of intelligibility and the principle of
visibility is not itself taken to be subject to debate or inquiry. This should be no surprise,
not because Socrates is speaking with his students, but because this very relation between
the intelligible and the visible is an assumption that must be made before any further
images might relate the sun and the good. Unless there is a meaningful relationship
between the visible and the intelligible, why should the sun’s role as a cause of visibility
become a model for the role of the good in intelligibility? Again, the interlocutors’
original context for the discussion of the good—that the idea of the good grounds
practical wisdom—returns as a tacit premise for the construction of all the images
Socrates uses to approach the idea of the good.
Rather than leave it a tacit assumption, however, Socrates reminds his students
about the hypothesis they must make in order to interpret an image, filial or otherwise.
First, he reintroduces the distinction between the intelligible ideas and their many visible
instances:
“We both say that there are,” I said, “and distinguish in speech, many
beautiful things, many good things, and so on for each kind of thing.”
“We say that, indeed.”
“And we also assert that there is beautiful itself, good itself, and so on for
all the things that we then set down as many. Now, again, we refer them
to one idea of each as though the idea were one; and we address each of
these as ‘what is’ (ho estin).” (507b2-7, Bloom)
Already anticipating the dual purpose of the divided line, Socrates asks his students to
agree not only about the two kinds of things there are but about the way that each kind of
thing is known to us—i.e., that ideas are intelligible and invisible (“tas d’au ideas
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noeistha men, horasthai d’ou”) and that their many instances are visible but unintelligible
(“ta men dē horasthai phamen, noeisthai d’ou”) (507b9-10).
That there is a difference and a relation between the principle of intelligibility and
the principle of visibility is not itself taken to be subject to debate or inquiry. It is in fact
the hypothesis that grounds all metaphysical speculation in the dialogues. But this is not
the reason that we should expect such an assumption. No, the relation between the
intelligible and the visible is necessary before any kind of image could be offered in place
of the good. For, without a pre-given relationship between the visible and the intelligible,
how could the sun’s role as a cause of visibility become a model for the role of the good
in intelligibility?
In addition to his hypothesis about the relation of forms to their instances,
Socrates asks his listeners to consider the special nature of vision, namely, that it requires
a medium. Whereas every act of sensation other than vision requires only that the
capacity to sense encounter a sensible thing (sound, taste, smell, texture), vision requires
the capacity to see, the visible thing, and the medium of light, which makes possible both
seeing and being seen. That is, I may have the capacity to see, but if there is no light I
cannot actually see anything visible before me. Likewise, even if there is something that
has color or shape and can be seen, unless there is also light, that shaped or colored thing
cannot be seen. The relation that holds between sight and what is visible is thus mediated
by a third term: light. With the addition of light as the “yoke” uniting sight and what is
seen, the structure of the phenomenon of vision becomes complicated by mediation, a
complication that will be held over in its comparison to the intelligible. 62 This special
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quality of vision is likewise carried over to the organ of vision, the eye, which by being
most “helioform” (helioeidestaton), or sunlike, is thereby more divine, an attribute that
will be carried over to its analogue, the soul (508b1).
Relying on the difference and relation asserted of the intelligible and the visible,
Socrates offers a new articulation of the analogy of the sun and the good: “as the good is
in the intelligible region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so also this
[the sun] is in the visible with respect to vision and what is visible” (508b12-c2). With
this, Socrates has shifted away from relating the sun to the good directly through the
father-child relationship toward relating them on the basis of relations each has with its
own area of influence, the very areas identified already by the supposition of the
difference between the ideas and their instances. Again, as with the first image, there
appears here a two-fold relation: the relation of similarity that holds between the sun and
the good is to be explained in terms of their causal relations with what each produces.
That is, the original causal relation that directly linked the sun and the good as child to
father has given way to a consideration of the similarity of the relations each term (sun
and good) individually has as a cause with respect to its medium. In order to account for
the mediation accomplished by the image (likeness), an image of mediation must be
incorporated into the account.
Let us, then, take some time to investigate this image of mediation by looking to
the relationship that the sun has to “vision and what is visible.” As Socrates noted at the
outset, light is the prerequisite for vision and the source of both the power of seeing and

Friedrich Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum, Vol. II (Bonn, Germany: R. Habelt, 1956). With the exception of those
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(63b6).
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being seen. The sun, then, is related to vision in so far as it is “responsible” (aitiasasthai)
for light (508a4). Socrates describes its causal nature, offering a rather poetic vision of
the overabundance of the sun’s wealth, which makes the powers of sight and of being
seen possible “as a sort of overflow from the sun’s treasury” (508b6-7). 63 Let us consider
the metaphor more closely. When Socrates describes the sun as the offspring of the good
(ekgonos) he also refers to it as the tokos of the good. This term means both child and
interest—it is not Plato who is inventing all the metaphors here after all. He is, however,
trading on them, and this is no metaphor. Why is the sun the interest on the good? This
assumes that the good is the capital of the investment and that whatever flows from it
comes from that resource, a resource that is not depleted in producing its “offspring.” If
we compare this to natural production we see that the farmer always borrows against the
future crop in order to make that crop possible. That is, the farmer buys seed on the
speculative interest (or surplus) that the future crop will yield. So, where is the
speculation within the economy of the good? It rests precisely in the fact that while the
image (sun) will have been the product of the good, the image must nevertheless come
first, as a speculation, before it is produced in fact. For the sun (and everything else, for
that matter) to be the offspring of the good, the sun must be hypothesized. Indeed, we
have already seen the hypothesis of the division between the intelligible and sensible;
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now we know why it is necessary. The reason that the image of the sun is an image of
mediation, then, has everything to do with this specular activity. Let us return now to
look more closely at that mediation. 64
Rather than maintain a direct causal relation between the terms to be related,
Socrates instead claims that the sun is the cause of the medium of vision. Light thus
mediates both the relation between sight and what is seen as well as the relation between
the visible world and the sun, its ultimate principle. So, just as there is a double relation
portrayed in the analogy (the similarity of the sun and the good and of their relation to
their objects), so too light is a medium that exposes the relation between the visible and
sight as well as the relation between the visible and the sun.
Because light mediates visibility itself, it points to the sun as the principle of
visibility. But as the medium between the visible world and the sun itself, light also
points to the necessity of the sun as a sustaining principle of life. As such, light exposes
the dependence of the visible world upon the sun not merely for its visibility but for its
very existence. Without the generative and sustaining properties of the light given by the
sun, there would be nothing to see, and no one to see it: “I think that the sun supplies the
things that are seen with the capacity for being seen, but also with becoming, growth and
nourishment, though it is not itself becoming” (509b2-4). Thus, the direct causal relation
between the sun and the visible world has not been overcome and has instead been
complicated by the sun’s production of the medium of visibility. In effect, the reference
to a medium is a way for the image both to take on the character of what it images (as
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causal) as well as to image the very need for the image of the sun, which is a mediated
view of the good as cause.
To recapitulate, the sun is the principle of the visible world in two ways: i) as the
source and cause of the visibility of the visible world, and ii) as the source and cause of
the continued existence of the visible world. In addition, we note that the sun, like vision
itself, does not exercise its causal power directly but through the medium of light, which
also performs a two-fold mediation: i) as what yokes the power of sight to what is visible,
and ii) as what links the existence of the visible world to the sun. If we are to understand
the analogy of the good with the sun, it will be necessary to understand a similar double
causality that the good has with the intelligible, as well as a double mediation performed
by a privileged product of the good.
Just as “sight” is the power to see something, “intellection” is the power to know
something. And since the power of sight can only be activated in the presence of light,
there must also be some key element without which the act of intellection is not
complete. Socrates explains to his students that even though the soul has the capacity to
understand things, this alone does not guarantee knowledge. That is, even though there
are many things that might be known, actual knowledge happens only when what is
intellected and what intellects are bound together by “truth and what is (to on)” (508d5).
What Socrates means by this is that even though we might think that something is real or
true, it is only when our thinking is “illuminated” or clarified by what is true and real that
we can be certain that we have knowledge (ibid.). Indeed, we can be sure that what we
know is in fact knowledge only if we know it to be both truthful and real. With this, we
can conclude the same thing about the good as we did about the sun: it is both the source
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and principle of intelligibility in so far as it produces the medium of intellection as well
as the principle of the being of the intelligible world.
Before moving forward, it is worth taking time to compare the construction of this
analogy to that of the first image of the sun as the offspring of the good. The first image
consists of two terms (sun and good), which are related as similar by reference to a third
(i.e., “child”). In the analogy of the sun and the good, the form of that relation becomes
part of the image on each side of the analogy, thereby doubling the original terms. Each
of the terms (both sun and good) becomes related to its subjects as fathers to their
children. In order for this to happen, however, there must be an additional relation not
explicit in the analogy as Socrates introduced it, but which is provided by the two
analogous media (light and truth). With the analogy, as it is stated, the relation the sun
has to the good is no longer direct (as child to parent) but indirect: the similarity the sun
has with the good has to do with the similarity of its relations with its own progeny. Thus
a two-term relation comes to be elaborated with reference to four terms: sun, visible,
good, intelligible, and with each elaboration the implicit relational structure must be
reintegrated into the explicit content of the subsequent explanatory image.

1.3 – Conclusions about the Problem of Imaging
In order to begin to understand the good, Socrates offered his students an image in
its likeness. As an explanation, the sun was portrayed as the analogue of the good, and
this introduced the idea that there is a medium for intellection just as there is a medium
for sight. The analogy of the good with the sun illustrates the mediated relationship that
the good has with what is known. On the face of it, the analogy elaborates the
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relationship of two terms, the good and intellection, by the addition of a third: the
medium of truth or being. At the same time, however, the analogy through which this
mediated relationship is exposed is itself composed of four terms: sun, visible, good, and
intelligible. The analogy proceeds on the basis of the mediation, but this mediation is not
itself one of the terms of the analogy. Thus, something implicit and necessary to the form
of the analogy remains unexpressed in the explicit content of the analogy, which is
nonetheless the basis of the analogy and must be a part of any explicit explanation of it.
What is unexpressed is the relation between visible light and the clarifying activity of
intellection.
The image of the divided line, which immediately follows Socrates’ discussion of
the sun-good analogy, is reckoned to be just such an explanation—an elaboration of the
relation that was only portrayed by the analogy of the sun and the good rather than
explicitly addressed by it. In the next section, I will discuss how the elaboration of an
analogy takes on and expresses the form of analogy through its explicit content. That is,
in so far as analogy requires four terms, the image of an analogy must also include four
terms. I take this “imaging” of analogy to constitute a process similar to the abstraction
required for a concept of analogy. Thus, although Plato does not consider or explicitly
employ the concept of analogy, I assert that just such an abstraction is already at work
(and producing effects) in his metaphysical thinking. We shall see that this is the case in
what follows.
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2 – The Divided Line, Image of Mediation

Many philosophers come to the text of the Republic having already learned the
“divided line” without the context of Book VI let alone the whole of the Republic. We
are taught that the line runs vertically and that it is divided into four sections, two
dividing the “visible realm” unequally and two the “intelligible realm” in a similar
proportion. The smallest section is at the bottom of the line, indicating the least
knowable things, like shadows and images and the affection of the soul that corresponds
to them, eikasia. The second lowest section is larger than the first and houses the visible
things of the world that are imaged by the section below, and we relate to those by the
soul’s affection of trust. The third section is the same size as the second, but it is still
higher because it indicates the lowest forms of intelligible being, numbers, figures,
hypotheses and anything that reproduces sensuous things in a way that they may be
thought through (dianoia). Finally, the highest and largest section of the line indicates
the realm of ideas, which are thought directly and continuously with nous. This is the
simplest story, almost always taught with an accompanying diagram of the vertical line,
sectioned proportionately as I have described.
There are a number of things about this typical education about the line that make
it hard for us to understand the significance of analogy in the divided line. First, there are
a few instructions left out in Socrates’ account of how to construct the line. The first
directions given to Glaucon for dividing the line require an unequal division, but we are
not told whether the intelligible occupies the greater part or the lesser. Most readers
unacquainted with “Platonism” at first assume that the visible occupies the greater part of
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the line. This is because the line itself is a quantitative measure, and, in terms of
quantities, visible things (and even more so their images) are a great deal more numerous
than our ideas or other abstractions of them. However, Socrates does tell us that the line
measures not quantity but quality, the relative clarity or obscurity of the things that affect
us. Again, on the face of it, visible things seem the most clear, whereas ideas are often
the most obscure of all. Here, the philosophy instructor must pause and crib from
Aristotle’s poignant analogy: “For as the eyes of bats are to the light of day, so is the
intellect of our soul to the objects which in their nature are most evident of all”
(Metaphysics 993b10-12). 65 Though ideas seem to be the furthest from us, they are
nevertheless intelligible, and thus most clear in themselves, even if not for us. After
reading the cave allegory, it becomes quite clear that the greater part of the line is
occupied with the intelligibles, but it is important, especially for Socrates’ claim that we
trust the things of the visible world, that this is not obvious at the outset. And this is
precisely why we do not know the true nature of phenomenal reality as dimmer than the
intelligibles upon which they depend.
Another difficulty we encounter is that Socrates does not tell us how the line is
oriented. That is, when we are taught that the line is vertical, we attribute a number of
things to the different portions of the line that are not necessarily specified by the line as
it is described in the Republic. The most important consequence of this is that the
equality of the central portions of the line, which is necessitated by the proportionality of
the two sides, is subtly overturned because the things of dianoia are “above” the things of
sense. As a result we are not led to ask any questions about dianoia’s proximity to trust
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and the tenuous line that distinguishes the intelligible and the visible. This problem is not
unrelated to the prior, where the assumption of the dominance and hierarchy of the
intelligible over the visible gets in the way of really grappling with the way that
dominance is rationalized by this very account. Let us begin, then, by analyzing only
those assumptions asserted by the text itself, so as to evaluate the standing of the divided
line as an account of the metaphysics of light, which is given by the good’s analogy to the
sun.

2.1 – Hypotheses and the Discursivity of the Divided Line
Unlike his conversation with the young slave of the Meno, Socrates does not
provide or draw the diagram for Glaucon; he gives Glaucon the instructions for how to
conceive of the line, building it slowly, piece by piece. Even before Glaucon is asked to
consider the image that will include what Socrates says has been left out of the analogy of
the sun and the good, he asks Glaucon, “Do you have these two forms (eidē), visible and
intelligible?” (509d4). That is, before the line is “drawn,” 66 its first division is already
made. In fact, Glaucon is not instructed to introduce the first division but to assume
(labōn) it (509d6). This assumption of the unequal division between the visible and the
intelligible acts as the hypothesis from which the rest of the subsequent dialectic
proceeds. But, importantly, this division also grounds the possibility of Socrates’ own
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method here. Were there not an assumption of the relation between the intelligible and
visible, images would have no capacity to “illuminate” the intelligible. Thus, the relation
to be established by these images must in some sense already be assumed by them in
advance. This is in fact what determines these approaches as hypothetical, mediated in
advance by the presumption of the likeness of the visible to the intelligible. Once we
come to know the divisions that make up the line, the line itself fits squarely within the
section attributed to dianoia, the lesser portion of the intelligible section. This is because
dianoia is the place of hypotheses and of the investigation of universals on the basis of
particular abstractions. It seems necessary that the attempt to account for the relation
between visibility and intelligibility could reside nowhere else since this is the place
where the two are most enmeshed. This curious dependence upon dianoia is what is
most in need of an account here.
Beyond the initial hypothesis of the visible and the intelligible, the ensuing image
of the line is also rightly associated with discursive, hypothetical dianoia because of the
way that Glaucon constructs the line as a sort of diagram or model for thinking through
the relation between the intelligible and visible. The image of the relation between the
intelligible and visible must be constructed in thought before it can produce any further
insight into the good. That the construction of this mediation is itself analogical is
confirmed when we see that Glaucon’s cuts are to be made proportionally, according to
the relation that each kind has to each other: “palin temne hekateron to tmēma ana ton
auton logon” (509d7-8). Looking only at the initial instructions in creating the line, we
are already able to see that the divided line is an image that, through its construction,
performs a mediation of the intelligible and visible according to analogy. Thus, by
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cutting each of the segments that stand for the visible and the intelligible, Glaucon is
performing a demonstration of the mediation that the sun-good analogy could only
represent. Whereas in the explicit analogy of the sun to the good Socrates reflected that
their relation was “ana logon” (proportional), here a relation is being constructed “ana
ton auton logon” (in accordance with the same proportion) by means of the image of the
line. That is, the sun is an analogue whereas the line is formally analogical.
Let us turn now to analyze the structural difference between these two images.
When Socrates offers the sun as the likeness of the good, there are only two terms put
into relation. However, as we have seen, once this likeness is explained, it comes to have
an analogical form: as the sun is with respect to the visible, the good is with respect to the
intelligible. But this expression of the analogy seems to have left something out, namely,
the good’s relation to the sun as its progenitor. In order to produce the analogy between
the sun and the good, the generative relation is meted out to each of the terms (the sun
and the good each become “fathers” of their respective “children”), but it is no longer
expressed between them. The divided line, then, is to remedy this state by providing a
simultaneous account of the relation between the visible and intelligible, both in terms of
their similarity and in terms of their difference. Let us see now, then, the way this
construction occurs and analogy’s implication within it.

2.2 – Rewriting the Image as Analogy: Constructing the Divided Line
We are told that in the two initial sections of the divided line reside a pair of
terms. 67 One member describes the way the soul is affected, while the other determines
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what affects the soul in that way. Socrates also explains that the length of the line in a
given segment corresponds to the degree of clarity with which the soul perceives the truth
of what affects it. The four sections of the line are produced by the original, unequal
division between the intelligible and the visible and Glaucon’s unequal yet proportional
division of each of these sections, producing four segments out of the original two. Thus,
the divided line is an image not just of the relations between the intelligible and the
visible but also of our understanding of it, of how that relation comes to be formed.
Mimicking the analogy of the sun and the good, the image of the divided line
reflects the four terms of the original analogy within the content of its image. The
divided line is an image of analogy. In addition, the divided line is able to display the
way things are caused and the way they are known. Within the visible portion of the line,
images are related to the things of which they are images in two ways. First, images,
shadows, and reflections are all similar to what they image. Second, it can be noted that
this relation of similarity is traced to the fact that images are caused by that which they
image. For example, a shadow of a ladder is caused by and similar to the ladder. This
should remind us of the relation that held between the sun and the good: they are similar
because the sun is the offspring of the good. But here we have overcome the paradox that
these terms represent at the same time a relation of similarity and a relation of difference.
This is the first example of how the image of the divided line offers a synthesis of the
relation of similarity and of difference by eliminating the latter in favor of the former.
However, rather than merely sacrificing the relation of difference, this relation is imaged
by the divisions of the line—that is, the hierarchy represented by the relative largeness
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and smallness of each section, referring to the relative epistemological strength of the
affections of the soul corresponding to each section (here, eikasia and pistis).
These relations are repeated between the visible and the intelligible, in so far as
dianoia (thought) “uses as likenesses those that were earlier imitated” (510b4). This
means that the ladder in our example can be taken as an image for thinking, as a
hypothesis for thinking through and toward something else (just as the sun was taken as
an image for the good, and the line described here is considered as a way of
understanding the whole of reality). Finally, with reference to the greatest portion of the
divided line, the hypothetical ladder is seen to be an imitation of its original in the ideas.
This double relation, integrating the logic of similarity by means of causal relations,
holds between each consecutive segment of the divided line. But these relations are
themselves mediated, in so far as the same double relation between the segments of each
“side” of the line holds also between the “sides” (visible and the intelligible) themselves.
Whereas the analogy of the sun and the good could not bridge the two sides of the
analogy except with reference to a similarity of relations, the divided line provides an
image for understanding the similarity between visible and intelligible things with
reference to an ontological basis for the similarity of relations that in the previous
analogy stood as a barrier because the ontological relation was also a relation of
difference. In order to provide an explicit account and image of those relations that
remained implicit in the sun and good analogy, the divided line is composed of four
terms, each of which is mediated within their respective division (intelligible or visible)
by the same relation that holds between the larger divisions. At the same time, the
divided line is able to demonstrate the relation of difference by reference to a proportion
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(analogia) that represents the relative strength of each section in terms of clarity. 68 In
this way, the divided line has come to express analogy without itself being one, in as
much as each of its parts relates to the others just as the terms in an analogy do.
More importantly, rather than being a particular analogy, like the analogy of the
sun to the good, the divided line acts as an account of analogy itself because it provides
an image of the structure of analogy. It constitutes the very abstraction that it describes
as existing between the intelligible and the visible, between the ideas and their instances.
Thus, the divided line functions as an expression of the form of analogy, whereas the sungood analogy that precedes it is merely an instance of analogy. Therefore, I take the
divided line as evidence of the implicit conceptual work of analogy in Plato’s philosophy,
present in advance of any explicit philosophical treatment of analogy.

2.3 – The Capital Account: The Supremacy of the Good
Although something is surely gained by having rendered the analogy of the sun
and the good as the analogical image of the divided line, what we are missing is perhaps
the very thing that worried Socrates when he warned Glaucon and Adeimantus to “be
careful that I don’t in some way unwillingly deceive you in rendering the account of the
interest/child fraudulent” (507a4-5, Bloom modified). While the divided line is able to
68
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account for the relation of the good to its offspring, it somehow loses that very relation
because the good is outside of being, epekeina tēs ousias, and thus outside of the line as
well. Because the good is the principle of difference, as the line makes clear, it cannot be
imaged as that difference. In order to reflect on the nest of difficulties that this hyperbole
of the good generates, I will look to some of Jacques Derrida’s comments on the good
and the divided line discussed in his late work, Rogues.
Derrida begins his brief treatment of the archaic, Platonic figure of sovereignty by
claiming that the good is “situated, at once inscribed and deinscribed, on a divided line
cut into two unequal parts.” 69 The idea of the good has an ambiguous relation to the
divided line: it is both the cause of and explained by everything depicted on the line.
Because the good itself is not in or on the line, being the cause of everything that is
depicted there, it is “written out” of the line; it is “deinscribed.” But, in so far as this
image is built as a way to depict the power of the good precisely by reference to its
causality of everything on the line, it is thereby written into everything on the line as their
cause.
The good is the paramount answer to the question “Why?” But, at the same time
as it accounts for its progeny on the line, the good is also measured by the line. And it
must be this way because the good cannot be understood directly. As the principle and
cause of intelligibility and being, the good is necessarily beyond both. In this way, the
image of the line defines and limits the good, but this same inscription simultaneously
defines the good as exceeding the line. In order to exert its power, it must be known as
what it is, as supervenient, but the portrayal of its power subjects the good to the

69

Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press), 137.

67

conditionality of its subordinates. The opposition of inscription and deinscription that
Derrida identifies is an oscillation that occurs because of the interaction between what the
line is meant to say and the structure of the image meant to portray it.
As we have already noted, there are further difficulties with the construct of the
line; that is, the line itself must somehow be located on the line. Derrida remarks that a
single portion of the line (dianoia) appears to be shaping the line itself from the inside:
“…the mathematical (which itself, from the inside, will have ordered the line and its
logos).” 70 In a way, hypothesis and dianoia (discursive thought, residing in the less clear
section of the intelligible division) act as the internal cause of the line, while the good
stands as the external cause. While the interaction of these two would seem forbidden by
the nature of the good as without hypothesis, they seem both (one from the side of the
conditional, the other from the side of the unconditional) to establish the line. And even
if dianoia is taken to be an intelligible product of the good, it is nevertheless somehow
privileged at the same time as it is subordinated (both to nous, the soul’s higher form of
interaction with the intelligible, as well as to the good itself). That is, it is privileged as
the method by which one might figure the good, but, having accomplished that, dianoia
necessarily recedes as the subordinate to nous.
In his second, again brief, section addressing the contours of the idea of the good,
Derrida refers specifically to what sets the good apart from any of its intelligible
counterparts on the line. He addresses the anhypothetical nature of the good, identifying
it as “the first figure of the ‘unconditional,’ the principle and anhypothetical archon
toward which the soul ascends (to ep’arkhēn anupotheton) (510b), without icons and on

70

Ibid.

68

the basis of hypothetical conditions.” 71 As the cause of intelligibility, the idea of the
good remains definitively outside that which it grounds, the hyperbole of intelligibility. 72
Because the good is the cause of the ideas, and the ideas serve as the basis, the archai, for
all our hypotheses, the good cannot itself be hypothetical. Indeed, it is the real, not
posited, origin of all thought and being. Its power and supremacy accounts for its
distance and separation from the power of its images, from the sun or the divided line.
For if the good were approached directly, it, like the sun, would threaten to incapacitate
the very power it produces.
This excessive, exceptional role of the idea of the good is what gives it supremacy
over all power. As Derrida writes in his third set of remarks, “It is a question of a power
more powerful than power, conveyed in a sovereign superlative that undercuts in an
exceptional fashion the analogy and hierarchy it nonetheless imposes.” 73 Here Derrida
has reintroduced the notion of sovereignty in relation to the good, a connection he has
both lexical and philosophical right to claim, especially on the basis of the analogy of the
sun with the good, which comparison will have been the source of all Socrates’
references to kingship, lordship, and authority in speaking of the good. 74 In addition,
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This can easily cause us to question whether the good is in itself and as such intelligible. Given that its
effects are intelligible, it too must be, but there is a question of whether direct knowledge is possible,
especially since it is with the good that knowledge and being ultimately converge. Of course, Socrates’
discussion of the inaccessibility of the good in the Phaedo would seem to point toward the fallibility of
human thought to attain this ultimate principle. The cave allegory, too, suggests that this is the trajectory of
every philosopher, and that, having witnessed the good is in fact the impetus for an ethical approach to the
power of knowledge. Further reflections on these complications follow in the next chapter.
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69

Derrida here suggests that the good has not only the power to impose the coordinate
hierarchy of knowledge and being that the images of the line and the ascent from the cave
indicate but also, because of its sovereignty, the power to unsettle that very hierarchy,
being a force beyond any of its subordinates. Because the good is “epekeina tēs ousias,”
because it is beyond being itself, a cause of being not subject to being, its power is
greater and more supreme than the very notion of power itself (509b9). If, in the most
basic sense (to follow in a certain regard the arguments of both St. Augustine and Baruch
Spinoza), 75 power is at its base a claim to being, then the good, as beyond being, has no
power at all. We might say, even, that the good is so powerful as not to require power,
that its resources are so abundant that it has need of none of them. It is inexhaustible
because it is not subject to depletion. The good is that which from its plenitude institutes
each finite economy of resource, need and expenditure.
Because power is defined by relations, the good is at the same time the basis of
every relation and is itself without relation. But, when the images of the good are
brought in as supplements, attempting to figure this anhypothetical cause, the exceptional
supremacy of the good appears to be compromised. In his fourth section, Derrida finally
refers to the image of the good as a father, the first image of the good given in the
Republic and the one that first accounts for the causal nature attributed to the good as
external but related to the line and all its contents. Just as the images of the good as a
sovereign and as capital preserve the right of a suspension and exceptionality to the laws

notions of sovereignty in “Kurios George and the Sovereign State,” Radical Philosophy Review 7, no. 2
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that it itself imposes, the law of generation appears not to apply to the good. It is the
fatherless father, the father not of any son but of the relations that constitute all
generations. However, by the act of producing, even as an overflow from its infinite
resource, the good is placed in a relation with that which it creates. This must indeed be
so, if the good is in fact “what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does
everything” (Republic 505d11-e1). The soul is that by which the good is put into
relation—not only with the soul itself but with all the rest that the good produces. Thus,
the good’s unconditionality is compromised by its relation to the soul, and that same
relation is precisely why the good comes to be imaged—and thereby rendered
conditional—in the first place.
The compromise to which the good is subject is probably best represented by its
entanglement with imaging, which is most evident in the analogy of the sun and the good.
When the sun is taken as the analogue of the good, the vocabulary of light and clarity
comes to dominate every explanation of the good’s relation to intelligibility. This elision
between the visible and the sensible determines the good as conditioned by the metaphor
of visibility. Although Derrida’s remarks focus on the divided line, he offers a clue to
this figure’s inheritance of the earlier context of the sun and the good analogy when he
claims that the line comes to be divided in accordance with an analogy that holds
between the “sensible visible” and the “intelligible visible.” 76 That both the sensible and
the intelligible are “visible” is clearly an appropriation of the analogy between the sun
and the good that precedes the divided line. But what is Derrida suggesting by this?
As we have seen, when Socrates introduces the image of the sun and the line, at
each point, the fact that there is a difference and a relation between the principle of
76
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intelligibility and the principle of visibility is not itself taken to be subject to debate or
inquiry. This is in fact the hypothesis that grounds all metaphysical speculation in the
dialogues, and Socrates is careful each time to remind his interlocutors of its necessity for
their inquiry into the good. But the mere fact that Socrates always introduces this
assertion before his metaphysical speculations is not the reason that we should expect
such an assumption. No, instead we must see that the relation between the intelligible
and the visible is itself entirely necessary before any kind of image could be offered in
place of the good. For, without a pre-given relationship between the visible and the
intelligible, how could the sun’s role as the cause of visibility become a plausible model
for the role of the good in intelligibility? That is, how could anything stand as an image
of anything else without an assumption in advance of the distinction and relation between
the intelligible and the sensible?
Secondly, what is meant by “intelligible visibility” is not something other than
visibility itself. Although the sun and the realm of the visible are initially presented as an
analogy, it becomes clear by the end of the account of the divided line that the metaphor
is no longer metaphorical. The metaphorical itself is overcome by the good (and this is
accomplished by means of the form of analogy). 77 Thus, the good is the real visible,
supplanting sensible visibility with its own criterion of truth. When we see, and thereby
in some (however attenuated) way know something, this is entirely on account of the
good. The availability to sight of a sensible being, the being of the sensing subject, the
power of seeing, and the phantasmatic opinion that it engenders, are all dependent upon
the good, and, importantly, this dependence is not metaphorical.
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Thus, the good is the cause of all intelligibility as well as all visibility. According
to the divided line, we are to believe that any truth, any “clarity,” that might be derived
from the, as Derrida puts it, “sensible visible” is itself based on the intelligible visibility
of what is most directly caused by the good. So, although we begin the account of the
good with the analogue of the sun, we complete the account of the good recognizing that
the good is the origin of the power of vision because it rests upon the power of
intellection. Thus, intellection is a visibility prior to the visibility of sense, the visibility
of visibility, which is itself invisible. 78 The good is the source of the possibility of
imaging of any kind, of the visibilities of the image, both as sensible and as intelligible.
The good, as a result, stands as the principle of imaging.

3 – The Ethics of Enlightenment: The Good and the Cave Allegory

After all of our analysis of the sun and good analogy as well as the divided line,
we may be curious about the fact that Socrates feels his account is still incomplete in as
much as he goes on to offer the cave allegory. This is a cue, however, to try to
understand in what way this could be seen as the culmination and completion of the prior
accounts. When Socrates originally began down this “longer road” in Book VI, the
discussion of the good arose because in the fairest city, “philosophers must be set up as
the most perfect guardians,” and perfect guardians must be educated in the greatest study,
something beyond any of the virtues already discussed in Book IV (503b4-5). Socrates
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reminds Glaucon and Adeimantus of this greatest study: “You have many times heard
that the idea of the good is the greatest study and that it’s by availing oneself of it along
with just things and the rest that they become useful and beneficial” (505a2-4, Bloom).
Thus, the theoretical investigation of the ideas (in particular, the idea of the good) and its
relation to the practical investigation of what the virtues (in particular, justice) are “good
for” constitute the basis of the comparison between the intelligible and the visible. Given
the origin of the conversation about the good, it is surprising that in Book Six we see no
image that retrieves this practical/ethical dimension of the good. Moreover, with the
divided line, the good itself has receded entirely from view (in so far as the good does not
occupy any place on the line). In trying to provide a mediated view of the good, that
view has somehow been entirely obscured. Rather than knowing something about the
good, we know a great deal about the visible and intelligible as well as the ways that the
soul is affected by each, but we do not have any account for the reason or the way that the
soul comes to be affected by different things in different ways and the way this is rooted
in the principle of ethics.
But is it any wonder that there has not yet been an account of the good? After all,
Socrates provided the disclaimer early on, saying that the way things seemed to him were
“beyond our current effort to reach at that time” (506e2-3). 79 In its particularity,
Socrates’ hesitation is temporal (nun) and depends entirely upon the aim (hormē) of the
discussion. Perhaps, then, the prior images and their relation to each other have opened
up the possibility that now, after all these accounts, Socrates and his interlocutors might
be able to approach the good? Indeed, the first word of Book VII suggests the
significance of the earlier discussion, perhaps as a propaedeutic. Continuing his narrative
79
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of the discussion, Socrates begins again, “After (meta) these things, liken our nature
regarding education and lack of education to such an experience,” and from here he
vividly describes the plight of the prisoners bound together in ignorance, one’s fateful
release from bondage, and his ascent from and return to the cave (514a1-2). It may seem
quite small, but “meta” used with an accusative most often indicates a temporal sequence
(though it may also refer to a non-temporal sequence), and this suggests that Socrates
gives the allegory of the cave only after having gone through the other figures because
the significance of the cave allegory as an image of the good might be missed otherwise.
This leads us to ask what is special or different about the cave allegory than the previous
images.
First of all, we may notice that the divided line is assumed in the entirety of the
structure of the ascent from the cave to the brightly illuminated world above ground. The
level of bondage, where the prisoners can only see shadows, is an image of the smallest
part of the line, corresponding to eikasia. The level above the prisoners, where the
puppeteers manipulate fabricated objects to present different shadows for the prisoners, is
an image of the second section of the visible portion of the line, that of pistis. The ascent
out of the cave, where the freed prisoner is able to look at real objects’ shadows and
reflections in water, highlights the work of intelligible images, the hypotheses of dianoia
in the third section of the line. With the final step, corresponding to the level of nous and
the forms, the freed prisoner recovers his sight and achieves the ability to look directly at
the things according to which those artifacts in the cave were fashioned, seeing the true
world without mediation for the first time: “Then finally I suppose he would be able to
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make out the sun—not its appearances in water or some alien place, but the sun itself by
itself in its own region (chōra)—and see what it’s like” (516b4-7, Bloom).
At this point, the cave allegory might seem to have duplicated the divided line,
providing an entertaining, animated parable for those less geometrically inclined. But the
cave allegory goes one important step further. The freed prisoner is said to be able to
look at the sun in its own place, to behold that which gives life and light to everything he
has now come to know clearly. His knowledge is complete not only when he knows how
to see well but when he knows why he can. With this, the original analogy of the sun and
the good is recuperated by the cave allegory in so far as the sun’s position at the top of
the visible realm stands as the analogue to the good in the intelligible. Indeed, the
metaphor of visibility that applies to both the visible and the intelligible is played out in
the tension between sight and blindness that the freed prisoner undergoes at each advance
and descent along his path. But these aspects of the image are already available in
respect of the original analogy of the sun and the good and the image of the divided line.
So, what has been added here that could not be represented through the original images?
What makes the cave allegory necessary to the completion of the account of the
good, rather than merely repetitive of the prior attempts, is that it accounts for the very
practice of philosophy, or the attempt to provide an adequate account. Why is this so?
Recall that the divided line image shifted the burden of the relation of difference off to
the epistemological level, having integrated the difference between the intelligible and
visible by transposing each into two forms of visibility. The special difference of the
good as the source of intelligibility thereby becomes insurmountable. As Francisco
González argues, “…if the good is presupposed by every act of knowing, how can it be
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itself an object of knowledge? The paradox is that the good is so essential to our
knowledge that it does not seem to be itself knowable.” 80 The good is no longer unlike
what it produced merely because it is superior; its very excess renders it entirely
invisible, even to noetic vision, that true vision the good founds. Being the cause of
rather than subject to intelligible visibility, the good is the source of this metaphor of
visibility itself. Because it is the cause of the distinction between the visible and the
intelligible, the good is the ground of the possibility of the logic of analogy, and so it is
not subject to any analogy that could adequately account for it.
But all along, we have seen that what is at stake is not merely the content of the
images offered but rather the way that imaging takes place and offers a view of the form
of imaging itself. What remains to be told is the story of why these mediations are
necessary, why our soul proceeds by way of such imaging, and the way this process can
itself be imaged. That is, the only way to account for the good is to account for the
negotiation of its differences—of its image as the mirrored pair of sensible visible and
intelligible visible. This negotiation is nothing other than the path of learning. What the
cave allegory is able to portray is the dynamic nature of the soul’s affection, that it moves
from one affection to another, that its epistemological character is dynamic. The divided
line was unable to offer anything more than the static image of the measures of the soul,
but the cave allegory allows us to see that the strength of the philosopher is that he is not
merely aware of the passions of the soul but that he activates his own soul, measured
against an understanding of those very passions.
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This dynamic character of knowledge is also why the freed prisoner is not able to
remain above, gazing only at what is most true. The philosopher returns to the cave and
its demagogic morass because of knowledge of the good, returning because that is the
right thing to do, the good thing, the just thing. As Socrates explained in his response to
the “third wave” of paradox (regarding the possibility of philosopher-kings coming to
be), when we are seeking for the good we are not seeking for what is good for one group
rather than another but for the good for all: “…we were making the guardians guardians
and the city as happy as we could, but we were not looking exclusively to one group in it
and forming it for happiness” (466a5-6, Bloom). This understanding of the practice of
philosophy reveals the place of the good as the principle of action. And, with this, we see
how the original aim of the discussion, to understand the good as the source and cause of
justice, has been achieved but only because of having enacted a series of images, each
attempting more and more to express the truth of the original hypothesis of the division
between the intelligible and visible. Now, this activity of imaging (of the sun, the line
and the cave) appears to be nothing more than dianoia, whereby the things of the sensible
world are taken as images for thinking such that we may make hypothetical postulations.
This would seem never to allow us access to the good itself since it is “unhypothetical.”
The construction of the divided line is itself dramatized by the cave allegory; this
portrayal of the dynamic of thinking is a reflection on the reflexivity of thought.
González explains, “Dialectic shows itself to have the reflexive character just described:
what is sought is revealed not in any ‘results,’ but rather in the very search. Dialectic as
practiced in these dialogues can therefore be said to be the way in which the good is
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known.” 81 The final image, the allegory of the cave, stands then not only as an image of
the hypothesis of the multiplicity of expressions of the good, but as an image for the
method that generated the series of images, i.e., dialectic.

4 – Conclusions about the Work of Analogy

I have attempted to show above that the divided line image of Republic VI is a
discursive expression of the already mediated relation between the visible and the
intelligible given in the analogy of the sun and the good. On the basis of this evidence, I
have asserted that, in accounting for this specific analogy, the divided line takes into its
substance the form of analogy. That the analogical form is expressed in the substance of
the image is attested to by its construction on the basis of four terms, their relations and
the relation of those relations. (See Figure 1.) The consequences of this conclusion,
however, gesture toward two larger and somewhat more interesting issues in interpreting
Plato’s thought.
The image of the divided line brings together both the direct causal relation
between the intelligible and the visible portrayed in Socrates’ first articulation of the sun
as the child of the good as well as the mediated relations within each “region,”
highlighted by the explicit analogy of the sun to the good. In so doing, the image
provides an account of both intelligible and visible being and their relation. This image is
often used as evidence of Plato’s metaphysical theory, and interpretations of it thereby
have an impact on how we conceive of Plato’s metaphysical thinking. As a consequence
of my thesis regarding the integration of the form of analogy into the subject or content of
81
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the divided line, Plato’s metaphysical thinking must be understood as characterized by
this same logic of analogy. At the very least, this conclusion is confirmed by much of the
interpretive legacy of early Platonism.
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Fig. 1. Graphic Depiction of the Divided Line & its Analogicity

Aside from this conclusion regarding an analogical metaphysics, the foregoing
analysis has introduced a basis for considering the interaction between the form of
expression and the thought that is expressed. In particular, as we have seen in the
passage from the analogy of the sun and the good to the image of the divided line, the
account of an analogy must take the form of that analogy as part of its content, rendering
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the account analogical in addition to its having thoroughly incorporated the sun-good
analogy into its account of each “side” of the line. What this shows is that the form of an
expression has an interaction with the content thereby expressed, such that any
elaboration of that expression will become an image of the previous expressive form. In
what follows, this general schema will be shown to operate in other areas, where thought
encounters its limits and demands an account of those limits. In particular, the next
chapter will address the founding story that expresses this limitation, Socrates’ “second
sailing.”
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Chapter Three
The Metaphysics of Similarity and Difference and
the Analogy of Logos

… the relation (the analogy) between the
logos/soul relation and the pharmakon/body
relation is itself designated by the term logos.
The name of the relation is the same as that of
one of its terms. 82
Jacques Derrida

1 – Accounting for a Metaphysical Hypothesis

The foregoing chapter has shown that the problem for Platonic metaphysics is the
problem of accounting for imaging. There, an analysis of the divided line in relation to
the sun and the good analogy supports the conclusion that the logic of analogy
necessarily “infects” the metaphysics of imaging because the structure of the account of
the relation of similarity is that of a relation of relations, or analogy. To show that this
feature is not limited to a metaphysics of imaging but extends to any recuperative
metaphysics that aims to explain the phenomenon of similarity and difference, we will
now look to the Phaedo where we find a sort of groundwork of mimetic metaphysics and
an analogical psychology that adumbrates some of the more difficult explanations of the
methods appropriate to dianoia.
The following analysis will trace the move from the first account of the forms,
where the relation between equal things and equality itself is expressed as one of
difference striving for likeness, to the second account of the forms, where the appearance
82
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of sensible things is said to be caused by participation in a form similar to that
appearance. In addition, we will attend to the lesson that Socrates introduces between the
two accounts, that of his “second sailing” in search of the cause of generation. The
second best method that Socrates advocates, to pursue logoi, is written in light of a potent
analogy regarding our unfitness to witness reality directly. Socrates suggests that the
logoi of beings act similarly to the way that a reflection in water can allow us to view of
an eclipse unharmed. In retrospect, it will be argued that, by their engagement with
hypothesis, both the first and second accounts participate in a performance of this
mediated method, which allows for the fundamental analogical nature of the soul’s
progress toward understanding to come to light.
In order to see why we must look to the Phaedo for conclusive evidence of the
analogical nature of Platonic metaphysics, we will note that there are some difficulties
with proceeding on the basis of the Republic alone. In particular, the causal relation
between the sun and the good, asserted within the very constitution of the image, violates
the limitations of imaging at the same time as it establishes them. The ultimate success
of this image and its culmination in a rigorous metaphysical account rely on two things:
first, the hypothesis of the relation of forms and sensible things and, second, the causal
relation between the good and the sun and, hence, between the intelligible and sensible.
These two assertions seem to beg for their own arguments. I contend that these
hypotheses are the same that are dealt with in some detail in the context of the Phaedo.
In addition, we should recall two things from our discussion of the Republic, both
of which seem to call for reference to the Phaedo. Suggestions made at both the
beginning and the end of the digression, or “longer path,” which addresses the paradox of
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the philosopher-king, beg reference to the Phaedo. The first mention of this indirect
route comes just before Socrates’ image of the ship of state, which is meant to explain not
only why philosophers appear to be the most useless citizens but also why Socrates
himself is “so greedy for images.” 83 We seem not to get a direct sense, however, of the
reason that the philosopher must tarry with images nor the reason that Socrates must
embark on this longer way around until the end of the series of images that are to account
for the philosopher-king’s generation. With the cave allegory it becomes clear that the
philosopher must not remain only with the forms, basking in the brilliance of the good.
He knows the good, and by this knowledge he is compelled to return to the cave, blinded
once more by the shift from lightness to darkness. Because he must return to the world of
shadows and images, he must also busy himself with accounting for them. The
philosopher’s work is to reveal the forms on which these shadows depend, but this
requires the use of images that might do so. The fact that Socrates must use images, as
demonstrated in the Republic, resonates with the intellectual autobiography Socrates
offers in the Phaedo, where he describes his “second sailing” in search for the cause of
things’ coming to be what they are. In the Republic, blindness is associated with the shift
in moving from ignorance to knowledge as well as in the return to confront that
ignorance in others. In the Phaedo, however, blindness is associated with the very source
of that hierarchy of knowledge over ignorance. To avoid the blindness risked by looking
at things directly (as natural philosophers might), Socrates claims he was forced (like an
astronomer looking at the sun) to contrive a way to look at the things through an image in
order to safely find their truth. We are drawn to the Phaedo, then, because in this
dialogue Socrates most closely addresses the origin and justification of the shift from
83
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likeness to being, from dark to light, and the relation between these that implicates the
explanatory accounts of that relation. What follows here, then, is a reading of the Phaedo
as the more explicit rendering of the metaphysical account of the relation of the
intelligible and sensible—a kind of portrait of the justification of the hypothesis that
grounds the metaphysical images of the Republic.

2 – Striving for Likeness: the First Account of the Forms

In addition to the fact that the Phaedo stands as the classic site for reading
Platonic metaphysics, this dialogue also offers a unique opportunity to view the
transformation of the account of the relation of forms and things from a phenomenal
account that emphasizes difference to a truly metaphysical one that emphasizes the
relations of similarity as cause. As we have seen already in the move from the sun-good
analogy to the image of the divided line, this transition is key to the formulation of a
structure of analogy. Because of this we might expect to find further evidence of Plato’s
analogical thinking in a text that deals with a similar dynamic of moving from difference
to similarity. Such a transition marks the move from a concern for the epistemological
connection between forms and things to one regarding their ontological connection. 84
Examining the grounds for the transition from a hypothesis based on difference aimed at
similarity to a hypothesis where similarity accounts for difference will also provide a
84
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means of reflecting on the power that unifies these different moments—i.e., the soul. The
significance of this may be confirmed by looking back to the dual purpose of the image
of the divided line: corresponding to each mode of being (images, things, hypotheses, and
forms) is a mode of the soul’s affection (imagining, trust, discursive thought, and
intellect). In a sense, the soul is the substance of the line, in so far as the soul maintains
coherence among the infinite series of points that the line connects. And this is precisely
what the allegory of the cave portrays: the soul is the possibility of the dynamic unity of
all becoming and being. Because the forms are the meeting place of the ontological and
epistemological accounts portrayed by the divided line as well as being the assumption
that makes the line possible, the Phaedo stands as an important site for analyzing the
precise relationship between the soul and what it knows and the way that relationship
operates.
We will note in conjunction with this that the discussion of the forms in the
Phaedo is precipitated by the arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. The first
explicit address to the forms (beyond their mere mention or suggestion) is not a
metaphysical excursion in its own right but instead an argument subordinated to the
attempt to prove the imperishability of the soul. In his final day’s discussion, Socrates
attempts to soothe his followers’ pain in the face of his nearing execution. He does this
by offering a series of accounts as so many offerings to Asclepius, 85 trying to establish a
stable faith in his friends that death is not an evil but rather a good. He argues that this
good only appears evil because of the shock of the change of condition, likening his
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death to the pleasure he experiences when he is released from his bonds, an experience
which is nevertheless preternaturally bound with pain (60b-c). In keeping with this,
Socrates first argues that the release of the soul from the body in death is a pain followed
by pleasure, in that the soul is freed from the bonds of the body’s desires. He concludes,
then, that the philosopher, who busies himself with the purest ideas, is also practicing for
death (64a1-3). Here, Socrates first introduces the hypothesis of the forms in order to
account for the philosopher’s (and the soul’s) likeness to those things that are separated
from the body.

2.1 – A Familiar Hypothesis
In his explanation of the sun as the image of the good, Socrates relied upon his
interlocutors’ familiarity with his use of the ideas of the good and the beautiful and their
contrast with the many instances of good and beautiful things. In the Phaedo, Socrates
relies on a similar foundation of hypotheses shared by the group:
“What about these kinds of things, Simmias? Do we say that there is a
‘just’ itself or no such thing?”
“We do say that, by Zeus.”
“And that there is ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’?”
“How not?” (65d4-8) 86
The just, the beautiful, and the good (as well as the big, healthy, and strong) are all
mentioned here long before any sustained discussion of the forms arises in the dialogue. 87
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Simmias and Cebes, the outsiders of the group, claim familiarity with those “muchtalked-about things” (100b5). 88 By their silence, the rest of the group also appears to be
familiar, and one could hardly conceive of Socrates’ followers not being more than
familiar with his own discussion of such matters.

2.2 – Recollection of a Hypothesis
In addition to their familiarity with what are later identified as the forms, it is
equally important to take seriously Cebes’ ebullience over the argument about learning as
recollection, since it is an indication that this argument (just as the forms) has a life of its
own outside of this dialogue and its ostensible concerns (life and death). Indeed,
although Socrates is able to make recollection work as a hinge in his argument for the
imperishability of the soul (namely, that the soul must have persisted through many lives
to have learned what it only now recollects), he is not the one who introduces it into the
conversation. While discussing the idea that just as smaller comes from bigger and vice
versa, so also death comes from life, and life comes from death, Cebes gleefully points
out its similarity to the familiar argument about recollection: “…we’re not deceived in
agreeing to these very things: There genuinely is a returning to life, the living come to be
from the dead, and the souls of the dead are” (72d7-10, Brann et al.). 89 Performing the
claim of the argument, Cebes is himself reminded of the familiar argument by this new
constructed by the addition of “auton” to the neuter nominative form of an adjective: “dikaion auton,” etc.
(2).
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one, on account of their shared theme of reincarnation. 90 Cebes says he has heard that
Socrates argues that learning is possible only if we have already had access to
knowledge, which is forgotten in death. Playfully, Simmias asks Cebes to “remind” him
(“hupomnēson me”) of the argument concerning learning (73a5). With this, the subject
of the discourse is enacted by its discussion, this time not just by Cebes’ implicit
recollection of the argument but also by his reminding Simmias of it. 91
Although he is not the one to bring it up, Socrates is able to use the suggestion of
the argument concerning recollection in concert with the distinction between intelligible
forms and their sensible instances to prove the existence of the knowing soul prior to its
presence in any body. It is important to note, then, that the explicit discussion of the
forms does not occur as a metaphysical account but is marshaled instead into the service
of a psychology (a logos of the soul). Moreover, Socrates goes on to construct his
argument in a different way than Cebes’ summary (and its apparent partner in the Meno)
suggested. Rather than provide a demonstration through his dialectical method with the
aid of mathematical images, as he does in the Meno, Socrates instead constructs the
argument around two modes of recollection. First, Socrates addresses the definition of
anamnēsis: “We agree, then, don’t we, that if someone is to have remembered something
he must have known that thing some time before” (73c1-3). This is the premise that will
facilitate the final conclusion. Second, Socrates claims that recollection occurs when
something is sensed that brings to mind both the knowledge of that which is sensed as
90
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well as something different: “Whenever someone who has either seen or heard
something, or grasped it with some other sense, knows not only that thing but also notices
a different thing, the knowledge of which would not be the same but another of which he
took notice, don’t we rightly say that this is recollection?” (73c5-d1). The force of
Socrates’ second statement is less clear at the outset, as evidenced by Simmias’
confusion, but it is a necessary addition to the argument in order to connect recollection
to his upcoming discussion of the relation of equality and equal things. 92
To illustrate, he first asks Simmias to agree that the knowledge of a human being
and of a lyre are different. Socrates then gives the example of the possessions of one’s
beloved, which remind one of the beloved in his absence. The lover’s cloak or lyre is
clearly related to the beloved by his prior use of them, and Socrates is here pointing out
that this relation is somehow born in the perception of the possession, calling for one to
make the beloved present by recalling him from some prior experience. He even
suggests the upcoming argument concerning forms when he speaks of the knowledge of
the boy as the form (“eidos”) that is brought to mind upon seeing the lyre or cloak in his
absence (73d8-10). Indeed, this relation of presence in absence will reappear later as
similar to the relation between equality and equal things.

2.2.1 – Recollection of similarity and difference
Next, Socrates momentarily shifts away from the association of different things
on the basis of use or compresence to a consideration of the association of two different
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things on the basis of some kind of likeness between them. It is a surprise when Socrates
moves away from the functional definition he initially articulated, which stressed the
difference between the knowledge of the thing sensed and the knowledge of what is
recollected. Far from taking Socrates away from the needs of the argument, however, the
example he offers of the similarity between a sketch of Simmias and Simmias himself
anticipates the articulation of the relation of similarity that holds also between a form and
that of which it is a form. 93 With this, Socrates revises his original definition of
recollection, noting that since the sketch of Simmias can remind us of our knowledge of
Simmias (to which it is similar) as well as our knowledge of Cebes (which is different
from the look of the sketch), recollection can therefore be of similar as well as different
things.
In this way, even prior to his discussion of the equals and equality, Socrates has
established that recollection comes in two kinds: one from an encounter with something
similar to the prior known thing (as a drawing of Simmias is similar to Simmias himself)
and one from what is dissimilar to the prior known thing (as a lyre or cloak is dissimilar
to one’s beloved or as the sketch of Simmias is different from Cebes). The detail of this
second premise is unexpected, but it is necessary because, by using the hypothesis of the
intelligible forms’ relation to sensible things, Socrates must next show that whether their
relation is one of similarity or of difference it is nevertheless one of recollection, which
necessitates the conclusion that the soul must have already known what it recollects
(whether those things that remind the soul of its prior knowledge are similar or dissimilar
to that prior knowledge). Clearly, then, the ensuing discussion concerning the relation of
93
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equality to equal things is subordinated to the greater argument that the soul existed
before it came into its present body.

2.3 – Eleipsis: Falling Short
Before he employs the model of recollection in the relation of equality to equal
things, Socrates must gain Simmias’ assent to this question: “Whenever someone
recollects something from similar things, isn’t it necessary that this one be affected
besides, that he note whether or not, with respect to similarity, something falls short of
[elleipei] that one he recollected?” (74a5-7). This claim must be related to the second of
the accounts of recollection: seeing the sketch of Simmias allows me to recollect
Simmias, and in so doing I must also know that, as an image of Simmias, the sketch is
not Simmias himself, while it still somehow shares a similar appearance. 94 This claim, of
course, does not hold true for those recollections that are either from or to something
different, since seeing the lyre and cloak that remind me of my beloved does not require
that I take note (implicitly or explicitly) of the lyre or the cloak’s attempt to be like the
beloved. So, if this additional premise applies only to those cases of recollection which
are from an image to that of which it is an image, then why does Socrates refer to cases of
recollection where the thing remembered is not similar to what sparked the recollection?
That is, what is the significance of the relation of dissimilar things that makes the model
of recollection useful for Socrates? Clearly, the intersection of these two questions relies
far less on the model of recollection than on that to which it will be applied: the relation
94
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of the equal itself to equal things. If Socrates were to rely only on the relation of images
to that which they image (i.e., sensible things), he would not be able to account for the
difference in kinds between forms and things since a sketch and Simmias are both
sensible and, as a result, do not require the hypothesis of the soul’s prior separation from
the body.
When Socrates introduces the question of how we come to know the equal itself,
he exposes the trajectory of the argument that highlights the difference between the soul’s
life with the body and the soul’s life on its own. Having already agreed to accept the
hypothesis mentioned often before that we have knowledge of “some equal itself,”
Simmias also consents that we come to know the equal itself by first sensing the many
equal things that there are: sticks, stones, etc. At this point, Simmias has only agreed to
the relation between the equal itself and its instances based on their similarity. However,
Socrates now shifts Simmias’ attention to the difference between the equal itself and the
sensible instances of equal:
“But consider it in this way: don’t equal stones and sticks, while staying
the same, sometimes appear equal in one way but not equal in another
way?”
“Again, entirely.”
“How about this? Is it the case that the equals themselves 95 sometimes
appeared unequal to you? Or equality appeared to be inequality?”
95
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“Never ever, Socrates.”
“Then,” he said, “These equal things and the equal itself are not the same.”
(74b7-9)
With Simmias’ confirmation, Socrates has shown that the recognition of the phenomenal
similarity between a form and its instance implies recognition of the difference between
the intelligible and the sensible. Socrates has thus provided the ground for the original
contention that along with the recognition of difference comes the recognition of a
relative perfection and, in particular, the lack of perfection of the sensible equals to the
complete perfection of the equal itself. At the same time, this provides a theoretical
ground for Socrates’ contention that the soul and the body are distinct, if related.
While the assertion that difference implies hierarchy might seem to be
presumptuous, if not also pernicious, 96 Socrates takes a relation of difference to be
concomitant with a relation of similarity, and this difference is not absolute but relative
(better and worse). 97 Moreover, Socrates does not need to claim that all difference is
between better and worse, since he has sidelined recollection by dissimilars for the
purpose of this discussion. He need only show that the difference implied by similarity is
a difference between better and worse. That both difference and its hierarchy follow
directly from the similarity of things is evidenced by Socrates and Simmias’ original
agreement: when someone recollects from similar things, s/he must also note that, with
respect to similarity, the thing presently appearing falls short of what is recollected.
whether, while something appears equal and is thus an appearance of equal itself, these appearances of the
form ever appear unequal? And we reply, certainly not.
96

If the analogy were to be made from metaphysics to politics, which is clearly at work in the Republic,
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returns in the Statesman dialogue along with the discussion of similarity and difference.
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Thus, the similarity between what is present and what is recollected is the basis of the
comparison that implies perfection. 98 And this is the reason why Socrates continues to
ask for Simmias’ agreement to the following:
“Therefore we agree that whenever someone upon seeing something
notices that on the one hand this thing which I now see wishes to be like
something else of what is, and on the other hand it is wanting and is not
able to be such as that one, but is more lowly, isn’t it somehow necessary
that the one noticing this has happened to see in advance that thing to
which he says that it likens itself but is yet more lacking?”
“Necessarily.” (74d9-e5)
That is, a sensible example (an equal stick or stone) shows itself to be striving for more
likeness to its form, but at the same time it also, to a certain degree, fails in this likeness.
Rather than reading this claim too along with the divided line or the cave allegory,
we must avoid asserting that sensible things are striving to be the forms but fall short of
that being, and instead notice that, at this point in the Phaedo, the emphasis is instead
placed on the aim for similarity and the judgment of its better or worse achievement. If
identity itself were the goal toward which appearances strive, then all instances of
similarity would equally fail, and no hierarchy could be judged. Such a hierarchy may be
imposed only because the basis for better and worse is a measure of similarity (which is
itself a relative rather than absolute judgment). We may now revise the common
interpretation of the first account of the forms in the Phaedo: rather than striving for the
being of the forms, sensible instances are striving for greater likeness to the forms. There
is no explicit evidence that there is any ontological claim made here. Sensible instances
do not somehow exist less than the forms they participate; they are merely described as

98

Indeed, we do not speak of recollection when we mean recognition. That is, if the present thing is not
merely similar but the same as the thing held in memory, then I do not recollect what I see; instead I
recognize it as the same thing. In recognition, identity is the basis, whereas recollection, as Socrates shows,
may proceed either from things similar or dissimilar to what is recollected.
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being less faithful to the likeness that the form presents to our understanding, which is a
phenomenal claim. How the commonly accepted ontological account is generated from
this phenomenal account, however, is the question that will guide my remaining
consideration of the Phaedo.
We may assert now that with the introduction of the relation of the forms to their
instances Socrates has been able to provide a way of understanding the simultaneous
relation of similarity and difference that holds between image and original by reference to
a similar relation between form and instance (as well as between intelligibility and
sensibility). Socrates has thus created an analogy for the phenomenon of the image in
order to account for the paradoxical state of its relation to what it images. An image
relates to what it images just as a sensible instance relates to its intelligible form. 99
Furthermore, in this analogy the character of the relation is analyzed into a dual relation
of similarity and difference. Accordingly, the emphasis on similarity refers to a
phenomenal aspect whereas the emphasis on difference refers to an ontological one.
Finally, with the interposition of the consideration of the perceiver, these relations are
ordered such that one is the explanation of the other. That is, the judging psychē is the
key to understanding the source of this hierarchy. As Socrates says, by taking note of the
difference between the image and what it images or between the instance and its form,
the perceiver necessarily notices that the one falls short of the other, lacking identity with
what it attempts to be like. Socrates’ point here is that accounting for the similarity of
what looks equal to what is equal itself requires giving a reason (logos), and this reason is
the fact of having noticed the difference between them, which is the ground of their
appearance as similar. Thus, the perceiver accounts for phenomenal similarity (the
99
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appearance of equal things as equal) by noticing that this appearing is in fact evidence of
that appearance’s falling short of the purity of the form.
There are three parts to Socrates’ account. First, the perceiver senses the
phenomenon as like, in the example used, as “equal.” 100 Second, the perceiver notices
that this phenomenon does not appear as what is known but as trying to be like what is
known. Finally, the perceiver, in considering this difference, establishes this difference
as the ground of the similarity. The soul is what holds together the three moments of
appearing, being, and logos. The account of the soul is an account of the logos that holds
between appearing and being.
Similarity is by definition an attempt at identity that falls short, and this is perhaps
the reason why equality is Socrates’ paradigm case. 101 As a result, there is a dependency
of the image and the instance on an identity of its aim: a dependency of both the relation
of similarity as well as the relation of difference. But, more importantly, the one relation
is seen as explained by the other. That is, by taking note of the way that the similarity of
equal things to equality itself evidences their falling short of it, the perceiver also notes
that the difference between the two is the explanation for the shortcoming. 102 The
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It is problematic that Socrates chooses this appearance by which to judge the relation of things to their
forms by reference to their similarity. That is, equality seems to fight the claim of similarity, since if
something is similar to the equal, it is in some sense equal and not merely similar. But this appears to be
precisely what Socrates is going for, since, in the end, this account of the hypothesis is not sufficient.
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This is precisely the ground of post-modern critiques of Platonism that find fault with its “identitarian
thinking.” Among others, Emmanuel Levinas lays the burden of metaphysics on Socrates: “Western
philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a
middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. This primacy of the same was Socrates’s
teaching…” (Totality and Infinity, translated by Alphonso Lingis [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1969], 43). In his Negative Dialectics, Theodor Adorno also consistently uses the terminology of
“identitarian thinking” (E. B. Ashton, trans. [New York: Seabury Press, 1972]).
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ontological difference (between the sensible instance and the intelligible form) becomes
the account for their relation. 103 The simultaneous relations of similarity and difference
in the phenomenon become understood (necessarily, Socrates says) by the perceiver’s
attention to the relation between those relations and her ordering of them. The perceiver,
then, performs the ontological gesture, placing the form in the position as explanatory
cause of the phenomenon and its ambivalence as both similar and different.
It is essential to note that this ontological explanation would not be possible with
the thoroughly phenomenal account of recollection that relies only on Simmias and the
sketch of Simmias. Because these are both sensible, their hierarchy would seem forced.
The image clearly does not exclusively depend on Simmias, since the value of the image
is precisely that it can outlast Simmias’ bodily presence. Attending merely to the
phenomena might actually provide a counter-argument, which seems to assert that the
image is stronger, more long-lasting than that which it images. This is not unrelated to
Cebes’ later counter-argument to Socrates’ argument for the imperishability of the soul—
namely, the analogy of the cloak that outlasts its weaver. In any case, with the
introduction of the relation between sensible instances and their intelligible counterparts,
Socrates achieves a perspective on the distinction essential to providing an ontological
account. And this is necessary since he himself is providing a sort of ontology of the soul
in its negotiation of the sensible and intelligible.
It is important to recall that this distinction between the sensible and intelligible
has already been addressed in the dialogue even before the argument about recollection,
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This claim might seem to decide that the forms are substantial entities, but because these claims
originate from a consideration of phenomena, both forms and their instances are known through the same
medium, and in this sense are not ontically different. My further analysis of the forms below will return to
this ontic equalization of the forms, which in fact rescues Platonic metaphysics from the fate of naïve
realism.
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even though it had not yet been put to argumentative use except in order to distinguish
the philosopher from the non-philosopher and the soul from the body. In his explanation
of why the true philosopher should not only not be afraid of death but be practicing for it,
Socrates introduces what seems (according to the responses of Simmias, the admiring
outsider) to be a well-accepted explanation of the difference between what the soul cares
about and what the body cares about. In particular, the senses are associated with inferior
understanding: “Do sight and hearing hold some truth for humans, or is it rather—as even
the poets are always babbling to us—that we neither hear nor see anything precise?”
(65b1-5). The appeal to the poets for attestation of this doxa confirms the ubiquity of this
opinion at the same time as it troubles its necessity. In Socratic dialectic, the common
opinion may be a good starting point but only so that it may be refined and put into the
service of justifying philosophical positions. To this end, Socrates continues by
contrasting the strength of the soul in its reasoning (logizesthai) to its weakness in relying
on the senses. The philosophical revision of the doxical position, then, claims that the
important point does not concern the distinction between a truth-weak body and a truthstrong soul but instead centers on the orientation of the soul itself toward those activities
(sensibility or intelligibility) that grant it a clearer approach to the truth. To this Socrates
avers that the soul “reasons most beautifully” (65c5) when it avoids attachment to how
the body pains the soul and instead “strives for what is” (65c9). 104 At this point we see
that the confusion regarding the ontology of things results from a confusion of the soul
with sensible things, and we should also note that this “striving” of the soul should
remind us of the same action of the inferior instance toward its superior form. But we
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At this point, Socrates has broadened his understanding of the threat the body poses to the soul. Beyond
the deceptions of the senses he claims that the soul is pained by everything associated with the body: its
senses, its grief, and even its pleasure (65c6-7).
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have here found the mistake of Platonist assumptions about this Platonic dialogue: while
the soul might strive for being, sensible things can only strive for a likeness to being.
Since sensible things are always becoming, they are not of the order of being and so
cannot strive for that. The soul, on the other hand, is akin to the permanence of being,
and as such it performs the relation of the visible and the intelligible in its perception and
in its understanding. The phenomena themselves do not appear as ordered; they are
ordered by the soul’s logoi. So, while our account of the appearance of things might
claim that they are themselves striving for being, this is just the appearance of our own
soul’s attempt to reconcile being and becoming. The work of distinguishing these and of
pursuing the philosophical logos is that of phronēsis, the virtue of the philosopher’s soul.
In addition to noting the difference between the soul’s capacity for sensing and its
capacity for thought, Socrates asks a receptive Simmias again if “we” posit the subjects
of all of Socrates’ dialectical “ti esti” questions: the just itself, the beautiful itself and the
good itself (65d4-7). Agreeing to the hypothesis, Simmias also states that these cannot be
seen by the eyes or any other bodily sense. Socrates confirms that he is discussing what
will later be called the forms when he says, “I mean about all of them, like about bigness
and health and strength and, in a word, about the being of all the rest—what each happens
to be” (65d12-e1). His aim is to give credit to the forms for the truth that the soul
beholds. At this point, what the soul knows is identified as invisible, but the character of
the soul’s knowledge when unmixed with the body is not positively articulated; all we
know is that thoughtfulness (phronēsis) requires purification from the body. This serves
as an introduction to the philosophical account for the truth of appearances, but, because
it is founded on doxa, hypothesis, and myth, Socrates’ interlocutors demand a more
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rigorous argument, which they finally ask for by name: the argument concerning
recollection.

2.4 – The Logos of Recollection
Although the distinction between sensing and thinking according to their
proximity to truth is established before the introduction of the ontological account that
employs the forms, the connection between these is explicitly addressed only after
Socrates has completed his argument about the reincarnation of the soul. At this point
Socrates returns to a characterization of both what the soul knows when it grasps the truth
(still the hypothetical forms, but now supported by the argument concerning recollection)
as well as the character of the soul itself, and in particular its proper activity:
logizesthai. 105 Following the first account of the forms, Socrates explicitly connects his
argument about our foreknowledge of the equal itself to “all the rest” from before:
Don’t you agree that if we came to be, having grasped and held it
[knowledge] before our coming to be, then we knew both before we came
to be and right when we were coming to be, not only the equal and the
greater and the lesser but also all such things? For our argument now is no
more about the equal than about the beautiful itself and the good itself and
the just and the holy and, as I say, about everything to which we apply this
seal, the “what is,” both in the questions asked and in the answers replied.
(75c7-d4)
Somehow, the account of recollection seems to have changed the demands on the soul.
Rather than avoid contact with the pains of the body, the soul must attend to the senses
since things that are sensed remind us of the true form. This association with the form
comes about by the fact of sensible things falling short of that form: “It’s certainly
possible that this happens: the one who senses something, whether seeing or hearing or
105

Logizesthai seems quite properly suited to dianoia, in so far as it is structured as a capacity to compare
phenomena and abstract their relations.
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grasping with some other sense, notices from this another thing that he had forgotten,
with which the first is associated either as dissimilar or similar” (76a1-4).
In this passage, the ground is laid for later considerations of the activity of the
sensitive, thinking soul. The role of the perceiver (or the perceiving soul) is thereby
crucial to the ontology that is in evidence at this point in the Phaedo. Most importantly,
these discussions, which, when challenged by Simmias and Cebes, give way to the allimportant claims regarding the threat of misology and Socrates’ response detailing the
need for a “second sailing.”

3 – The Telephian Cure: Misology and the Second Sailing

From what we have seen there are two major points to note about the ontology
suggested by the first account of the forms. First, although it is inspired by the
phenomenon of recollection via similarity, the hierarchical ordering of the sensible and
intelligible is performed by the judging psychē, which recognizes this similarity as
grounded in a difference that can be ordered in a hierarchy of relative likeness. Second,
this reflective activity of psychē refers to its capacity as logizesthai, which will come to
be seen as necessary to the figuration of any account of being. Although logizesthai
concerns the relations among sensible phenomena, it also concerns reflection on the
soul’s relation to phenomena (in recollection, in particular). While logizesthai receives
little elaboration in the text of the Phaedo, the pivotal discussion of the role of logos in
the path to thinking philosophically should help to illuminate this power proper to the
human soul.
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3.1 – Misology
Although we considered the discussion on recollection somewhat separately from
its aim as a proof for the soul’s imperishability, Phaedo attests that Socrates’ audience is
transfixed by its elegant persuasion. They are thus all the more shocked and distressed by
the two counter-arguments provided by Socrates’ eager interlocutors, Simmias and
Cebes, who take this opportunity to play at philosophistry. Responding to Echechrates’
urgent questions, Phaedo, who narrates the discussion, explains that Socrates was deeply
troubled by the effect these speeches had on his friends but remarks that he was able to
“heal us so well” (89a4-5) 106 and to encourage them “to join in examining the argument
(syskopein ton logon)” (89a7-8). We may conclude, then, that Socrates goes on to
address misology not because it directly relates to the substance of the counter-arguments
but because of his care for the souls of his students, a care that is not disconnected from
his erotic care, as evidenced by Socrates caressing Phaedo’s long hair (89b). Indeed,
Socrates links this erotic preoccupation with his worry about logoi when he says that
Phaedo should not cut his hair in mourning for him but that they will together have to cut
their hair in mourning “if our argument (logos) meets its end and we can’t bring it back to
life” (89b9-c1, Brann et al.). Socrates implies that the death of the logos should cause
more grief than his own.
Socrates warns his listeners that the disappointment his students are facing is a
dangerous experience, since its repetition could lead to a general mistrust and, worse yet,
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The significance of this suggestion from Phaedo foreshadows Socrates’ final words: “We owe a cock to
Aesclepius. Give what’s due and don’t be careless” (118a7-8). This connection between the debt owed for
a healing and the imperative to care for one’s soul is precisely the one at stake in Socrates discussion of
misology.
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a hatred of arguments (misologoi) (89d1). Likening this state to that of one who has a
general mistrust and hatred of all humans, Socrates makes the poignant claim that the
blame for such a condition does not rest on those who have proven untrustworthy but on
the one who has naïvely trusted. Socrates says that without the art of argument (“aneu
tēs peri tous logous technēs,” 90b7) in one’s soul, any argument may be persuasive
without good reason and lead to distress when one’s belief is proven false. Clearly this is
a claim that is dear to Socrates, as he took it to be his god-given vocation to rid people of
their unexamined beliefs and guide them toward a concern for their souls. 107 From this
point on, the aim of the dialogue will be the resolution of this threat of misology, for this
is the true meaning of the soul’s perishing. 108
The discussion thus far corroborates our previous analysis that the giving of
accounts (the use of logoi) is an activity of the soul and that the cultivation of this activity
is the concern of philosophy, the soul’s relation to truth by logizesthai. In addition, the
warning against misology appears not merely because the listeners are disheartened by
the counter-arguments but also because Socrates perceives that those who are
disappointed were too well convinced of the original argument, which, because it
proceeds on the basis of a hypothesis, require a certain consent that may not be guided
sufficiently by understanding. Furthermore, in our analysis of the argument it became
clear that Socrates’ claims require that we maintain a paradox: what appears as similar
must also at the same time be different. This paradox is not the contradiction that
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This interpretation has been forcefully argued by scholars who are sensitive to the dramatic nature of the
dialogues: Ronna Burger (Platonic Labyrinth), Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem (Introduction
to Plato’s Phaedo), and James Crooks (“Writing Conversation: Notes on the Structure of the Phaedo,” in
Retracing the Platonic Text [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000], 155-174).
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objectors might wish to exploit; rather, this is the condition for philosophical thought, and
the urge toward logos. 109
We may see more clearly this special property of logos to negotiate such a
paradox if we attend to a curious comment that Socrates makes just before Cebes’ and
Simmias’ counter-arguments are offered. While Socrates is still explaining the
consequences of his account of recollection, he introduces a puzzling reference to
Penelope in relation to the soul, saying that “[The philosophical man’s soul] would not
think that philosophy must untie her and that, once untied, he should give herself over to
pleasures and pains and again force herself down and in and practice the
unaccomplishable work of some Penelope, putting her hands to the web in opposed
ways” (84a5-7). 110 This suggestion seems to foreshadow Cebes’ own use of the analogy
of the soul with the weaver in his impending counter-argument, which claims that the
soul is like the weaver of the body. But how are the soul’s weaving and the weaving of
logos related here? Let us note before continuing that there is a curious addendum to
Socrates’ allusion. To the interminable work of weaving and unweaving that is both the
ruse of Penelope and the risk of a soul encumbered by body, Socrates offers the
alternative of the philosophical soul, which “allows for a calm [separate] from these
things” (84a7-8). “Calm” here translates “galēnē,” which, in addition to meaning calm or
109

Consider, again, Socrates’ claim the Book VII of the Republic that abstract thinking is called for by the
appearance of sensible paradoxes, like that of the ring finger, which appears both larger and smaller at the
same time (523b-524d). Socrates calls upon a similar paradox as the starting point for his discussion later in
the Phaedo of the way that forms mediate oppositional relations (102b-103b).
The difficult phrase is “enantiōs histon metacheirizomenēn,” which I have translated somewhat literally.
Given the account in the Odyssey of Penelope’s scheme to avoid choosing a suitor by unweaving the web
she weaves each day, we may assume that the work of weaving and unweaving of her web (a common
gloss in translation) is at odds with itself (enantiōs). I believe this somewhat clunky phrase should be
rendered in a more literal way, since its cumbersome articulation surely draws attention to itself, whereas
the more poetical “weaving and unweaving,” while a legitimate gloss, seems to gild the overt dissonance of
the phrase in Greek.
110
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tranquility, carries an association with the calmness of a sea or wind. To include
reference here to the wind or sea would anticipate the upcoming “second sailing”
passage, but this decision is a perilous one, given the important difference between the
media of wind and water within the upcoming analogy. That is, in Socrates’ “second
sailing,” the wind fails, setting up the need for a secondary method, the use of oars set
against the water. In their explanation of the recurrent motif of the water voyage, Eva
Brann, Peter Kalkavage and Eric Salem make this illuminating comment:
Earlier in the dialogue Socrates had invoked the figure of Penelope. There
the true philosopher was not like Penelope, whose web was done only to
be undone. He did not, once free of bodily entanglement, let his soul then
fall shamelessly back into a liaison with body. But here, at the very end of
the arguments in the Phaedo, Socrates both indirectly recalls and
rehabilitates the figure of Penelope. The true philosopher is indeed like
the wife of Odysseus. At the end of an argument, when a conclusion has
been “woven,” he must then go back to the beginning, separate the strands
of which the argument is composed, and undo the web of logos. The
logos, whose return to life the new Heracles has tried to bring about, is
perpetuated precisely in this oscillation between weaving and
unweaving. 111
We should take Socrates’ reference to Penelope, then, as a reminder of his
discussion of misology, in as much as thinking cannot proceed without logos and that to
be safe in navigating logoi requires the art of logos in the soul (which includes both the
weaving and unweaving of logoi). Indeed, this art of weaving logoi is performed by the
dialogue in its formal relation to the Theseus myth. That is, if we adopt the
interpretation, argued persuasively by Ronna Burger in The Phaedo: A Platonic
Labyrinth, that the analogue of the Minotaur is misology, that Socrates is the analogue of
Theseus, and Phaedo his Ariadne (recall the erotic interlude between Socrates and
Phaedo regarding his beautiful hair), then the narration of the discourse, the unbroken
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thread of the dialogue itself, is just such a weaving that trains the soul of the reader
toward the weaving and unweaving of the logoi of the dialogue. And, although Socrates
claims this is an unending task, this does not exclude its being productive: after all,
Penelope’s “fruitless” handiwork did come to an end when Odysseus returned,
accomplishing the far more significant goal of delaying the suitors through the whole
time of Odysseus’ absence.
After Cebes has completed the second counter-argument—the equivalent,
perhaps, of the suitors’ persistent advances—Socrates pauses for some time. When he
finally speaks, Socrates says that his response to Cebes must deal with “the cause
regarding coming to be and passing away in their entirety” (95e10). Given that the
weaving and unweaving of logoi is itself an image of coming to be and passing away, we
seem to be right in our assessment of the allusion to Penelope. In so far as it is an image,
however, Socrates’ account will necessarily suffer from the same inferiority as the many
equal things, always striving to be like the equal and always falling short. Logoi, then,
are a dynamic representation of this problematic of imaging, one that, like Penelope’s
work, is constantly in process. What follows in Socrates’ story about his desire as a
young man to know the causes of things coming to be and passing away thus works as an
illustration of the dual threats of the inadequacy of logoi and the disease of the soul that is
misology. In the account of his “second sailing,” Socrates also reveals the proper
response to these threats, one that stresses the cultivation of the soul’s art of logoi.
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3.2 – Sailing Without Wind
Rather than launch into a cosmogony, which he claims is needed in order to
sufficiently respond to Cebes’ counter-argument, Socrates tells him a story about
himself. 112 While still young and curious, Socrates relates that he had been mesmerized
by the wealth of science available in the works of those thinkers that came before him,
thinkers who explained the coming to be and passing away of everything visible by
means of elemental bodies and natures or by means of essential qualities and pairs of
opposites holding all things together. Frustrated when they did not provide adequate
accounts of the cause of things, Socrates became disenchanted with “physics,” or natural
philosophy. This was his first disappointment with logoi. He goes onto explain that he
was delighted to discover a new principle in the works of Anaxagoras, which seemed
much better suited for explaining why things come to be the way they are, viz., that mind
(nous) is the cause of everything (97c1-2). In spite of this early delight, however,
Socrates says that he felt let down again by these logoi because Anaxagoras made little to
no use of this explanatory principle in his thinking, relying, as did the others Socrates had
already rejected, on merely physical explanations of things (98b-c). His disappointment
with Anaxagoras seems to have been more distressing than the first, probably because it
was precisely what had led Socrates out of his disappointment with the natural
philosophers. To find that the accounts that saved him from the first failure of logos were
no different seems to have added betrayal to disappointment. The result, Socrates says,
was that none of these thinkers could give sufficient (formal) causes for things, and only
ever offered the merely necessary (material) ones. As an example, Socrates explains that,
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This cosmological account appears to be left aside in the Phaedo, but in the next chapter we shall take
up the account of generation given in the Timaeus, returning us, finally, to the subject of cosmology
indicated by the Phaedo.
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if asked, Anaxagoras and the other natural philosophers would claim that the reason for
Socrates sitting in jail on that day is the nature of the sinews and bones that compose his
body, whereas the satisfactory account, in Socrates’ eyes, would take as far more
important the fact that the Athenian judges thought it best for him to be executed and that
Socrates himself thought it best for him to abide their decision (98c-99b). Socrates’
disappointment with Anaxagoras rests on the fact that, even though he claimed that mind
explains all order in the cosmos, he was incapable of accounting for what mind considers
good. As he says, he was “robbed” of the chance of discovering, either on his own or
from another, the “good and binding (deon) that truly is good and binding (sundeon)”
(99c5-6). 113
The threat of misology for Socrates, then, was not only the threat of losing the
satisfactory account of why things come to be the way they are but also even the
necessary account of what things are. If he had given up on logoi, he would have had to
give up on both the sufficient and the necessary accounts. Although the question of what
something is (ti esti) is just as philosophical as the question of why something is the way
it is, following Socrates’ example, these questions are nonetheless ordered—with the
account of causes ranking above the account for beings. 114 In both cases, however, logoi
are the means through which one might have the knowledge desired, and the art of this
logos is the source of the knowledge of this ordering of logoi. So, when Socrates says
that he must discuss his experiences in investigating causes because Cebes’ counter113

The move to sundeon is noteworthy in that this term also carries the more literal sense of “binding” a
wound. The significance of this binding will return when we consider the allusion to Telephus later in this
section.
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the original appeal of Anaxagoras’ principle to Socrates) has priority over the account of being because of a
concern with accounting for justice.
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argument has led him to have to address coming into being and passing away, he is also
responding to the threat of misology he has identified at the outset before addressing
Simmias’ counter-claim. It is significant that Socrates did not offer this story earlier,
since to do so would have appeared to be merely a salve for the wounds inflicted on the
argument about recollection. Introducing his cure to misology before Socrates addresses
Cebes’ argument allows him to show the relation between the investigation of causes and
the path of investigation that requires logos.
Having reached the point in his story where he too was threatened by misology,
Socrates asks Cebes if he would like to hear how Socrates has continued to investigate
causes in the face of his disappointments, using a second-best method. “Second-best”
here renders Socrates’ reference to a deuteros plous, a second sailing, which in its
colloquial context means the use of oars when there is not enough wind to sail by. The
allusion seems to suggest that the resulting method compensates for a limited external
power by the use of a power proper to the one attempting transit. 115
Socrates proclaims that because of the betrayal of science and because of having
failed in his inquiry into beings, he was fearful of being blinded like some people who,
eager for a look at the exceptional sight of the eclipsed sun, are blinded by the experience
unless they look at the image of it in a medium, like water (99d4-e1). He claims that this
is why he turned toward logoi for refuge from the threat of blindness in his soul. The
way this analogy is introduced immediately creates some ambiguity in the interpretation
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of its meaning. The question for interpreters of the image is whether Socrates is claiming
that his disappointment with the direct investigation of beings as well as his failure to
learn or discover the good are both akin to the blinding that happens when one looks
directly at an eclipse. There is no ambiguity concerning the claim that looking
exclusively at phenomenal things (as Socrates claims natural philosophers do) produces
blindness; Socrates says as much when he earlier claims that his inquiries into causes led
him to be “blinded so seriously by this investigating that I unlearned even those things
that I thought I knew before” (96c5-7). Again, immediately after giving the image,
Socrates interprets it, saying, “I myself thought this kind of thing through and was afraid
lest my soul be utterly blinded by looking at things (pragmata), trying to grasp them with
my eyes and each of the senses” (99e1-4). Clearly, at least one way that Socrates intends
the analogy of blindness is in reference to the direct investigation of things through the
senses.
Although in explaining the image Socrates explicitly refers only to the failures he
had in looking into things with his senses, he has just finished discussing his failure to
learn or discover the good and binding cause, which seems to be included in what led to
the threat of blindness. The analogy’s use of the (eclipsed) sun also lends support to the
claim that Socrates’ more recent foray in trying to learn the good and binding cause of all
things might also be a source of blindness, since the good is likened to the sun in the
Republic. But claiming that Socrates meant he was worried about being blinded not only
by the things but also by the good is at the very most only implicit. Because this point is
unclear, however, we must briefly consider the basis for such a claim to assist in our
interpretation of the significance of Socrates’ “second sailing.”
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3.2.1 – The causes of blindness
I will first address the evidence in the Phaedo for the interpretation that the good
is the source of the blindness Socrates fears, and then I will turn to the passage’s relation
to the Republic. As mentioned above, Socrates introduces the analogy directly after
having recounted his disappointment with Anaxagoras, saying that it was “after these
things” that he decided to pursue logoi. “These things” would seem to suggest the entire
story he has just told, including not only the frustration with natural philosophy but also
that whereby he was “robbed of this [learning the good and binding cause] and could not
become able to discover it myself or learn it from another” (99c8-9). If “these things”
suggests the whole story, then “after” also suggests that both of his disappointments led
to his second sailing. This is especially intimated when Socrates claims that when
(epeidē) he couldn’t reach the good he went in search of a second sailing. The thrust of
the analogy that follows is that following his failure and the threat of blindness that
corresponds to that failure, Socrates was forced to take the safer route through logoi. If
the threat of blindness comes about because of one or both of the failures, and if the
threat of blindness brings about the turn to logoi, then Socrates’ claim that his failure to
attain knowledge of the good and binding led to his search for the second sailing makes it
seem that this failure too is related to the blindness that led to the second sailing. Again,
Socrates confirms that the threat of blindness comes as a result of his having “failed at
investigating beings (ta onta).” Given the foregoing analyses, however, Socrates’ shift in
terms from pragmata to onta introduces sufficient space for claiming that this
investigation of beings might include both routes Socrates attempted but failed, meaning
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that the search for the second sailing comes out of both disappointments, and that both
can be understood as threats of blindness.
Despite this linguistic evidence, the above interpretation seems to rely on an
assumption that the Phaedo’s account is a continuation of the sun-good analogy of the
Republic, in particular, its claims that the good is like the sun and beyond being
(epikeinas tēs ousias). Since my own interpretation of the sun analogy in the Republic
benefits from the present analysis of the Phaedo, it would seem useless to argue that the
Republic cannot be called as evidence for interpreting images in the Phaedo. I would like
to argue, in any event, that the passage of the Phaedo, while consistent with the sun-good
analogy and the cave allegory, emphasizes a particular aspect of those accounts, which in
turn allows us to posit that the good itself is not precisely the source of blindness that
Socrates fears.
It seems almost absurd to try to argue that the eclipsed sun of the Phaedo has no
reference to the analogy of the sun and the good in the Republic. It is easy to elide these
two accounts, claiming that the blindness we are subjected to is caused by an experience
with which we are all familiar: the fiery intensity of the sun’s light actually pains our eyes
if we look too long at it. Joseph Cropsey, among others, feels no need even to argue this
interpretation, instead citing it as though the case were clear within the context of the
Phaedo itself: “Nor would he try to ascend to the realm of the things in themselves, for he
feared being blinded by them as are those who look directly at the sun.” 116 Things are
not so simple, however. We are immediately confronted with the fact that the analogy in
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Plato’s World: Man’s Place in the Cosmos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 207.
Hereafter, Plato’s World. Cropsey ignores the fact that Socrates refers to an eclipsed sun (rather than the
sun on its own) and then assumes that the analogue of the sun is “the things themselves,” clearly referring
to the forms. He must feel that these things are already quite clear.
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the Phaedo does not describe someone like an astronomer, looking directly at the sun in
order to investigate it, but anyone attracted by the spectacle of an eclipsed sun. In
addition, looking back to the evidence of the Republic, John Sallis comments that the
hazards of gazing at the sun appear unworthy of note there: “Socrates fails to mention the
pain and even blindness that result if one does anything more than merely glance
momentarily at the sun.” 117 And Socrates seems to have ample opportunity, since, within
this same context, he even says that the sun is seen without mentioning anything about
the detriment to vision: “While the sun is not sight, being the cause of it, it is seen by
sight itself” (508b9-10, my emphasis). This seems to indicate that the sun is an object of
study for sight, that it can be seen, and that it, unlike the good, resides within the very
realm it begets. In the Republic, Socrates clearly has the option of remarking on the
blindness that the sun can cause, but he does not. Why is this? Is it too obvious?
Perhaps this is enough of an answer. The fact of the matter is, we do not look at the sun
long enough to be blinded by it; our nature turns us away from such an act. Just as one
cannot hold one’s breath long enough to asphyxiate, one does not wish to look at the sun
directly—except during an eclipse. An eclipse is an exceptional event, a darkening of the
earth that calls attention to the enormity of the sun’s power and majesty, and we are
drawn to find the cause of such an uncommon experience. 118 Here we discover the
reason why the sun’s blinding capacity is unremarkable in the Republic and yet acts as
the centerpiece of the “second sailing” passage.
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Being and Logos, 404.
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Derrida remarks, “Dead, extinguished, or hidden, that star is more dangerous than ever” (“Plato’s
Pharmacy,” 84).
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It is important, then, that in the Phaedo Socrates chooses the eclipsed sun, rather
than merely rehearsing the sun-good analogy of the Republic. It is clear that he is
emphasizing something different in the Phaedo. Something stands between the sun and
us, something that is harmless in itself but that leads us to do something we would not
otherwise want to do, something that could blind us. We are drawn to the juxtaposition
of the sun and the moon, drawn to the effects it produces in the world and for our vision.
It is imperative, then, that we interpret the meaning of this moon and the source of our
blindness.
We will recall that Socrates explicitly states that investigating things (pragmata)
by means of the senses is blinding. This experience is like the blindness of an eclipse
because, by the logic of appearance, things themselves obscure their truth. That is,
things’ appearances often obscure their true identities. 119 This, at least, was the reason
that Glaucon and Adeimantus determined that they had to take away all the appearances
of justice from the just man in order to evaluate him in Republic, Book II. In addition to
having seen this in our analysis of the theme of imaging in the Republic, the most recent
analysis of the relation of sensible equal things to the equal itself also confirms the
distance and difference that grounds appearance. The investigation through the senses is
no less a mediation than the use of logoi, except that things, standing as the interposed
moon, are neither revealing of themselves nor of what is behind them—unless they are
reflected in the medium of logoi. 120 The blindness caused by things, then, is a blindness
of darkness and absence. All of this would seem to argue that the sun of the Phaedo is
119

This effect of a “revealing concealing” is the basis of Heidegger’s reading of the originary meaning of
truth, aletheia. See note 78.
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As Derrida notes in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” the moon is the “supplement to the sun,” just as written logos is
the supplement to speech (89).
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not an image for the “good and binding” because the stress of the analogy is upon what
obscures the sun not the sun itself.
But we must not forget why an eclipse is so dangerous. We may blame the moon
and call it a cause in a certain sense, but is it really the fault of the moon if our sight is
damaged by looking at an eclipse? Certainly not. The moon is responsible only in so far
as it provides the occasion to look at the sun with the appearance of safety, something we
would otherwise never consider doing in its absence because of the immediate pain
produced in the attempt. It is painless to look at an eclipse because so much of the light
of the sun is cut off; yet not all of it is, and this is why it can harm the eyes unnoticeably.
In an eclipse there are two kinds of blindness. On the one hand, we are blind to the moon
itself: it appears as a perfectly black disk slipping across the pale red orb of the sun. That
is, the quality of the moon is such that we cannot know it through our senses during an
eclipse. On the other hand, our sight itself is damaged by the radiation from the sun that
escapes past the edges of the moon’s outline. That is, there is a blindness that has to do
with what is seen and another blindness (occasioned by a certain attractiveness of the
first) that has to do with the capacity to sense itself.
Let us complete the analogy. If the moon is the analogue of sensible things and
the sun, following the Republic, the analogue of the good, we now see in what ways each
is a cause of the blindness that Socrates fears. In the first place, sensible things can
dazzle us, not allowing us to penetrate their surface to understand what they really are.
We are thereby “blind” to the very things we see. This was precisely what Socrates
sought to know as a young man, an understanding that was frustrated by thinkers’
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inconsistent application of the method of logoi. 121 Consider, as an analogue of the
captivating event of the sun’s eclipse, an unusual event of aesthetic experience that draws
attention toward the very impenetrability of sensible things. We are struck in such a way
when we see contradictory qualities in a single thing because of its relations to others
nearby. As Socrates will note in the discussion that follows the “second sailing” passage,
Phaedo is taller than Simmias, who is taller than Socrates (102b3-6). This event of
sensation calls anyone who sees it to investigate how it is that Simmias is both big and
small at the same time. 122 Such an account cannot be given by means of the senses
themselves. The senses can only provide the contradictions, and simply dwelling in the
contradiction will eventually blind the soul (just as the experience of aporia runs the risk
of alienating an interlocutor and causing them to turn away from the argument, e.g.,
Meno or Euthyphro). If we are interminably drawn to the black mire of sensible
contradictions, we will to a certain extent become used to such things and be incapable of
viewing the world in any other way. This, then, constitutes the second form of blindness,
which affects the capacity to think. In a certain sense, by gazing on such confusions, one
sees what lies behind the everyday face of the sensible world, but to do this with no craft
of inquiry, with no tools, is foolish and risks the elimination of all sense. 123 Socrates
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Francisco González pursues the connection of this form of blindness to say that the blindness caused by
things is a blindness to the good that lies behind them: “he [Socrates] wants us to see that the good, while
reflected in physical things, is also ‘eclipsed’ by them. Perception of a thing reveals only its physical parts;
in this way, however, perception blinds us to the good that defines the thing and gives it its unity. This is
exactly what Socrates suffered in his pursuit of natural science” (Dialectic and Dialogue, 195).
122

This is precisely the point made in Book VII of the Republic, where Socrates argues that calculation
(logismos) is the first step toward abstract thought. We have noted this passage above.
123
To a certain degree, this constitutes Plato’s (following Socrates’) charge against radical relativism.
While this position is not false, it is incomplete. Relativism is true but only as regards sense. If one refuses
to employ logos (as certain of Plato’s Heracleiteans contemporaries do), not only does one eschew the
opportunity to understand the cause of the “truth” one sees, one may altogether lose the capacity to go
beyond that level of understanding, like a prisoner who, out of laziness or greed, stops at the level of the
puppeteers to take up his own artifact.
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explains that these are the reasons he was forced to turn to logoi, which act like
reflections in water, which allow safe interaction with the phenomenon of the eclipse. As
the image of the eclipsed sun is rendered safe when cast in water, so too is the appearance
of things rendered harmless when cast in logoi.

3.2.2 – Logoi as images
The most important feature of Socrates’ “second sailing” for our purposes is the
mediation that logoi provide for inquiring into the causes of the things of sensual
experience without the risk of destroying the capacity to discern things in the first place.
There are two levels of mediation in our safe approach to this source: first, the
interposition of things between the sun and our vision and, second, the imaging of these
things in some other medium. Just as the eclipsed sun is reflected in water, producing
images that will not harm our eyes, so too do logoi produce images of those interposed
things that will not blind our souls. The analogy may be drawn out a bit further: just as
watery images are the mode of reflection proper to our eyes, so are logoi the reflections
proper to our souls. 124 This, now, recalls almost every aspect of the sun and the good
analogy of the Republic. This dialogue clearly has relevance for interpreting the “second
sailing,” and perhaps there is more that can assist in that task.
Let us begin by noting that the images in water suggested here resonate quite
directly with the passage from the cave allegory where Socrates claims that the prisoner
who reaches the surface outside of the cave will be forced by the overwhelming
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The notion of logoi as images is repeated in the Theaetetus, when one of the possible meanings of logos
is said to be “making one’s own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the
opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water” (206d1-4, Fowler).
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brightness of the daylight to turn his head down, looking only (and slowly, at that) at
reflections of the world around him: “At first he’d most easily make out the shadows and
after that the phantoms of the human beings and the other things in water” (516a6-8,
Bloom). Secondly, we may note that this portion of the cave allegory corresponds to the
third section of the divided line, the one ascribed to dianoia and hypothesis. Given that
the third section of the line is an “image,” it seems unclear from the context of the
Republic alone how something like the divided line, itself an “image for thinking,” could
be any better than an image, such as the picture of Simmias. This difference now seems
more apparent, however. The divided line, as with any hypothesis constructed for
thinking, has the capacity to reveal the forms themselves because they are dependent only
upon the soul’s capacity to reason toward those images’ original source. One cannot
reason through the image of Simmias in order to generate the sufficient reasons for his
being. This is possible, however, if we take Simmias as an image in thought, if we take
Simmias as the form that suggests his ultimate principles (the definition of human, for
example). To entertain the hypothesis of the relation of forms to instances is already to
engage the constructive power of dianoia.
On these points, at least, there is remarkable consistency between the account in
the Phaedo and that of the Republic. It is worth considering, however, a difference of
emphasis between the two passages. Whereas the attainment of the good is the whole
aim of the images of Books VI and VII of the Republic, the Phaedo’s message seems to
be a sober warning against such lofty ambitions without sufficient preparation. The
Phaedo seems to press that the way to move out of the natural disposition of blindness in
the face of reality is entirely through the acquisition of the art of logoi. But how are logoi
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helpful in this endeavor? If we consider the theme of blindness that recurs in the allegory
of the cave, we might have a hint at the notion of logizesthai we have been tracking in the
Phaedo.
After presenting the cave allegory, Socrates cautions against the harsh judgment
of anyone who appears confused:
“But if a man were intelligent,” I said, “he would remember that there are
two kinds of disturbances of the eyes, stemming from two sources—when
they have been transferred from light to darkness and when they have been
transferred from darkness to light. And if he held that these same things
happen to a soul too, whenever he saw one that is confused and unable to
make anything out, he wouldn’t laugh without reasoning but would go on
to consider whether, come from a brighter life, it is in darkness for want of
being accustomed, or whether, going from greater lack of learning to
greater brightness, it is dazzled by the greater brilliance.” (518a1-b1,
Bloom)
What Socrates indicates is reminiscent of the twofold blindness that we have already
discussed. One may be blinded by things, being mired in them and unable to see the
truth. On the other hand, one may be blinded by the brilliance of the good, peering from
behind the things, and this too would make one appear confused. In either case, however,
the appropriate response is to turn to logoi. Logoi, then, are a sort of transitional pathway
between different ways of interpreting the world. Take the case of travel to foreign lands:
one will always experience a culture shock of sorts upon arriving in an unfamiliar
country. We miss the routines and patterns that organize our understanding and
perception of the world we live in, and we experience the world as foreign because of
this. In the new place, the world is not yet ours. Language, as it happens, is key to this
feeling of inclusion or exclusion. Without our prefigured habits of meaning, we are lost,
but if we can interpret the language of another place, we are on our way to adopting that
culture’s references and, literally, reading its signs. Logoi are a habituating method, a
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way of mediating what is different and as yet unknown in a process of assimilation,
which is a mediation of the different and the same. This is exactly the process of
analogical reasoning. It is not an accident that when Socrates asks after the “art of
turning around (periagogē)” (518d4) that begins the ascent out of ignorance, the answer
is logizesthai (522c7).

3.3 – The Weapon that Heals
If we take Socrates’ own philosophical journey as a parable of the alternative to
misology, we learn that the only way to safely negotiate the threat of misology is to use
logos as the medium for our investigation. Let us not forget that Socrates originally said
that misology is to be counteracted by having the art of logos in one’s soul. If the threat
in this case were that his soul might be blinded, then the use of logoi is clearly a method
for the soul. We have come a bit closer at this point to understanding why logizesthai
was so important earlier. Moreover, we have identified this art of the soul (logizesthai)
as the mediation of what must already be mediated. This relation, as we have seen
before, is analogical.
We may confirm our interpretation of the ironic claim that the only way to be
cured of misology is to use logoi when we find that, in his long, mythic construction of
the layers of the earth and the comings and goings of souls, Socrates alludes off-hand to
the legend of Telephus. At this point in the dialogue, Socrates claims that the path to and
from Hades is not so straight as Euripides’ Telephus would have it. Telephus was a
Trojan ally whose leg was wounded in battle by the spear of Achilles. Owing to the
godlike strength of the wielder of the spear, the wound itself was supernatural and could
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not be healed. 125 Perplexed, Telephus asked an oracle for advice, and he was told that the
wound would be healed only when the one who wounded became the healer and the
instrument his cure. Telephus seeks out Achilles and tells him the oracle. Achilles
abides by the request, and, flaking the rust from his spear into the wound, he realizes the
oracle, curing Telephus. 126
This reflects back on our reading of the second sailing not only because it shows
the productive logic of the original paradox 127—that what inflicted the wound in the
threat of misology was also the source of its cure (logoi)—but also because it shows that
the one who wields the instrument of wounding must also become the healer by means of
the same instrument. In this case, it seems that Socrates stands in for Achilles, having in
some sense wounded the souls of his listeners by allowing them to become too convinced
of his logoi without their having the proper art of logoi to judge by. 128 He becomes the
healer too, as Phaedo attests (89a5-6), when he brings their attention to the danger and
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Another story of divine gangrene is that of the pitiful yet unsympathetic character of Philoctetes, an
Achaean who suffered a foot injury (most accounts claim it was a Apollonian snake bite) on the way to the
Trojan War. Because Philoctetes’ agonizing yelps of pain and the stench of the ulcerous wound were too
excruciating for his comrades to bear, the group, led by Odysseus, abandon Philoctetes on the island of
Lemnos. Seamus Heaney’s recent English translation and adaptation of Sophocles’ dramatization of this
legend is quite moving (The Cure at Troy: A Version of Sophocles’ Philoctetes [New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux: 1991].)
126

Modifications on this story are multiple, and there was a play on the subject by Sophocles (The
Assembly of the Achaeans). Euripides’ lost play, Telephus, gives the account that Telephus goes to his
enemy’s wife, Agamemnon’s famously unfaithful Clytemnestra, who advises him to return to Achilles and
use the rust from the spear. In the play, Telephus dresses as a beggar (a common trick—viz., Athena and
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This is the oracular method par excellence. In addition, this logic of the “productive paradox” is the
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128

Socrates even states that this is his concern: “I run the risk of being in a mood not to love wisdom but to
love victory, as do altogether uneducated people…But as for all of you, if you’re persuaded by me and give
little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth, you must agree with me if I seem to you to say what’s
true; and if I don’t, you must strain against me with every argument you’ve got, taking care that I don’t, out
of eagerness, go off, having deceived both myself and you, like a bee that’s left its stinger behind” (91a1c6, Brann et al.).
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when he tells them his own story about the danger of investigating causes. If we apply
the reference one more time, we also find that in the analogy of the observation of an
eclipse what threatens to blind us (sensible things) cannot be avoided, but the way that we
look at the phenomenon can be modified. Although the danger of their inaccuracy as
well as misology threatens us, we cannot avoid logoi. While we must go through them,
the way that we use them (whether with the art of logos in our soul or not) determines our
safety. The lesson of the second sailing and the warning about misology are now linked:
knowing that we are threatened by the intensity of our sensing of things but also knowing
that things are only known when they are investigated through logoi, we must acquire
facility in using logoi to investigate things more safely. Rather than being led around by
the pleasures and pains associated with sensing things through the body (weaving and
unweaving our own soul), we must use this very threat to attend both to how things
appear in logoi (to the web of logos reflective of each thing) and to how this reveals their
truth. In order to do this, however, we are challenged by another threat of blindness, that
of misology. A willful blindness, misology entraps us when we do not have the art of
logos in our soul by which we could safely judge the truthfulness of accounts about
things. If we attend to this care of our souls, we will be skilled in the medium through
which we may safely know those things that otherwise threaten to blind. At the same
time, we will not be able to be led by persuasive, though false, explanations of the causes
of things.
Socrates goes on to explain his alternative method, which looks for the truth of
beings in logoi: “Each time, I put as a ground (hypothemenos) the account (logon) that I
determine is most robust; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put
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down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, and whatever isn’t I put down
as not true” (100a3-7). Again, Socrates not only tells Cebes what his method is but will
show him how it works, so that “should something of what I say seem useful to you, you
may use it for persuading us about what you say” (96a2-3). With the ensuing
demonstration, Socrates shows Cebes how to use hypothetical argument and makes good
on the claim that the art of logos is essential to rejecting misology. He also shows Cebes
how this art in turn redeems his earlier promise to care for the truth and for the life of the
argument more than his reputation and his own life, since the hypothetical method will
help the argument concerning causes as a whole. This order is important, however:
without the proper way of thinking, you will never be able to think the truth even if
confronted by it. 129 Indeed, looking directly at the truth blinds us to it, so we must adapt
the method to our humanity: hypothesis is just that humane method.

4 – The Second Account of the Forms

In the following section, we will investigate the way that Socrates demonstrates
the mediation that logoi perform. In the hypothetical investigation that follows, Socrates
will return to those questions whose unsatisfactory answers had frustrated him in his
search of causes, leading him to recognize the need for logoi. In doing this, he will
discover that there are more sufficient causes that he had not been able to see before he
turned himself over not to the guidance of the logoi of others but to the logoi themselves.
Understanding Socrates’ account of the way these logoi are employed, then, will be of the
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This is reminiscent of Socrates’ reformulation of Meno’s challenge to the possibility of learning,
“Meno’s Paradox” (80d-e).
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utmost importance for understanding the way the soul negotiates its several affections,
both sensible and intelligible. The path of logoi will describe just such a mediation
between the sensible and intelligible, something the first account of the forms began but
only the second completes.

4.1 – A New Hypothesis
The second account of the forms is similar to the first argument about equal things
and equality in that the metaphysical account is the basis for the psychical one: “From
these [ta polythrylēta] I hope to demonstrate the cause and find out that the soul is an
immortal thing” (100b8-9). This account does differ from the prior, however, in its
metaphysical orientation, which now reflects the threat exposed by the eclipse analogy.
Socrates expresses the new formulation of the hypothesis itself as well as the reasons for
judging it to be robust and true by asking Cebes whether he will agree that beautiful
things are what they are through nothing other than the beautiful itself: “…nothing makes
a thing beautiful but the presence of or communion with that beautiful—or however and
in whatever way you say it happens. As for that, I don’t yet make any definite assertion,
but I do assert that it’s by the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful” (100d4-e3,
Brann et al.). 130 This is already quite a different claim than the earlier discussion of the
equal things and the equal itself, wherein Socrates proceeded on the basis of the
assumption that first we perceive equal things and only after this question their relation to
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As we see here, in addition to restructuring the method of investigating causes, Socrates introduces the
terms “participates” (metechei), “presence” (parousia), and “communion” (koinōnia) to adumbrate the
relation between the things and the forms. Nonetheless, he is careful not to be distracted by providing a
detailed account of these different articulations of the relation—not only because this is not the aim of the
hypotheses but also because, as he says, this is a matter merely of preference. Note here also that each of
these terms is an analogue of the relation that holds between the forms and their instances.
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the equal itself. With the beginning of a new argument, Socrates has inverted the order of
the hypothesis such that, rather than begin by assuming the existence of beautiful things,
he assumes there to be a beautiful itself and that if there were any beautiful things they
would get their being from the beautiful itself. Nonetheless, the strength of this new
hypothesis seems to be drawn from the earlier reflections on the relation of equal things
to the equal itself, namely, that we come to know the equal itself only on the basis of
sensing equal things’ striving for a likeness to equality itself.
Socrates iterates this hypothesis numerous times with the small, the big,
multitude, one, and two and in so doing demonstrates the power of this hypothesis to
avoid the weaknesses of the common opinions that he held before his encounter with the
physicists, whose speculations confused him about those things in which he had
originally placed his trust. 131 He shows that the hypotheses are strong by reviewing the
logical contradictions inherent in his previous, unsophisticated uses of language, such as
the claim that something is bigger than another by “a head,” which, upon investigation,
produces the paradox that something is big because of something small (101a-b). 132
Again, the hypotheses of the forms are shown to be compromised by their use by one
unskilled in logoi.
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Socrates’ original trust in common opinions rightly calls to mind the second level of the divided line,
that wherein “things” (ta onta) reside, and in which we may only “trust” (pistis).
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These concerns are downplayed in the later dialogue, Philebus, where Socrates claims that such
perplexities are fodder only for sophistical neophytes and that the problem of the one and the many is not
so much about contradiction as about the fact and indeterminacy of their relation (14a-18d). But this
attention to relations is implicit to the discussion of the Phaedo, as I argue in what follows. The result, then,
I contend, is that the differences between the “middle period” metaphysics and the “late” metaphysics is
more a matter of the contexts of elaboration than the content of the purported “doctrine.” This claim would
also lend some support to the idea that considering the forms to be “doctrinal” is in fact misleading, as it
would require a developmental hypothesis about Plato’s work, which is not born out by the kind of analysis
I am offering here.
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Having intimated that the strength of the hypotheses of forms lies in the
avoidance of semantic paradoxes, Socrates reflects that even strong hypotheses can be
challenged, requiring ever more sufficient bases for inquiry: “And should you have to
give an account of that hypothesis itself, you’d give it in just the same way, by
hypothesizing in turn another hypothesis, whichever of the higher ones appeared best,
until you came to something sufficient” (101d6-8, Brann et al.). Socrates will test what
follows from their hypotheses but not before an interruption of the framing dialogue
between Echecrates and Phaedo.
It is in fact Phaedo, in his narrative of Socrates’ argument, and not Socrates, who
first names these hypotheses as eidē: “…it was agreed that each of the forms was
something and that everything else that has a share in them gets its name from these very
things” (102b1-3, Brann et al.). 133 This statement goes far beyond anything that Socrates
himself has said to this point, positing both the existence of the forms individually and
the relation of the forms to naming. This is an important moment of contrast between the
investigation itself and the account of the investigation. After all, Phaedo provides an
entirely mediated discourse, conveying the discussion of Socrates’ last day, as though it
were present, whereas the whole discourse is an image in logoi. 134 Phaedo is even
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This is not, however, to say that the term has not yet been mentioned. When Socrates introduces the
initial hypotheses he does in fact use the term “eidos,” but not to indicate the hypotheticals. Perhaps this
crucial term appears as a promise of the later account, but at that point it is used only to refer to the “eidos
of the cause” (100b3-4). Socrates has already explicitly asserted that he has put to himself the task of giving
an account of the cause of coming to be and passing away, claiming that he is required to do so in order to
respond to Cebes’ concern with weaving, which allusion suggested both the weaving of logoi and the telic
weaving of beings by Anaxagoras’ elusive nous. Cropsey rightly accentuates the metaphysical bent of the
ensuing discussion: “Before proceeding, Socrates pauses at length to reflect, and decides that nothing less
than a full account of the causation of generation and dissolution will serve. The reason for this is evident:
the skepticisms of Simmias and Kebes rest on the premise that the natural whole of corporeal causation is
the whole pure and simple” (Plato’s World, 203).
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Indeed, this is a feature of many of Plato’s dialogues, which suggests that the Platonic medium is itself a
performance of the mediation indicated by Socrates’ second sailing. One potent example of Plato’s
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careful to note before his summary of the beginning of the hypothetical discussion that
this is what he thinks (egō oimai) Socrates said (102a11). We are thereby made aware
that these “infamous” things are indeed the forms, but not without any hesitation. They
are recognized as problematic, at least from the “absent” Plato’s perspective if not also
from Socrates’. 135 The questionability of a dogmatic, dualist metaphysics (or
metaphysical realism, or Platonic idealism), then, is not merely suggested by the way the
dialogue unfolds. The uncertainty of the “theory of forms” is included in the dialogical
detail of the way that Phaedo identifies the recognizable Platonist thesis that the forms
exist in their own right and are the basis for anything else being called after the form’s
name. The insertion of this perspective at the instauration of the “mighty” hypothesis
cautions us to preserve a Socratic humility about the provisional nature of what has been
established this far (100a4). As Socrates instructs, the initial hypotheses are always to be
replaced by more sufficient explanations, ones that stretch beyond the merely necessary
causes that these descriptive names offer. Moreover, we may conclude from our prior
analysis that our understanding of the “forms,” if we can even know what these are on
their own, is founded on logoi and that through logoi they must be sounded out for
consonance and resiliency. This, in fact, is in great measure the substance of the art of
logos.

preoccupation with this issue is the use made of the “city in speech (logō)” in the Republic, which is just
such a model appropriate to our peculiarly human way of understanding (369a5-6). This in turn is related to
dianoia, the mediating, third portion of the divided line (dianoia) concerned with “images for thinking,”
which we address more directly in what follows.
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“I think Plato was sick” (59b10).
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4.2 – Testing the Hypothesis
Beginning from Cebes’ assent to the forms as the sufficient account of the
appearances of things (as “big,” “beautiful,” etc.), Socrates constructs a problem to test
this new hypothesis against the paradox of relative sizes: “‘Now if you say ‘yes’ to all
this,’ said he, ‘then whenever you claim that Simmias is bigger than Socrates but littler
than Phaedo, aren’t you on those occasions asserting that both these things, Bigness and
Smallness, are in Simmias?’” (102b3-6, Brann et al.). With this, Socrates reconsiders the
original problem of measuring height “by a head,” complicating it by inserting the issue
of accounting for relations into the question of how to account for causes. Claiming that
it is neither Socrates himself (by being Socrates), nor Simmias himself (by being
Simmias), who is the cause of the difference in size between each, and instead using the
original hypothesis, Socrates asserts that the adequate cause of Simmias’ bigness and
Socrates’ smallness is the “bigness” and “smallness” in each respectively. Using the
original hypothesis is problematic, however, because “bigness” is not the same as
Simmias nor is it something that he always has. Instead, it is something that he “happens
to have” when he is in relation to Socrates. 136
Originally, the reason for abandoning the “wise” answer to the puzzle that claims
Phaedo is taller “by a head” is that something other than the quality itself produced that
136

This distinction may be articulated in any number of anachronistic ways: as essence vs. accident, as
substance vs. property, as primary and secondary ousiai. While, even among themselves, these concepts are
not equivalent, they are severally read back as the ground of this discussion. However, given the tentative
and provisional nature of Socrates’ assertions, it seems vain to attribute to Plato’s dialogues the later
metaphysical accounts that come to appropriate it for purposes highly contextualized by the systematic
metaphysical projects underwritten by the very discussion in question. The unanimity of this view is
overwhelming, with most interpreters following the now longstanding authority of John Burnet, one of the
most strident proponents of the claim that this passage represents an articulation of the distinction between
essence and accident (Plato’s Phaedo [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911], note to 102b8-c9). On the other
hand I am sympathetic with Hector-Neri Castañeda’s argument that this passage concerns relations rather
than essential and accidental predication and that these are not reducible to each other (“Plato’s Relations,
Not Essences or Accidents, at Phaedo 102b2-d2,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 1 [1978]: 39-53).
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quality: something small was taken to be the cause of something big. The new
hypothesis (that forms are the cause of things’ appearances) appeals to a cause similar to
its effect. Unfortunately, in the problem presented, there are two opposite appearances in
Simmias, and as a result this opposition is carried into the explanation of the causes. One
is forced to claim that “Smallness” and “Bigness” are both the cause of Simmias
appearing as he does. These forms on their own are unable to account for the relations
among forms as they appear together in sensible things. This is because the hypothesis of
the forms as causes implies that the name given to an appearance gets its being from the
form (the beautiful, just, big, etc.) showing through whatever appears in that way. This
feature reveals the new hypothesis’ response to the demand for an investigation through
logoi, since forms are often understood as a principle of predication. The problem with
the first approach to the forms was that it could not account for the relations among forms
and only accounts for forms’ relation to instances. An account of the cause of relations is
therefore necessary, an account that can explain how Simmias can be in a relation as big
and in another relation as small. What appears to be a challenge to the new hypothesis,
however, will ultimately become its strength.

4.3 – The Revised Hypothesis
Evidently, the hypothesis of the forms as causes has difficulty accounting for
relations because it relies upon an account of a cause that is similar to its effect, whereas
the earlier hypothesis accounts for things’ appearances by reference to something
dissimilar. Recall that the difference between these hypotheses lies in a difference of
perspective, not in a difference of terms. They have always been pointing to the relation
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between forms and things. The difference between the hypotheses rests on whether
similarity (as can be seen in the translation of eidos as “look”) or difference (represented
by a view that stresses ontological hierarchy) is emphasized. As a result, the problems
suggested by the first account of the forms haunt the second account: the explanation of
the relation of similarity between equal things and the equal itself requires an appeal to
their difference, which creates a paradox. What is required for sufficiency in both these
accounts is an account of relation itself and not merely relational qualities.
To give a more sufficient account, an account of the original hypotheses, as he
had earlier told Cebes might be needed, Socrates refigures the issue once more,
introducing the special examples of fire and snow, 137 visible phenomena that have in
them the persistence of a contrary, in this case, hot and cold. Neither will perdure as
what it is if it does not also hold on to its special character as hot or cold. With the
introduction of this consideration, Socrates himself finally employs the term “eidos”:
“So, it’s the case,’ said he, ‘about some things of this sort, that the Form [eidos] Itself
isn’t the only thing worthy of the form’s name for all time; there’s also something else,
something that is not that form but, whenever it is, always has the shape of that form”
(103e2-5, Brann et al.). That is, with respect to our use of logoi, there is a form itself that
always takes the name (bigness itself or littleness itself), but there are also some special
things (like fire and snow) that do not occur without also taking that name. Socrates has
retrospectively named the “infamous” things with the moniker “eidos,” but it seems that
this necessarily comes late. This is because the hypotheses must first be grounded in the
137

Dorter aptly notes that the choice of snow rather than ice relates to the need to represent a substance that
disappears (quickly) when confronted with the opposed property: “Perhaps it is just because the ‘perishing’
of snow is thus more definitive than that of ice would be, that Plato chose it rather than the otherwise more
obvious ice for his example” (Plato’s Phaedo, 143).
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logoi we use before we might understand or articulate the forms as the cause of those
logoi.
Consider the fact that the first articulation of the hypothesis comes by way of
referring to the forms as polythrylēta. In a basic sense, this term means “much talked
about,” but it can also have a pejorative tone, as something that is “babbled” about all
over. In a sense, we know of the forms through others’ logoi long before we have
considered the forms through the logoi of the forms themselves; we are always already
caught up in the conversation of the forms before we are prepared for it. If we reflect
now on the analogy of the eclipse, we may extend this insight a bit further. Just as our
curiosity turns our attention toward something dangerous that we do not know to be
dangerous, so too are we caught up in the web of arguments that people are always using
to account for things we each have questions about before we really have the skill to
determine the value or harm of their logoi. This describes a similar problem to the one
Socrates identifies in the Protagoras dialogue concerning the purchase of mathēmata
from a sophist:
“For I tell you there is far more serious risk in the purchase of doctrines
than in that of eatables. When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry
them off from the dealer or merchant in separate vessels, and before you
take them into your body by drinking or eating you can lay them by in
your house and take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to
what is fit to eat or drink and what is not, and how much you should take
and when; so that in this purchase the risk is not serious. But you cannot
carry away doctrines in a separate vessel: you are compelled, when you
have handed over the price, to take the doctrine in your very soul by
learning it, and so to depart either an injured or a benefited man. (314a1b4) 138
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W.R.M. Lamb’s translation in the Loeb Classical Library edition, Vol. 165 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1924).
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Logoi, then, are not the same as the forms, but they are indicative of them and are
necessarily prior in the order of discovery. 139 It is clear from this that Socrates’ own use
of hypotheses has been a performance of the proper procedure by which to grapple safely
with things and their causes, the forms. The hypotheses are obviously neither the forms
themselves nor the things themselves; they are reflections of and on the relations between
these two aspects of reality. Because they are reflections they are imperfect, but the price
of perfection is the soul’s blindness to intelligibility. This is the reason that logoi are
needed: to mediate the forms and things for our souls. The way that we perform this
mediation is through hypothesis.

5 – Hypothesis: The Medium of Thinking

We have found that the means of the safer path suggested by Socrates’ “second
sailing” is hypothesis and that hypothesis, in turn, is the representative of the medium of
logoi. Since the Phaedo itself offers no detailed explanation of the method of hypothesis,
let us briefly consider Socrates’ accounts of this path in both the Meno and in the
Republic. In so doing, we will grasp a sense of the precise way that hypothesis acts as a
medium within the soul.
Having just provided a demonstration of the way that recollection allows for the
generation of true opinions, Socrates is baffled by Meno’s insistence that he skip over
identifying virtue itself in order to answer whether virtue is teachable. Rather than resist
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Aristotle’s methodological reflections on the order of discovery versus the order of causes is thus
distinctly Platonic (if not also Socratic). The characteristic difference, however, lies in his explicit
articulation of the method, whereas Plato’s most potent engagement with this method comes in
performances of it in the dialogues. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095a31-b3; Metaphysics, Book II,
993b4-12.
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him again, however, Socrates gives in, asking only that they proceed by the method that
he prefers for such an investigation: “So we must, it appears, inquire into the qualities of
something the nature of which we do not yet know. However, please relax your rule a
little bit for me and agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a
hypothesis. I mean the way geometers often carry on their investigations” (86e1-7). 140
Socrates goes on to describe the way that geometers begin with a certain hypothesis about
the relations between shapes of particular proportions. Beginning with these hypotheses,
they go on to determine what is or is not compatible with these hypotheses. What he
describes here seems to be a sort of “applied” hypothetical method, which fits well with
the type of investigation he will embark on next with regard to whether virtue is
teachable. The “hypotheses” of this method are twofold. First, the geometer must
assume the figures and numbers that pertain to the problem. Second, the geometer must
put these hypotheses into some sort of relation on the basis of which he will test out what
follows from those relations. Similarly, Socrates must presume the nature of virtue,
teaching, knowledge, etc. in order to produce a hypothesis about their interrelations,
which he can then test.
This allows us to refine our earlier discussion about hypothesis. Each hypothesis
shares the assumption of the existence of the forms and their instances and then produces
a hypothesis about their relation. In the first account, the hypothesis is that if there are
equal things, then they are striving to be like equality itself. The second account inverts
the original hypothesis, saying that if there are beautiful (or big, etc.) things, then they
have beauty itself (or big itself) in them. Socrates’ final revision (concerning fire and
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G. M. A. Grube translation in Plato: Five Dialogues, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2002).
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snow and the even and odd) suggests that he has in mind the following hypothesis: If
something reflects an oppositional quality, this is because of a relation to a particular
form that is not itself an opposite.
An important difference exists between the use of hypotheses in the Phaedo and
the description and use of the method of hypothesis in the Meno. In the Meno, hypothesis
seems to tie us down to diagrams and other representations of the relations at work in the
problem, something the Phaedo appears not to need. 141 This is certainly not because
Socrates does not care to leave such images behind. In the Meno, Socrates himself was
led to sketch the problem he used as a demonstration with the slave boy. But is this
because it was necessary for the problem? Surely anyone who has already learned
geometry would be familiar with the problem of how to construct the double area on the
basis of square with an area of four. Anyone who has truly grasped the ideas this
problem points to has no need of the diagram. They would, however, use such an image
in order to teach someone else who has not yet learned the problem and its solution. The
entanglement of hypothesis in images, then, is related to the need to acquire the skill of
using logoi in the soul, which is demanded by Socrates’ warning against misology and
dramatized by the eclipse analogy. Given these things, let us now consider the difference
between thinking with the use of hypotheses that employ images and thinking with the
use of hypotheses alone.
In Book VI of the Republic, while describing the lower section of the intelligible
region attributed to dianoia, Socrates makes the following claims:
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This seems even to be true of Socrates’ use of hypothesis regarding the teaching of virtue. The
soundness of the hypothesis is never tested out merely on conceptual grounds. There are often appeals to
the realities of everyday life—from the virtue of actual statesmen’s sons to Anytus’ impressions of
sophists.
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1) …the soul, using as images the things that were previously imitated, is
compelled to investigate on the basis of hypotheses and makes its way
not to a beginning (archēn) but to an end (teleutēn). (510b4-6, Bloom)
2) I suppose you know that the men who work in geometry, calculation
(logismous), and the like treat as known the odd and the even, the
figures, three forms of angles, and other things akin to these in each
kind of inquiry (methodon). These things they make hypotheses and
don’t think it worthwhile to give any further account (logon) of them
to themselves or others, as though they were clear to all. Beginning
(archomenoi) from them, they go ahead with their exposition of what
remains and end (teleutōsin) consistently at the object toward which
their investigation was directed. (510c2-d3, Bloom)
3) Don’t you also know that they use visible forms (horōmenois eidesi)
besides and make their arguments (logous) about them, not thinking
(dianooumenoi) about them but about those others that they are like?
They make the arguments for the sake of the square itself and the
diagonal itself, not for the sake of the diagonal they draw, and likewise
with the rest. These things themselves that they mold and draw, of
which there are shadows and images in water, they now use as images,
seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in no other
way than with thought (dianoia). (510d5-511a1, Bloom)
4) Well, then, this is the form I said was intelligible. However, a soul in
investigating it is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a
beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses. And
it uses as images those very things of which images are made by the
things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to be
clear and are given honor. (511a3-8, Bloom)

The second quote seems completely consistent with Socrates’ description in the Meno of
the work that geometers do with hypotheses and the role their assumptions (the figures,
numbers, etc.) plays in them. It adds to that conversation, though, that the aim of the
geometer’s task is not to question and discover the causes of those hypotheses but instead
to use them in order to achieve some end for thought. This point was brought up in the
first quote, where Socrates seems to claim that the way these hypotheses are imaged
requires that they are forced into serving ends of thought other than themselves. Taking
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this along with the third quote, we find that the nature of these hypotheses as imaged is
what distinguishes them from the hypotheses that produce noetic understanding of the
forms. Nevertheless, in order for these images to be “intelligible,” they must somehow
be different from an image, such as a mirror’s reflection or portrait. Geometrical
diagrams and illustrations of the relations among the hypotheses differ from the “lower”
images in so far as they are constructed for the sake of thinking through the things they
image. That is, the lines drawn in the sand for Socrates’ demonstration of recollection
are not drawn for the sake of gazing at them (for aesthetic purposes) but in order to evoke
the intelligible counterparts of those lines. 142 These intelligible images are what Socrates
refers to as images of “the things that were previously imitated.” He refers, of course, to
the sensible things of which likenesses (like the mirror’s reflection and the portrait) are
imitations.143 Nevertheless, being tied to images requires that this form of hypothetical
thinking always aim at something other than the hypotheses themselves, namely some
combination and relation of forms.
In the same section of the Republic, Socrates goes on to describe dialectic, the
form of thought that allows one to reach out beyond hypotheses toward the archai of
those very hypotheses, the forms themselves: “I mean that which argument itself grasps
with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really
hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free
from hypothesis (anupothetou) at the beginning of the whole” (511b4-7, Bloom).

142

This is the same argument that was made in the previous chapter regarding the status of the divided line
as an image for thought.
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It seems necessary to claim, however, that all sensible things can be imaged, for a photograph can be
reproduced, copied, traced, etc. Thus, imitation is a continuum. After all, sensible things themselves are
imitations of the forms, according to the cave allegory.
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Socrates also claims that this method is free of anything sensed, which is what allows it
to arrive at the intelligible foundation of those many images caused by the forms (511c12).
We can see now that the use of hypotheses is not univocal. To use hypotheses
does not automatically mean that one is a geometer or other discursive thinker. One may
well use hypotheses in the search for the ground of those hypotheses themselves. But are
we right to assume that, since there are no diagrams in use in the Phaedo, it too
participates in just such dialectical uses of hypotheses? Do the Phaedo’s uses of
hypotheses rely on images at all? We discovered that the first formulation of the
hypothesis had to do with the way that forms are implied by our experience of sensible
things’ equality. Appeal was made to our imagining (or, perhaps, even seeing) two sticks
or stones that are of equal size. That this is clearly mimetic hypothesis can be shown by
reference to the fact that this passage, like the divided line, is best taught to others by
reference either to actual lengths of sensible things or drawings representing Socrates’
examples. At the very least, imagining these examples seems to require the same appeal
to images that is described in the Meno and the Republic as the geometric method of
hypothesis. As we noted already, the second articulation of the hypothesis relies on the
conclusions of the first, but this alone does not make it mimetic rather than dialectical.
We must question, then, the connection that the eclipse analogy has with the hypothesis
that follows it. This will allow us to understand the peculiar way that this discourse
performs the transition between mimetic and dialectical uses of hypothesis.
As Socrates describes it in the Republic, hypothesis has a double role to play in
thinking. It allows for the evidence of the senses, from which we all begin, to act as the
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ground from which our hypotheses sprout, such that their source may be questioned
carefully, without blinding us. Secondly, hypotheses can question the very basis of those
hypotheses, discovering not only the causes of things appearing the way that they do but
the cause of appearance itself. This means that hypotheses act as a bridge between the
intelligible and the sensible. No wonder that, at the point when Socrates claims he must
investigate the causes of all coming into being, both of these uses of hypothesis come to
bear on his discussion in the Phaedo. Hypothesis, then, is a medium for our safe
witnessing of the drama of the eclipse, and it stands as the image in deed (en ergois) of
the relation of the intelligible and the sensible. The safer route that Socrates
recommended is now more clearly seen to require the tools of dianoia. Even if dialectic
is the ultimate goal, such thinking still requires hypothesis and these are possible only on
the basis of images in logos. We may also reflect that, as a result of this dependence
upon hypothesis and dianoia, any final understanding of the forms will have been
produced on the basis of these “images for thinking” and will bear within them the
structure of that thought.
What remains to be considered is the fact that this elaborated metaphysics, so far
from any purported realism (naïve or metaphysical), interacts with the analogy through
which it is reflected. Just as logoi are that through which we might know anything of the
forms reflected through beings in them, so too has dialectical metaphysics taken place on
the basis of an analogy, which, as it reflects, comes to shape what it reflects. This can be
seen to be the case in so far as logos is adopted as the secure path of wisdom. In
particular, logos is taken up through hypotheses because of their unique capacity to
negotiate the relation between the sensible and intelligible and to provide an image for
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thinking through causes within and between each. The soul, then, is the binding relation
that holds both sides of the metaphysical analogy together in a proportional relation. This
is because just as hypotheses are reflections adapted to the logical nature of our souls, it
would seem that the account of this logical nature of the soul would itself need to be
expressed analogically: the soul proceeds by way of logoi, and the logos of the soul (a
logos of logos) must be analogical. This is why Socrates’ explanation of the path of
logos had to occur by means of an analogy.
We turned to the Phaedo in order to understand the way that the metaphysics of
imaging, portrayed in the account of the forms, is founded on analogical structures of
thought. Clearly, the first account of the forms sketches the problem of the forms as
mimetic principles, since they describe a similarity that is nonetheless beholden to
difference. While this hypothesis of the forms is descriptive of the relation between the
sensible and intelligible, it is not sufficient. This and other perceived failures prompted
Socrates to caution against misology and to tell his story of disillusionment with regard to
logos. This mythos emphasized the perceiver as inquisitive and curious but ignorant and
therefore in peril of losing the very capacity by which he might exercise any inquiry. By
suggesting that, in spite of the disappointments of logoi, one must turn to them for refuge,
Socrates recognizes that logoi are fundamental to the soul, which allow it to traverse the
distinction between the intelligible and sensible. Having begun by searching for an
account of the reasons for believing that the soul is immortal, Socrates succeeds in
providing an account of its participation in the relation between the being and
appearance, the forms and things. His account demonstrates the work of logoi in bearing
the soul toward the forms by showing the way that hypotheses operate both within
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dianoia and dialectic. Hypothesis, then, is a logos that operates as a means of mediating
the sensible and the intelligible (things and forms) as well as integrating discursive
thought and dialectic (dianoia and nous). By performing a double mediation, one
ontological and the other psychological, hypothesis is a figure of analogy essential to
Plato’s metaphysical thought.
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Chapter Four
Analogy in the Kosmo-logos of Plato’s Timaeus

It seems to me to be glaringly clear to all who
are not utterly blind to serious literature that the
aim of the Platonic Timaeus is firmly fixed upon
the whole of physical inquiry, and involves the
study of the All, dealing with this from
beginning to end. 144
Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus

1 – Metaphysical Analogy Writ Large

Our analyses of the construction and effect of the divided line in the Republic and
of the soul’s mediation of the intelligible and sensible through hypothesis and logoi in the
Phaedo have demonstrated that Plato’s thinking is deeply infused with an analogical
structure. Nothing of what we have seen thus far, however, functions precisely as an
account (logos) of the reason that analogy is implicated in these ways. While this form
has been active within the metaphysics and psychology of the dialogues we have
discussed, Socrates has not given a sustained discussion of the relation between the
subjects of his discourse and the manner by which his discourse proceeds—and he never
will. It seems that Plato reserved such explicitly reflective philosophical discourse for
characters who, while associated with Socrates, do not have quite his level of
commitment to the awareness and even practice of ignorance 145: “…when I do not know,
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Harold Tarrant, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), I: §1.4-7, 91.
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By “practice of ignorance,” I mean the benefit Socrates attaches to aporia, such as his defense in the
Meno of his elenchtic practice with Meno’s slave: “Socrates: Have we done him any harm by making him
perplexed (aporein) and numb as the torpedo fish does? Meno: I do not think so. Socrates: Indeed, we have
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neither do I think I know” (Apology 21d5). 146 Such a character is Timaeus, the
Pythagorean geometer and astronomer from Italian Locri who offers a feast of logoi, an
ambitious monologue on the generation of the kosmos. 147 While Socrates is present for
the discourse, his contributions act to contextualize the ensuing discourse, introducing the
aim of the speech and its lineage in the dramatic timeline of the Republic, Timaeus, and
Critias. Timaeus’ role as a thinker who is empowered to lay claim to explicit theories
suggests that his namesake text may be a site for a more developed discussion of analogy.
Although Timaeus’ discourse is highly reflective of Socratic practice and the themes
developed in those dialogues Socrates conducts, nowhere does Socrates himself explicitly
take up the analogical themes that Timaeus introduces.
In addition to Timaeus’ peculiar capacity to approach Socratic themes from a
more abstract position, there are other reasons to turn to the Timaeus to look for the
development of a philosophical conceptualization of analogy. First, the term analogia is
used in the Timaeus more than in any other authentic Platonic dialogue. In each case, it
appears (as Robinson remarks) 148 to refer to the popular sense of analogia, that is, the
mathematical sense of “proportion.” This use of the term appears to harbor a meaning
already far more abstract than the common, present-day sense of analogy as a rhetorical
form. But this mathematical sense has already been employed in the Republic in
probably achieved something relevant to finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he
would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make many fine speeches to large
audiences about the square of double size and said that it must have a base twice as long” (83b5-c2, Grube
translation in Plato, Five Dialogues).
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G. M. A. Grube’s translation in Plato, Five Dialogues.
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Timaeus’ identification as an astronomer from Locri, site of a Pythagorean sect, is confirmed by
evidence of the doxographic tradition. Debra Nails notes as sources an eponymous third century BCE
historian as well as Iamblicus and Cicero in her entry on Timaeus of Locri (The People of Plato: A
Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2002], 293).
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See note 68.
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reference to the divided line, where the phrase “ana logon” is used adverbially
throughout to describe the means by which the line’s sections are to be cut. In fact, in his
summary of the conclusions of the divided line, Socrates states the following elaborate
analogy in the only passage in the Republic where the precise term analogia appears:
And while opinion is about becoming, intellection is about being. And as
being is to becoming, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to
opinion, so is knowledge to trust and thought to imagination. But as for
the proportion (analogia) between the things over which these are set and
the division into two parts of each—the opinable and the intelligible—let’s
let that go, Glaucon, so as not to run afoul of arguments many times longer
than those that have been gone through. (534a2-8, Bloom, modified)
Timaeus, himself a party to the recitation of the discussion of the Republic on the day
prior, appears to adopt this peculiarly metaphysical analogy as an axiomatic starting
point, which he simplifies into the phrase, “being is to becoming as truth is to trust”
(29c3). 149 Indeed, this analogy appears to include the conclusions of our analyses of both
the Republic and the Phaedo. That is, the soul relates to the difference and similarity
between being and becoming according as it is affected by truth and trust. This relation,
as we have seen, is accomplished through logos, and Timaeus’ statement of that analogy
is just such a logos.
Both Socrates’ and Timaeus’ statements of the metaphysical analogy are highly
conceptual, dealing with opinion, thought, knowledge, belief, being, and becoming, with
neither making reference to anything itself sensible. Socrates relies on the mathematical
sense of analogia as proportion, using this to provide a framework for relating the visible
and the invisible (the sensible and the intelligible), but this analogy appears to be the end
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of Socrates’ discussion of the matter. Timaeus, on the other hand, begins from the
metaphysical analogy established by Socrates in the Republic, transitions into a
consideration of the mathematical power of proportion (analogia) to unify extremes, and
then applies this principle to his articulation of the generation of elements. That is,
Timaeus appears to take the result of Socrates’ argument as the starting point of his own.
According to our analysis of hypothesis in the previous chapter, the Timaeus appears to
be the continuation of a hypothetical argument that begins with the end achieved by
Socrates’ mimetic hypothesis of the divided line, posited as the original hypothesis.
Whether this hypothesis of a metaphysical analogy will ultimately yield a dialectical
discourse is not yet clear, but it seems that the aims of the discourse are such as to
attempt to account for the origins of the hypothesis itself. That is, its end would be a
beginning, consonant with the dialectical method described in the Republic.
The Timaeus again goes one step further than the Republic, leading us to believe
that this may be an opportune site for a discourse on the philosophical concept of
analogy. Timaeus’ metaphysical hypothesis is not alone. He offers a secondary
hypothesis that is said to follow from the first, one that is methodological in scope.
Timaeus claims that since there is an analogy between the order of being and the order of
psychic affections, 150 the logoi employed to address a topic must themselves have a
relation of similarity to the things expressed in them: “And so, concerning a likeness and
the model (paradeigmatos), one must discern that the accounts too are akin to those same
150

I follow the use of “affection” (pathēma) introduced in book VI of the Republic: “And, along with me,
take these four affections arising in the soul in relation to the four segments: intellection in relation to the
highest one, and thought in relation to the second; to the third assign trust, and to the last imagination”
(511d6-e2, Bloom). Recall also that this is the point at which Socrates identifies the relation between each
of the segments of the line as following a proportion (ana logon) according to the twin standards of truth
and clarity: “Arrange them in a proportion, and believe that as the segments to which they correspond
participate in truth, so they participate in clarity” (511e2-4, Bloom).
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things of which the accounts are explanations” (29b3-5, Kalkavage, modified). 151
Because logoi have been identified by Socrates in the Phaedo as the proper place for the
soul’s encounter with the mediation of the intelligible and the sensible, the application of
a mimetic structure to the relation between logoi and their subjects introduces an
additional mediation to the existing analogical account of mediation described by
Timaeus’ first hypothesis. While this statement about logoi is not presented as an
analogy, it does appear that the soul relates through logoi to the truth because logoi relate
faithfully (that is, as kindreds) to the things they describe. This means that the account
(or logos) of the soul’s relation to truth is another relation (that between logoi and its
subjects). This articulation of the kindred relation of logoi to their subjects, then, is a
second analogy that Timaeus will adopt as another beginning, or hypothesis, of his
discourse. It is worth noting, too, that although Timaeus describes the generation of the
kosmos (a kosmo-gony), his attention to the bearing of his logos on that subject makes of
this dialogue a kosmo-logos, a beautifully-ordered account of the beautiful arrangement
of the whole world. 152
Timaeus’ speech is itself perspicuously concerned with beginnings and initiates a
series of accounts, three in all, each of which attempts to account for the causes of
generation. He begins with an account from the perspective of nous (the intelligible,
paternal account), followed by an account from anankē (the necessary, maternal account),

151

The Cratylus addresses some similar philosophical territory in its discussion of the relation between
words and their referents (the question of natural language).
152

The philosophical sense of kosmos as “the world,” according to Charles Kahn, is Milesian in origin
(Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology [New York: Columbia University Press, 1960] 219).
The non-technical sense of the term is of something that has good order or arrangement of its parts: “In
Homer and in the other early literature, kosmos, kosmeō, and their derivatives denote in general any
arrangement or disposition of parts which is appropriate, well-disposed, and effective. The primary idea is
of something physically neat and trim rather than morally or socially ‘correct’” (ibid., 220).
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and concludes with an account that determines the best blending of these two (the final,
offspring’s account). To analyze the role and development of a concept of analogy in the
Timaeus, I will begin with the failure of the account from nous (quite like that which
precipitated Socrates’ “second sailing”) and the way this necessitates a turn toward
materiality, which in turn is still insufficient to account for the whole of generation. The
likeness of his account to what he describes becomes most important at the point when he
begins to describe these material principles that guide the necessary causes of the kosmos.
Within the second account, Timaeus refers to his own logos as “bastard,” illegitimate in
the absence of the father, nous. 153 This illegitimacy is reflected in the paradoxical and
incoherent images Timaeus offers as a way to mediate between the logos of the father
and the recalcitrance of materiality. Analogies of clay, gold, perfume, nurse and womb
all suggest a feminine principle, but none is sufficient to what must be, paradoxically, a
sexless mother. The insufficiency of these analogies appears to be evidence of Timaeus’
faithfulness to the methodological hypothesis that logoi be like their subjects. That is,
since he is describing the action of the principle of becoming, his logoi are equally
incomplete.
Analyzing this bastard account, I demonstrate that, at the culmination of a series
of analogies that fails to account for the principle of materiality, 154 Timaeus’ bastard

153

“Nothō” (52b3). As compared to Socrates’ fear of producing a “fraudulent/illegitimate” (kibdylon—
Republic 507a5) account of the good, Timaeus seems ultimately reconciled to the necessity that in order to
be faithful (and legitimate) to its subject, his logos will be compromised by the base heritage of the third
kind. As opposed to “kibdylon,” “nothō” indicates in addition to illegitimacy a sense of indeterminate
mixture and thus a lack of determinate origin. This characteristic is directly related to its overwhelmingly
natural origin—so natural as to have a tie neither to nomos or logos, both of which are instituted after and
as a way to give limit and determinacy to this originally diverse and boundless source.
154

It is problematic to use this term, “materiality” in advance of a reading of the account itself, for any
determination here is necessarily anachronistic, imputing something like a form/matter distinction. While
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account conceives a generative analogy, one that reflects the analogical structure that
necessarily subtends the relation of being and becoming necessary to all generation.
Finally, focusing on this theme of generation, I will also attempt to provide some
reflection on the interaction of the generational metaphors employed in descriptions of
the subject matter and the self-descriptions the logoi themselves provide. It will become
apparent through my analysis that the failures of the successive analogies that try to
account for a mediating principle, which Timaeus names chōra, are themselves taken up
into the structure of this principle—and not accidentally. I argue that this analogical
nature is required for thinking such a mediating principle, and for producing a complete
account, which explains the structural similarity of a reliance on analogy that holds
between Plato’s metaphysics and cosmology.
Given the Timaeus’ concern with the reflective quality of logoi, I will also go on
to offer an explanation of the reason that the totalizing accounts of metaphysics and
cosmology rest upon some form of recursive thinking and upon analogy to negotiate the
reflective mediation required. 155 The figure of chōra in particular gets to the heart of
analogy as a cosmological principle because it is not only the principle of metaphysical
analogy but is itself analogical. Because this assertion introduces the question of how
cosmology is itself disposed in relation to metaphysics, a consideration of this question as
well as of the role of analogy as a philosophical method will serve as a conclusion to this
chapter and an entry point for my further analysis of the Statesman dialogue, which I treat
in the final chapter.
this is not irrelevant, I will try to resist simply assimilating this cosmology to later Platonist or Aristotelian
physics and metaphysics.
155

Indeed, the fact that each is subject to this same logical structure is evidence of a thoroughgoing analogy
between totalizing discourses. I intend to develop this argument in the conclusion of this chapter.
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2 – Analogical Cosmology

The Timaeus begins beyond itself. It begins with a dialogue that very roughly
recapitulates part of the Republic’s conversation and previews the bellicose desires of the
Critias, which will follow on the next day. 156 But when it turns toward its true aim, to
provide an account of the generation of the whole, it is Timaeus who offers the speeches,
as if presenting the entrée at the friends’ banquet. 157 For, although Socrates asked to hear
of his beautiful city “struggling against other cities” in war (19c5), the group agrees that
before Critias’ account is to overlay Socrates’ kallipolis onto the noble and authoritative
legend of Athens’ defeat of Atlantis (the subject of the Critias dialogue). To prepare for
this, however, Timaeus (“since he’s the most astronomical of us and the one who’s made
it his main job to know about the nature of the all”) is called upon to first give an account
of the creation of everything, which will result also in the creation of humans (27a4-7).
An account of generation, then, is the primary aim and content of the dialogue. Of
course, “dialogue” is not an especially apt term for the text that follows Timaeus’
introduction since he is the sole speaker for the vast majority of what follows. 158 This
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This refers to the dramatic order of the dialogues, as established by the text itself. There is a four day
timeline beginning with Socrates’ original conversation, which is then recounted by Socrates (this is the
text of the Republic), followed by the Timaeus’ “conversation” on the following day, and then the Critias’
on the next. See Proclus’ imaginative assignation of symbolism for the order of the speakers and Timaeus’
place as the mean (which is also paradoxically the “top”): Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, I: §198.25202.13, 298-301).
157

Socrates makes quite an entrance, as he claims he has come dressed up (kekosmēmenos) for the festive
occasion (taken to be the Panathenaea) and wishes to be feasted with logoi (28b8): “So here I am—arrayed
for the occasion and readiest of all men to do my receiving” (20c1-2). Socrates, a silent receiver of logoi,
seems to be likening himself as the chōra of dialectic. The rhetoric of exchange that appears later in the
second account is alluded to here, but is even more apparent with Socrates’ repeated claims that he will
receive a feast in return for the one he gave the day before (i.e., his retelling of the dialogue of the
Republic): “Perfect and brilliant too, it seems, is the feast of speeches I’m to get in return!” (27b7-8).
158
Socrates’ relative silence is a common feature of later dialogues, such as the Sophist and Statesman, this
is often marshaled as evidence of Timaeus’ relatively late composition. But in addition to the explicit
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lack of dialectical banter makes this account of the origin of the whole univocal in a way
few accounts of the dialogues are allowed to be. 159
Timaeus’ speech on “the beginning” is divided into three accounts, each of which
is also announced as a new beginning. 160 At the beginning of the second account,
Timaeus retrospectively names his first account the account from intellect (nous), in
order to distinguish it from the second account, the account from necessity (anankē), and
he recapitulates its concern: “Now what’s gone by so far in what was said, except for a
bit, has shown the things that have been crafted through intellect (ta dia nou
dedēmiourgēmena)” (47e3-4). Later, Timaeus announces at the beginning of the third
account that it will tie together the first two parts of his account, blending them as a
weaver blends the woof and the warp (69a6-8), 161 and that this final piece will act as the
head for the story (mythō). 162 In each case, the turn to a new account comes in response
to some inadequacy in the prior—an inadequacy that arises in the relation of the form of
the account to its content. This relation will be seen as the analogue of the relation
between seeming and being that we saw in the Republic and between form and instance

dramatic references, the Timaeus’ monological character links it yet again to the Republic, which, although
it portrays a dialogue, consists entirely of Socrates’ narration of the prior day’s discussion.
159

This fact, combined with the relative ubiquity of this dialogue of Plato’s in late antiquity and the
medieval West, goes a long way toward accounting for the privileging of “systematic” Platonism. If the
series of dialogues is read as a whole, however, Plato’s commitment to the performance of dialectical
thought is much more clear, as the series of dialogues reveals a dialectic that relies less on individuals’
contributions and more on cooperative theorizing.
160

F. M. Cornford notes this in his analysis of the structure of Timaeus’ speech: Plato’s Cosmology (New
York City: Humanities Press, 1971), 32-33.
161

I return to this imagery in my later discussion of the third account, especially as it connects to the
example of weaving in the Statesman, which will be the subject of a discussion key to the final chapter.
162

Rémi Brague makes a good case for how deeply rhetorical figure structures Timaeus’ discourse: “The
Body of the Speech: A New Hypothesis on the Compositional Structure of Timaeus’ Monologue,” Platonic
Investigations, Dominic J. O’Meara, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of American Press, 1985),
53-83.
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in the Phaedo. Again, just as we saw that these metaphysical mediations required
recourse to analogy in order to reconcile their incommensurability, so too we shall find in
the Timaeus that the relation between the subject of Timaeus’ logos and the form of that
logos resolves into an analogy. In the Timaeus, a figure of analogy vouchsafes the
generation of the kosmos.
Again, I claim in what follows that the progress of Timaeus’ speech from the
account according to nous to the account according to anankē and its crowning
culmination 163 in the mixture of the two is determined by the need for a mediating
principle that will be articulated in the figure of chōra. Appearing within the second
account, the idea of chōra is the fruit of a series of inadequate analogies. Chōra
formalizes the structure of analogy as a principle of the mediation of relations. That is,
chōra, which gives a principle for material/phenomenal causality, articulates and reflects
the crisis of mediation that arises in the accounts of nous and anankē, thought and
necessity. However, chōra is an unstable principle, since it is the utterly inconceivable
ground of conception. It is no surprise that after the rift opened by the “chorology”
Timaeus shifts to a third account that blends the prior two in a harmonious,
mathematically determined abstraction that negotiates each point of mediation with a
measure rather than an image. The relation between this mathematized structure and the
phenomenal one based on the analogies will be of especial interest in transitioning to our
final section.

163

“Teleutēn kephalēn” (69b1-2).
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2.1 – The Intelligible Kosmos
In order to bear out the claim that Timaeus’ cosmology is analogical, I must first
show the way that it operates with analogies and then the way that this operation is
analogical in character. Indeed, the use of analogies alone is not evidence of an
“analogical character,” since my claim is not that Timaeus’ cosmology is analogical
merely in that it contains analogies but rather that the analogical form is taken up within
the framework of the cosmology. Later, it will indeed be necessary to reconsider the
method of using analogies and its relation to the theory it makes possible. Let us begin
here, though, by noticing the way that the Timaeus, by way of his first account, inherits
the complications of analogy in its adoption of the metaphysical hypothesis we have
already discussed.

2.1.1 – Reflection, Mediation, and Logos
Before he even begins his speech on the construction of the kosmos, Timaeus’
“invocation” of the gods provides a signal that what he is about to undertake is in some
way beyond his own ability, in particular that of “we who attempt in some way to make
speeches about the all” (27c4-5, my translation). Interestingly, it is Socrates who asks for
the invocation, 164 and, rather than actually invoking the gods, Timaeus merely talks about
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Socrates’ suggestion seems to come more as a continuation of his play on this discourse being offered as
a feast for him as the guest: “So, Timaeus, it seems it would be your task to speak next—that is, after
you’ve called upon gods in accordance with custom” (27b8-9). Though it is customary to call upon the
gods before feasting, whether in thanksgiving or praise, Socrates seems again to be stressing the
indeterminacy between custom, law and song: “In the most telling moment of the dialogue, he calls the
likely story not a logos or a mythos, not an account or a story, but a nomos (29d)” (Peter Kalkavage,
Introduction to Plato’s Timaeus [Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2001] 18-19). Proclus offers the
insight that this reference to nomos “signifies the divine order, according to which the secondary things are
always linked to what precedes, and receive their fullness from them” (Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus,
Vol. 1, §203.7-8, 303). He suggests that this is Socrates’ way of asking for a Pythagorean account of the
natural order of things.
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the obvious need to do it. 165 That is, he gives a logos about the act rather than performing
the act itself. It will be necessary to pay close attention to the difference and relation
between logos and what a logos accomplishes or performs, as this will lead to a clearer
sense of the role of analogy in Timaeus’ account.
But why invoke the gods in the first place? What is so fearsome about Timaeus’
planned speech? First, to speak of “the all” requires that one go beyond oneself, to
speculate concerning causes that one is either too young to know or too impotent to
effect. This is one of the same reasons that Socrates condones the “noble lie”: “And, in
the telling of the tales we were just now speaking about—those told because we don’t
know where the truth about ancient things lies—likening the lie to the truth as best we
can, don’t we also make it useful?” (382d1-3). But in the case of Timaeus, since one of
his hypotheses incorporates this likeness of logoi to their subjects, his form of speech
must somehow embrace itself, must somehow account for its own generation. Timaeus is
tasked with providing a divine logos about divine things. Moreover, since his account is
to bring about the generation of the human in logoi and since logos is itself peculiarly
human, Timaeus is left trying to account for the very conditions that allow him to account
for those conditions. But how could logos account for the time before itself? These
specters of recursion inspire reverence indeed for what is beyond human power. 166
Socrates is right to ask Timaeus to pray before he begins.

165

Proclus notes this curiosity as well: “But how can it be, they say, that Timaeus has announced with a
grand flourish that one should pray and call on the gods and goddesses, but that he fails to do this himself
and immediately turns to the proposed accounts without praying?” (Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol.
II, trans. David T. Runia [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], §221.9-12, 58).
166

While recursion is a thoroughly modern problem (beginning, perhaps, with Kant), it is not entirely an
imposition upon Platonic problems to locate a consideration of this issue here. Plato’s concern to give an
account and defense of philosophy, to distinguish it from its pretenders (rhetoric, poetry, and sophistry’s
many guises), requires that he engage the very discourses he seeks to discredit. In particular, as I see it, the
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This theme of recursion is repeated when Timaeus’ former reverence takes an
anthropocentric turn. Having just acknowledged how his task seems to outstrip his
human abilities, Timaeus adds that a speaker must invoke himself—as if in order to give
an account one must speak oneself, and not just one’s logoi, into being. With these two
invocations, then, the problem of self-reflection is prominently at issue in the first words
of Timaeus’ speech. As we saw in the last chapter, the form of analogy offers a
framework for representing mediation, and that is precisely what is needed to negotiate
self-reflection. The fact that Timaeus’ speeches will come to rely on analogical thinking
is therefore to be expected. For now, we must leave the theme of recursion aside. We
will be able to return to it more directly in the final section of this chapter on cosmology
and method. To begin to see the role of mediation, however, we turn now to an analysis
of the elaboration of Timaeus’ initial metaphysical hypotheses.

2.1.2 – Hypothetical mimesis
In spite of the difficulty of his enterprise, Timaeus confidently strides forward,
stipulating the principles upon which his entire speech will proceed. He begins with an
almost Parmenidean hypothesis of the difference between being and becoming: “Now
then, in my opinion, one must first distinguish the following. What always has being,
and does not have becoming, and what always 167 has becoming and never being?” (27d5-

form that the dialogues take is an encounter with and response to the problem of recursion. By enacting
philosophical discourses, especially those about the identity of philosophy, Plato provides a reflection upon
the act of reflection. And, though this may serve numerous strategic roles, the dialogue form nonetheless
clearly addresses the problem of a logos accounting for itself.
167

There is some critical debate about the insertion of the second aei (“always”). I translate it here for sense
and the overall parallelism on which the grammar is relying, which is why, I suspect, John Burnet inserted
it in the first place. While there is philosophical merit to discussing the difference in the meaning conveyed
by its presence or absence (since it may seem paradoxical for anything to be always true of “becoming”),
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7). 168 With this, Timaeus reiterates the hypotheses of both the Republic and the Phaedo’s
metaphysical discussions. That is, he begins with the distinction between the stable
reality of forms and the evanescent appearances of things. In addition to this rendering of
one half of the axiomatic metaphysical analogy, Timaeus sets down the modes of
knowing each kind: being pertains to nous and logos, whereas becoming pertains to doxa
and aisthēsis, which, he adds, is without logos. This explanation works to elaborate what
is meant by “truth” and “trust” in the second half of the metaphysical analogy. Thus,
there are two sets of distinctions, each coordinated with the other. Finally, Timaeus
offers what will function as a relational principle for the two kinds: “everything that
comes to be comes to be by some cause of necessity” (28a5-6, my translation). 169 With
this, Timaeus has given a basis for understanding the phenomena of becoming as
necessitated owing to some causes unlike them (namely, causes that are not “of
necessity”). For, if all phenomena are necessitated and they were all necessitated by
other things that are necessitated, the question of their cause would be infinite.
Consequently, phenomena have causes that must be unlike them as necessitated. 170 At
this point, Timaeus has completed an outline of the contents of the cosmology (being and

this does not really seem to be at the heart of Timaeus’ point here. He is merely stipulating a hypothesis
that is readily identified and agreed to by all present. Note, for example, that, while Kalkavage omits it,
Bury includes it. On this issue, see John Whittaker’s “Textual Comments on Timaeus 27 C-D,” Phoenix 27
(1973): 387-391.
168

This line is grammatically curious—although it is indeed in the form of a question, this can only be
considered “rhetorical,” since it is never answered and gets taken up as a stipulation or condition of the
ensuing demonstration.
If it seems strange that anankē should appear in the account from nous, this is just another instance of
materiality encroaching on this first account, which forces Timaeus to begin again and account for material
causation.
169

170

This explanation anticipates cosmological arguments for the existence of a single, first principle.
Consider Aristotle’s argument in Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 2, 1094a18-22.
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becoming), the form of their being known (either by thought or by opinion), and their
principle of interaction (causation by reason of necessity).
Let us review the construction of the more elaborate metaphysical analogy.
Timaeus establishes two sets of relations (being-becoming and nous-doxa), whose
relation to each other must in turn be accounted for by means of a principle of interaction.
Indeed, this is the same form of relation that comes to be presented between the sun and
the good, resolved into the divided line of Book VI of the Republic. 171 In a sense, the
Timaeus provides an account of the origin of such a relation—that is, between the visible
and the intelligible. As Donald Zeyl puts it:
In middle dialogues like the Phaedo and Republic, Plato presents and
develops his theory of Forms as the foundation of his metaphysical,
epistemological, and ethical theories. It is striking, however, that in these
dialogues any argument in support of that theory is entirely absent. The
present passage in the Timaeus appears to be the only one in the Platonic
corpus which purports to be an argument for the existence of Forms…The
distinction between Forms and sensibles, Plato maintains, is entailed by a
distinction between understanding (nous) and true opinion (doxa
alēthēs). 172
In the Phaedo, Socrates recognizes the need to provide an account of all genesis (“What
you’re searching for is no trivial business, Cebes. For we must busy ourselves with the
cause concerning generation and destruction as a whole”), but this leads him to explain
the reason why such a direct investigation is impossible, sharing his experiences with his
unfruitful investigation of natural causes (95e8-10, Brann et al.). Of course, as we have
discussed above, Timaeus has fewer qualms about speaking speculatively, and the
articulation of the metaphysical analogy we have already discussed comes up
immediately after this detailed account: “As being is to becoming, so is truth to trust.”
171

See Chapter Two of this work.

172

Introduction to Plato: Timaeus (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2000), lxiv.
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We did not note when we began, however, that in this formulation Timaeus is not
speaking directly of the affections of the soul (thought and opinion) but of the character
of the relationship that holds between the soul and what affects it. Timaeus has proposed
an analogy of the relation among different forms of experience 173 and different kinds of
being, which, as we noted in our reading of the Phaedo, is negotiated through logos. For,
it is important to notice that, in providing the analogy, Timaeus is giving an account, a
logos. This is why, in stating the analogy, he abandons reference to aesthesis in favor of
doxa, since opinion is not speechless (alogon).
These, then, are the quintessential poles of philosophical analogy: being and truth.
Each analogy that follows this foundational analogy is written with a view to both the
ontological and epistemological relations that hold between the analogates. Given its
overarching importance as a ground for the metaphysics of the dialogues, we must
inquire into the primary relation articulated by this analogy and into what is at stake in
that relation. On the one hand there is being and becoming, which together comprise the
whole of what is. On the other hand, there is truth and trust, which are two of the
essential ways that our souls are affected by the world we live in. What, then, holds the
analogy together? What mediates between the soul and what is? As we saw in our
analysis of the divided line, logos is just that intermediary. This is the reason that the
secondary form of the hypothesis (regarding the likeness of logoi to their subjects) is
posited on the basis of the metaphysical analogy.
Let us reflect on this in a bit more detail now. A logos must be like what it is
about, but a likeness must also be a sort of harmony, a proportional relation that produces

173

By experience, I mean anything that affects the soul rather than one particular mode of affection or
faculty by which the soul perceives the aesthetic environment.
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a resonance between the appearance of the logos and the appearance of the subject of that
logos. Timaeus claims that more is needed than mere similarity—this relation between
logoi and their subjects must be proportional, ana logon. But why? What more is added
when logoi are not merely homologoi
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but logoi ana logon? Just as in the

metaphysical analogy above there is a kind of measure that accounts for the relation
articulated in the analogy, so too here there is a logos of logos that accounts for the
relation of logoi to what they announce. This is what is meant by ana logon, and
analogies like the one above are referred to with a name derived from this phrase. Now,
ana logon has a broader scope and a less rigorous determination at the time that Plato is
writing than it does even with Aristotle. 175 As has already been mentioned, the original
sense of “analogia” is tied to its mathematical function as “proportion,” and this is the
sense employed throughout the dialogues. Indeed, this is the best translation on hand for
its uses in the Timaeus, especially given Timaeus’ Pythagoreanism. Although I have
drawn a distinction between mathematical and philosophical analogy, the Timaeus is an
example of the point of intersection of these two and of Plato’s work to leverage the
quantitative relationality indicated by mathematical proportion toward the qualitative
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“In agreement” (literally, “same speech”). Here, Heidegger offers some support to my assertion that
despite Timaeus’ claim at 28a1 that logos “sides with” nous, it harbors an ambivalent relation to its
subsumption under the positive determination of all-knowing intellect: “At the same time, however,
precisely as homologein, it is not the Same at all. It is not the same as the Logos itself. Rather, homologein
remains a legein which always and only lays or lets lie whatever is already, as homon, gathered together
and lying before us; this lying never springs from the homologein but rather rests in the Laying that gathers,
i.e. in the Logos” (“Logos [Heracleitus, Fragment B 50],” in Early Greek Thinking: the Dawn of Western
Philosophy, trans. D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi [San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984] 67).
175

In his Poetics, Aristotle identifies the best form of metaphor as “metaphora kata ton analogon,” where
we see he is already using a substantized version of “ana logon” with the addition of an article (1457b720).
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relationality of analogy, which is necessary for resolving metaphysical dualism. 176 This
inheritance is evident in Timaeus’ own initial coupling of logos with nous, betraying a
proclivity toward this mathematical sense of relation.
With the completion of his introduction 177 we see that even in advance of any
logos of the kosmos’ generation, Timaeus’ cosmology carries with it the difficulty of
accounting for mediation, whether that of being and becoming, the soul and what it
grasps, or the relation of logoi to their own activity. Indeed, the latter is most manifest in
the fact that the “logos” of “ana logon” is taken to be able to account for the relation of
logos to what it says. Thus, even Timaeus’ introduction is suffused with the problem of
recursion and seems already bound to the logic of analogy in order to articulate this
difficulty.

2.1.3 – The Mediation of Syllogism as a Form of Analogy
From the three principles he outlined early in his introduction, Timaeus goes on to
build his hypothetical account. 178 He begins the genetic demonstration, however, with an
176

Interestingly, an argument regarding what might be an irretrievable difference between quantitative and
qualitative analogia centers on the fact that, as J.A. Creaven suggests, “…there is a common material
element which is realized univocally in each relation as i.e., the relation of quadruple in 8;2;;32;8. But in
philosophical analogy this is not true, because, as Kant saw [CPR], the latter deals with qualitative
distinctions and comparisons” (“Aspects of Analogy,” 75). Clearly, then, the material basis of analogy has
bearing on its philosophical use.
177

Socrates refers to it as his “prooimion” at 29d5.
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I use the term “build” deliberately since Timaeus’ account (as with all hypothetical argument) appears
constructive. This would only be appropriate, given Timaeus’ injunction that his logoi should themselves
look like their subjects, and this one will indeed be about the cosmic demiurge’s constructs. Later, Timaeus
will make reference to the second account as the wood (hylē) with which he will “weave together the
account that remains [the third]” (69a6-7). Anne Friere Ashbaugh argues a similar point, noting that the
association of chōra with hylē is inaccurate: “Later in the dialogue (Tim. 53c-55c), the basic stuff is further
specified as something composed of basic triangles. That determination clearly speaks against identifying
chōra with hulē. … If one is searching for a Platonic analogue of hulē, I think one should look carefully at
anankē, not at chōra” (Plato’s Theory of Explanation: A Study of the Cosmological Account in the Timaeus
[Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988], 119-120).
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additional, tacit assumption, one that is unique to this discussion. Timaeus posits that
there is a craftsman god who works with these original principles to create all generated
beings. 179 Timaeus then formulates an account of the causal relation between being and
becoming beginning from two hypotheses. If a demiurge generates something based on
an eternal being (i.e., a form), then the generated thing will be beautiful. And if anything
is visible and tangible it is also something that is generated. Since the kosmos is both
sensible as well as beautiful, it is something generated on the basis of an eternal model.
The syllogistic form of his argument requires that there be a middle term shared by each
of the extreme terms to be related. In the case of this hypothetical argument, there is a
compound middle term. The first is that of being generated, the second, beauty. Given
that the kosmos is both visible (and thus generated) and beautiful, it shares this compound
middle term (generated and beautiful) with what is generated from an eternal copy.
This logic of the hypothetical syllogism dominates the structure of Timaeus’ first
account of the kosmos and grounds the distinction essential to the rest of that account.
179

Although there is no attempt to conceal the fact that the craftsman god is at work, Timaeus does not
identify this as one of his foundational hypotheses. There appears to be an argument Timaeus gives,
however, that the reason we must assume that the kosmos is created by a god is that it is evidently beautiful,
and only those created things which were created on the basis of an eternal model could be beautiful: “So
one must go back again and investigate the following about the all: to which of the two models the builder
looked when he fashioned it—to the one that’s in a self-same condition and consistent, or to the one that
has come to be. Now if this kosmos here is beautiful and its craftsman good, then it’s plain that he was
looking to the one that’s everlasting, but if otherwise—which isn’t even right for anyone to say—then to
the one that has come to be. Now it’s clear to everyone that it was to the everlasting; for the kosmos is the
most beautiful of things born and its craftsman the best of causes. Since that’s how it has come to be, then it
has been created with reference to that which is grasped by reason and prudence and is in a self-same
condition” (28e5-29b1). We must already assume there to be some artificer who could consult such a
model for the sake of creating this beautiful copy of it. But this assumption is dependent on the more
foundational assumption of the beauty of the world. With this, however, Timaeus is assuming that we can
identify the whole of the kosmos as beautiful. This is a difficult assumption, though, because we are not
able to see that whole all at once, and even if its parts are beautiful perhaps they are not when taken as a
whole. (Consider, for example, a flower arrangement that is ugly in spite of each of its flowers being
beautiful.) However, Timaeus seems to be thinking of what we know of the world at discrete points (e.g., a
single night’s sky) abstracted as a whole, modeled in thought, as it were, for our contemplation of an
unified, ordered and, thus, beautiful whole (e.g., a map of the stars or stellar globe). This appeal to the
constructed model and a purified, abstract perspective gestures toward what I identify as Timaeus’ reliance
on the dianoetic in thought, which attempts to subordinate all imaging that is overly bound to aisthēsis.
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That the account from nous should be told according to such a formal structure is not so
surprising given that the noetic account proceeds according to the form of logos.
Because the eidos is proper to nous, it is thereby proper to the account that displays the
products of nous (“epidedeiktai ta dia nou dedēmiourgēmena,” 28a5-6). In addition to
the critical role of “form” to the paradigm of the demiurge, this logical structure
determines Timaeus’ first account as an account of formal cause and of the necessities
implied by a principle of nous, of a thinking creator, whose gaze is upon an eternal
model.
As we saw in Chapter One, the predominance of the syllogistic form to his
argument again demonstrates the presence of a concern with the formal structure of
analogy. Syllogisms require at least two premises (the major and minor), each of which
shares a middle term. This mediating term drops out of the conclusion, which thereby
unifies or relates the major term and the minor term directly. The premises of any
syllogism may be written as a continuous analogy of the form: A:B :: B:C, with A as the
major term, B the middle and C the minor. (A:B stands as the major premise and B:C the
minor.) The conclusion of a syllogism is just the expression of the reducibility of the
four termed relations to a two-termed relation. The middle (and its mediating role) drops
out entirely. Timaeus’ conclusions about the nature of the kosmos on the basis of his
hypothetical argument are reductive in just this way of the mediations operating in his
account.
Nevertheless, Timaeus himself resuscitates and even honors the role of this
mediator when he begins his cosmogenetic speculations: “…hence, in the beginning to
construct the body of the all, the god proceeded to make it out of fire and earth. But it’s
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not possible for two things alone to be beautifully combined apart from some third: some
bond must get in the middle and bring them both together” (31b6-c2). We are confirmed
in identifying this middle with an analogic 180 when Timaeus continues by saying, “And
the most beautiful of these bonds is that which, as much as possible, makes itself and the
things bound together one, and proportion (analogia) is suited by nature to accomplish
this most beautifully” (31c2-4). Timaeus goes on to recapitulate the generic form of the
proportional mean, which, when compared to the syllogistic form outlined above, is a
perfect match: “For whenever, of three numbers, the middle term of any two of them,
whether cubic or square, is such that as the first is to it so is it to the last—and again,
conversely, as the last is to the middle so is this middle to the first—then the middle term
becomes first and last, while the last and first in turn both become middle terms, so that
of necessity it will turn out that all the terms will be the same; and once they’ve come to
be the same in relation to each other, all will be one” (31c4-32a7). 181
This all goes to show that, while Socrates uses the concept of analogical relations
in his metaphysical accounts in the Republic, Timaeus not only begins with the
mathematical form but extends it, applying it to his method, and, as I argue, the substance
of his cosmology. This extension of proportionality into his account of natural causation
begins when Timaeus introduces the first mediation of the principle elements of fire and
air. He says that there must be two agents of mediation, earth and water, indicating that,
just as in analogy, four term positions must be occupied in order to accomplish the
mediation. With this analogical construction, Timaeus has constituted the first composite
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This neologism represents what I have until now been referring to as the “structure of analogy.”

181

This is perhaps the best argument one could have for Plato’s “anticipation” of Aristotle’s syllogistic
logic with his use of geometry.
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body. The first account, then, is facilitated by the principle of proportion, which guides
the mediation of the elements. As we shall see in what follows, however, accounting for
the elements themselves will also require an account of this principle of mediation, that
is, of analogy itself.

2.1.4 – The Materiality of the Demiurge
Timaeus’ first account, his logos according to pure thought (nous), proceeds
according to hypothetical demonstration and, as we have noted, has two tacit assumptions
in addition to the two explicit hypotheses (metaphysical and methodological). The first
of these the Timaeus shares in common with other metaphysical accounts in Plato’s
dialogues: the prior existence of forms, which are different from and the basis of any
particular instance of each. The second assumption is more original to the Timaeus: there
is a demiurgic god who crafts all of becoming on the basis of his intelligent contact with
these eternal paradigms. 182 These two assumptions are explicitly addressed only after the
many inadequate analogies that attempt to illustrate the necessary, “wandering” cause of
the second account. 183 Analyzing these two conditions of Timaeus’ first account will
allow us to see why the second account, in particular its logos on chōra, is not only the
account from necessity but is the necessary account, i.e., an account necessary as a
supplement to the hypotheses crucial to the first account.
While it might seem that the forms are in some way contained within the premise
of the exclusive division of being and becoming, since they are everlasting and stable like
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While the idea of a creator-god(s) is not unique to the Timaeus (viz., the Statesman), the demiurge model

is.
183

“Planōmenēs” (48a8).
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being, they lack the unity and simplicity of being, and their multiplicity (whether that
multiplicity is part of the nature of the form itself or occurs only in its instantiations) has
no account. The forms, then, are in actuality a middle ground between being and
becoming, and this is attested to in the appeal to the analogy of the demiurge as a model
of creation. Since being is non-sensible, there is no way that any demiurge might “look”
to it in order to model anything of becoming. 184 A creator must instead look to
something that is between being and becoming somehow sharing a similar relation to
both. What is more, the demiurge is a figure drawn from what is less than pure being.
The problem of mediation is thereby intensified because of the substance of the model of
the demiurge and because an appeal to such an image is an appeal to the realm of genesis.
Timaeus does not leave these hypotheses unthematized. He recognizes the
problem of the assumption of the existence of the forms, and he addresses it immediately
after another summary that invokes the model-copy view of creation (51b7-52d1). When
Timaeus outlines the problem behind assuming the existence of the forms, he says that it
boils down to the fact that some assert that the objects of sense are the only source for
knowledge. Timaeus nevertheless judges in favor of (literally, “casts his vote,” 51d3) the
position that there is a difference between the forms and their sensible instances. In a
sense, Timaeus adopts the position of the demiurge within his own logos, implicitly
claiming knowledge about what is best when he chooses in favor of the forms. Such
authorial determination is notably absent from the accounts of the forms in the Phaedo.
184

On the other hand, this again argues for the foundational metaphor of visibility, which we saw in our
analysis of the analogy of the sun and the good. As Derrida notes, there is an “intelligible visibility” to
which the artisan directs her gaze. In contrast to Book X of the Republic, however, the Timaeus claims this
demiurge is not the creator of the forms themselves but of the generated instances of the forms: “‘There
turn out, then, to be these three kinds of couches: one that is in nature, which we would say, I suppose, a
god produced. Or who else?’ –‘No one else, I suppose.’ ‘And then one that the carpenter produced.’ –
‘Yes,’ he said. ‘And one that the painter produced, isn’t that so?’ – ‘Let it be so’” (Republic 597b3-8,
Bloom).
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Because of this authoritative judgment, Timaeus is able to make his account
probable but never certain. Though it is from nous, it requires a decision on the basis of
an opinion concerning what seems best, which must be drawn from the objects of
becoming (necessity). That these two kinds are different, however, does not in advance
determine which is more exalted nor that there need be a hierarchy of being between
them. In fact, their compresence as principles initiates the need for an account of this
“secondary” principle, i.e., necessity.
The problem of the demiurge’s materiality and the imaginative nature of the
account become the solution to the problems it instigates insofar as the analogical form
gets taken up as the very principle of mediation, which must relate being and becoming
without itself occupying either position. In his second account, Timaeus drives directly
to the heart of the problem of analogies as a means of addressing the incompleteness of
the account from nous. Given the “material” scope of the second account, the most
adequate way to get at the problem of analogies is by using them. 185 The following
analysis will show that the principle of analogical relation is produced through the series
of failed analogies presented as models for thinking through that “wherein” being and
becoming meet.
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It is important to note that the method of hypothesis is not entirely abandoned, nor is the use of nous
precluded in the second account. In a certain way, the purpose of the second account is to purify or exorcise
the first account of its material demons. The fact that the second account makes possible an account of the
work of final cause and of a god that works according to the principle of the best suffices to show that the
inclinations and methods of intellect are by no means abandoned but are instead solidified and made most
persuasive by means of the purification afforded by the formalization of a material principle.
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2.2 – The Necessity of Analogy
From the hypothetical account from nous, Timaeus shifts to the account from
necessity. The objects of each account are themselves different. The first account treats
things crafted (ta dedēmiourgēmena) with nous, whereas the second treats things that
come to be through necessity (ta di’anankēs gignomena, 47e4-5). Nevertheless, the
analogy with the demiurge that characterizes the account of intellect’s handiwork is what
necessitates a turn to an account of the cause “gone astray,” 186 which determines by
necessity rather than intellect. The elements were assumed as given in advance of the
demiurge’s creation of the kosmos, but, according to their own cause, these must be taken
as matter that obeys the laws of necessity rather than intellect. For, intellect is prior to
the generation of composite beings constructed by the demiurge. How else would the
demiurge, a figure for the long sought Anaxagorean principle of nous, gaze upon the
paradigms in order to create beings? The origin and generation of these necessary
elements, then, is the focus of Timaeus’ second account. But Timaeus is quick to
comment that providing a principle (or principles) of everything is not appropriate to the
kind of “way through (diexodou)” of his account (48c6). Instead, he will be guided by
the goal of the likely account (eikoton logōn)—an account that, because it deals with
what is only a created likeness, must itself only be probable or “likely” (48d1).
Because he moves away from a description of thought, Timaeus is also forced to
turn away from the hypothetical discourse (and demonstrations) of his account from nous
and to introduce a third kind to the division between the forms of being and becoming
that originally exhausted the kosmos. This third thing will figure much of the rest of
Timaeus’ speech on material necessity, but its very materiality seems to get in the way of
186

This is also referred to as the “wandering” cause: “to tēs planōmenēs eidos aitias” (48a8).
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its being shown through words. Through the process of adumbrating this shadowy form
(“amudron eidos”), the specific problems to which this third kind is a possible answer
also find illumination (49a4). 187 The third thing is an answer to the following problem
within the assumption of the two kinds with which Timaeus’ first account began: if there
is only being and becoming, what allows their relation? Timaeus’ answer to this question
will be his discourse on “chōra.”
In spite of our knowing in advance what this principle will be named, the third
kind remains anonymous for quite a long time, as Timaeus appears to grope in the dark.
The instability and inadequacy of this account marks an essential difference between it
and the first. Since the logos must be like its subject, the lack of a principle or definition
of the subject of the coming discourse makes any determination of the forms the logos
should take a struggle. This indeterminacy is itself necessitated by the materiality
demanded of the account and is in fact “reflective” in the way Timaeus had instructed in
his methodological hypothesis. What compels the second account is the failure of the
first account and its ontological assumptions. This is a pattern that will return within the
body of the second account, namely, that the failure of one model determines the
possibility and form of the next. There are obvious similarities here to the difficulties
Socrates identifies in his philosophical biography in the Phaedo. Recall, for instance,
that he claims there that although Anaxagoras had his hands on the better principle
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Timaeus’ reference to this cause as a form (eidos) indicates that even in recognizing the material
contingency of what comes to be we can only incorporate it into the account so long as matter is taken up
formally (abstractly), as materiality. He uses a similar tactic, when he proposes chōra as the principle
figure of this cause; chōra comes to have a formal quality, which makes it notetically coherent while
removing it irretrievably from its character as material.
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(nous), he nonetheless digressed, spending most of his time on material questions. The
Timaeus is thus a fuller account of the reason that such a digression is necessary. 188
The most serious inadequacy of the first account, however, is exemplified by the
problem of identifying things that come to be in terms of their elemental composition.
Recall that these primary bodies were assumed rather than explained. Indeed, the second
account begins with a recognition that this was inadequate. After all, we must know very
little about these elements themselves if in the process of saying that one thing is water
that same thing is just as likely to be called “air.” Take, for example, a pot of boiling
water. Looking at the surface of the boiling water, we can as easily describe the
phenomenon by reference to water as we may by reference to air. 189 This may seem to be
a problem with materiality, and in a short time Timaeus will mark it out that way, but it is
a problem for the account from intellect because of the interest in identifying things with
rational, stable determinations. Without naming it, Timaeus has marked the threat of
Heracleitean relativism, whereby we might be rendered entirely mute, given that the
world about which we speak is in a constant course of change. 190 So, even if the
188

In fact, the Timaeus seems to pick up where the Phaedo left off in that it addresses (and, strikingly,
without the enormous hesitations of Socrates in both the Republic and Phaedo) the good and how the good
works as the guiding principle for the demiurge’s generation of the kosmos. It is as if the Timaeus makes
good on Anaxagoras’ principles (to agathon and ho nous), which Socrates had despaired of discovering.
This might go some way to explaining why Timaeus is forced to reconcile the account of nous with that of
material causes. R.D. Archer-Hind confirms this reading when he states, “Plato had found fault with
Anaxagoras for not introducing to beltiston in his physical theories as the final cause. In the physical part of
the Timaeus he seeks to make good this defect” (“Introduction,” The Timaeus of Plato [New York: Arno
Press, 1973], 47).
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Just as the Timaeus will finally offer a sort of redemption of the unfulfilled promises of Anaxagoras and
in so doing unify both the necessary and the sufficient causes (the material and the telic), this common,
everyday perspective is of the sort that Timaeus is eager to incorporate into his all-encompassing logos. Of
course, there are a great deal more philosophical and ontological issues as work here, as Harold Cherniss
has argued in some detail in “A Much Misread Passage of the Timaeus” (Selected Papers, Leonardo Tarán,
ed. [Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1977], 346-363).
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In the Theaetetus, Socrates refers to this thought as Heracleitean as well as and Homeric: “…and there is
complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are
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elements are taken to be given in advance as the building blocks of the demiurge’s
production of the kosmos, they are not themselves stable and are instead this “cause gone
astray.”
The preliminary solution to the problems presented by the mutability of the
elements is said even by Timaeus to be concerned with logos: the entire issue arises as a
meditation on the trouble of affixing names to things:
For in describing each of these [elements], to say which one should
genuinely be called water rather than fire, and which is any one thing
rather than all of them individually so as to make use of some word that’s
trustworthy and stable, is difficult…First, the very thing we’ve now named
water we see condensing, thereby becoming, so it seems to us, stones and
earth; and this same thing again, by melting and dissolving, we see
becoming wind and air; and air, having been heated, becoming fire; and
conversely we see fire, having been contracted and quenched, going back
once more to the look of air; and air, by coming together and thickening
up, going back to become cloud and fog; and when these are compressed
still more, we see water flow from them and from water back to earth and
stones—a circle—thus passing on to one another, as it appears, birth.
(49b4-8, b10-c9)
Timaeus ends here with “genesin.” That is, he ends with the beginning, effectively
performing the very cycle he invokes. Indeed, the origin is the source of the trouble with
giving a cosmology. The problem lies less in the evanescence of things than in the
incapacity to mediate the difference between our thought of those things, which is static,
and the things themselves, which are constantly changing. Timaeus’ solution is to
suggest that perhaps the elements merely name the appearance of a quality and not any
fixed identity. Thus, the elements are not knowable in themselves because they are
wholly relative to the phenomena of becoming. Similarly, Timaeus concludes that the

in motion, like streams,” and Theodorus later repeats a claim similar to the one Timaeus introduces as the
weakness of his first account: “How can it be possible, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if
while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?” (Loeb Classical Library Vol. 123,
Harold North Fowler, trans [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996], 160d, 182d).

169

area or region that the elements pass through is a sufficient account of the reason that we
point at things and say “this” (49e3-5). 191 Timaeus concludes that there is something “in
which” and “out of which” all these appearances of the changes of elements pass: “en hō
de eggignomena aei hekasta autōn phantazetai kai palin ekeithen apollutai” (49e9-50a1).
This formulation is as difficult as it is unfamiliar. “En hō” and “ekeithen” are
remarkably vague terms, which could suggest either a spatial relation or a substantial one.
Indeed, much debate surrounds the interpretation of this passage, mostly regarding
whether Plato is here foreshadowing something like Aristotelian protē hylē, or primary
matter. 192 Those who argue for this interpretation must rely on the image that follows,
namely that gold is the underlying substance from which a variety of shapes come to take
form. While the image is meant to elucidate his suggestion and, more importantly,
maintain the principles of providing both a likely account as well as a material account,
Timaeus’ image seems to overtake his meaning. Those who take this image as the final
determination in the story of the third kind fail to notice that Timaeus’ account is itself
undergoing transformation; it, like gold, is malleable and indeterminate.
The gold image, too, is indebted to the account that has come before. Timaeus
begins where he had left off in the first account, namely, with a demiurge. This time,
however, the demiurge is made more specific, defined in relation to his medium and
material: he is a goldsmith. Trying to mimic the original problem of the elements,
191

The “touto” and “tode” (“this” and “that”) are deictics, understood at base to have some kind of relation
to a pointing out of location or direction. This passage is full of references to “deiknumi,” which can mean
“make known,” “exhibit,” “show,” and “point out,” all of which refer to the demonstrative nature of this
argument and its dependence on objects of sense. This phrase, tode ti, of course, is also pivotal to
Aristotle’s metaphysics, and we see here, perhaps, a Platonic rendering of a similar concern.
192

Arguing for a combination of the two, Zeyl offers a useful synopsis of both the differences in translation
as well as the interpretive differences implied by each of the “traditional” and “alternative” readings of this
passage (“Introduction,” lvi-lix). Cherniss is the first to truly question this orthodoxy of Platonic cosmology
and physics (“A Much Misread Passage”).
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Timaeus describes a demiurge who forms gold into all different shapes, one after another,
never resting from his creations. 193 Since the gold is where all the figures make their
appearance and that from which they pass away, making way for the next shape, it acts as
a substance that supports the fleeting shapes. And if this image were to be taken as
similar to the action of the third kind, then we would readily affirm that it is a kind of
base substance or matter in which the forms place their imprint. On the basis of this
image, Timaeus refers to the elusive third thing as “the receiver (dechomenon) of all
bodies,” with receptivity being its proper capacity (dynamis). 194 Indeed, if it were the
case that Timaeus were ascribing these features on the basis of the nature of gold itself,
there would be no use for his image; rather, the only resource the analogy may
legitimately offer remains in the relation between the gold and its figures. This is the
value of the analogy, however inadequate its details.
This only continues to affirm the interpretation that Plato here presents an account
of primary matter. The analogy is honored not because Timaeus means that everything is
made out of gold but because all things (gold included) are made out of some basic
substance that is capable of receiving every possible quality. Timaeus continues his
account, now likening the “receiver” to a modeling substance (ekmageion), capable of
being stamped or formed by anything that enters it. With this analogy, Timaeus more
193

We are here reminded of the god of the Statesman who, during the age of Cronos, is constantly at work,
spinning the world, providing its source of life and renewal at each moment. See 269c4-5, 270a3-5, 271d3272b1. One is reminded here of Descartes’ conception of God as constantly active in maintaining and
nourishing the being of his creation: “…the same power and action are needed to preserve anything at each
individual moment of its duration as would be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in
existence. Hence the distinction between preservation and creation is only a conceptual one” (John
Cottingham, trans., “Third Meditation,” Philosophical Writings of Descartes [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984], 49).
“Tēs ta panta dekhomenēs sōmata,” (50b7). The Sophist dialogue also asserts that the capacity to be
affected indicates being: “I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to
produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause,
though it be only on one occasion, has real existence” (247d8-e4, Fowler).
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closely represents the receptive quality of the third kind. Just as wax makes way for its
impressions and in so doing preserves the mirror image of its stamp, so too there is a kind
of inverse relation between the capacity of the third kind to be void of qualities and its
success in allowing the appearance of the things that come to be and perish through it. 195
The analogy fails, however, to adequately reflect the relation Timaeus seeks to make
intelligible. These base substances remain the material cause of their representations,
however much they recede from appearing. An impression is still a waxen one, a figure
golden. In order to have the property of receptivity, wax, like gold, must be malleable,
smooth, and soft, but it must also maintain the form impressed into it. That is, in order to
have these special features, wax cannot be substance itself, but rather a substance—of a
particular kind. Thus, this third kind, which would establish the ground of all other
“kinds” of things, is a kind beyond kind, a genre of genres. 196 It supercedes and founds
the possibility of any property or quality, but in such a way that it alone has no properties.
Thus, the very thing that makes images possible is somehow already invoked in order to
provide an image of that process. There is no way to get behind this third kind, since it is
the guarantor for any image that would seek to represent it.

195

This reference to wax is common to the Theaetetus, where the soul’s capacity to be affected is likened to
wax, and each soul’s relative capacity to retain knowledge compared to the smoothness and receptivity of
that same wax (191d-195b). Note also that when Aristotle employs this same image of the waxen stamp, he
does so not in order to argue for primary matter but in order to understand the way that the soul perceives
the forms of sensible things: “On the whole, then, concerning every sense it is necessary to take it that a
sense is what is capable of receiving perceptible forms without the matter, as the wax receives the mark of
the ring without the iron or gold. It takes the golden or brazen mark, but not insofar as it is gold or bronze.
Likewise, the sense in each case is affected by what has color or flavor or sound—not insofar as each of
these is said, but insofar as it is this sort of thing, and according to logos” (De Anima ii 12, 424a17-24).
This English rendering is used with permission from the translator, Benjamin Grazzini, author of the
unpublished paper, “Putting it on Wax: Aristotle on the Development of Perception,” February 20, 2009.
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Derrida asks, “And what if, perhaps as in the case of the khōra, this appeal to the third genre was only
the moment of a detour in order to signal toward a genre beyond genre? Beyond categories, and above all
beyond categorial oppositions, which in the first place allow it to be approached or said?” (“Khōra,” in On
the Name, Ian McLeod, trans., Thomas Dutoit, ed. [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995], 90).
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A similar problem dogs the further analogies of modeling clay and a perfume’s
base:
And that’s why that which is to take up all the kinds within itself should
be outside of all forms, just as with all those fragrant oils, whose makers
first artfully contrive this very condition: they first make the liquids that
are to receive the scents as odorless as possible. And all those who
attempt to make impressions of figures in anything soft in no way allow
any figure whatsoever to be manifest in it, but fashion their object by first
leveling it out so that it’s as smooth as possible.
In the same way, it’s appropriate for that which is to receive beautifully
over its whole extent, and often, copies of all things that are always to be
by nature outside of all the forms. (50e1-51a3)
Each of these analogies is inadequate because, while it is a medium or vehicle for what
appears thanks to it, none can themselves be without its formal quality as receptive. Even
the most rarified oil is greasy and pure. These technical analogies fail insofar as the form
is forever opposed to the generated thing into which it is placed. The very issue of this
second account is that matter is not rational. 197 Any analogy from the realm of technē,
then, will be structurally inadequate to the task. In terms of causes, the forms remain
apportioned to the mind of the artificer, the activity to the body, and the material cause to
the clay/gold/ointment. These “technical” analogies presuppose the very distinctions
they are meant to explain and cannot overcome the structure of the mutual
impenetrability of form and matter that characterizes the technical model. 198 Thus, none
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It is, however, subject to persuasion. The difference between force and persuasion is analogous to that
between nous and logos.
198

In his essay, “Khōra,” Derrida argues a similar point: “Rich, numerous, inexhaustible, the interpretations
come, in short, to give form to the meaning of khōra. They always consist in giving form to it by
determining it, it which, however, can “offer itself” or promise itself only by removing itself from any
determination, from all the marks or impressions to which we say it is exposed…” (94). In his much earlier
work, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” we see a similar claim: “It is a matrix, womb, or receptacle that is never and
nowhere offered up in the form of presence, or in the presence of form, since both of these already
presuppose an inscription within the mother” (160). Our analysis also makes it difficult to agree with Luc
Brisson when he claims, “…Plato only speaks of the spatial milieu by using a totally metaphorical
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of these analogies are able to provide an image of the mediation that makes them possible
as analogies.

2.3 – The Turn to Nature and a Feminine Principle
To the failures of the technical analogies Timaeus addresses a series of “natural”
analogies. 199 Contrasted with production by means of artifice are the “products” of
nature, i.e., the genesis of living things. Countering the presupposed distinctions that
contribute to the inadequacy of the first set of analogies, Timaeus suggests that the third
kind might have a relation to the things of becoming 200 as a mother is related to her child,
a nurse to her ward and a womb to its fetus. While not all of the natural analogies are
explicitly gendered, they are gender-coded and refer us to the sphere of human
reproduction in both its social and biological determinations. Here we shall have to
attend quite closely to see what the final notion of chōra will have inherited from these
images of it.
Before addressing the explicit comparison of the third kind to a mother, a nurse,
and a womb, it is worth noting first that, even with the technical analogies, some of the

language, which gets away from any technical quality” (Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique
du Timée de Platon [Paris: Klincksieck, 1974], 208, my translation).
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I would like to avoid making the claim that Timaeus is aware or in control of the way these analogies
proceed. By the very fact that they appear all at once, in a swarm threatening to overtake the account, I
hope it is obvious that Timaeus does not “see” the failures of the technical analogies directly and then go
about stopping those gaps with the natural analogies. It is not incompatible to claim both that the analogical
character of the cosmology is explicitly held in advance (for instance, the grand metaphysical analogy
given at the beginning of the first account) and that the cosmology is made to be analogical in response to
the inadequacies inherent to any cosmological enterprise.
200

This is a misleading phrase (“the things of becoming”) because it presupposes metaphysical realms that
have yet to be established or, more precisely, questioned. Nevertheless, the Greek phrase, “ta gignomena,”
(literally, “the things becoming” or “the things that are becoming,”) is cumbersome in translation, because
the English “to become” is intransitive and because we have no capacity to render the middle voice
directly.
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attempts to image this third kind in its receptivity are related to gender-feminine
activities. 201 The figures of receptivity (a concept that is gendered feminine in classical
Greek social life), 202 of gold and perfume, evoke the realm of feminine adornment
(kosmetikē), itself analogically related to a discourse of the beautifully ordered whole
(kosmos). 203 While not themselves “woman’s work,” the technai suggested by these
images are evocative of activities that are coded feminine. 204 Given critical comments
about writing in the Phaedrus and Cratylus, as well as the general disapproval of mimetic
arts in the Republic, Ion, and elsewhere, it is worth considering whether the inclusion of
the smoothing of wax and the homogenization of modeling clay is also a slight to the
reputations of the technai associated with writing and the mimetic arts. In a sense, this
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This language preserves the important distinction between the gender identification of the agent and the
gender associated with the activity itself. Thus, a male-identified man can just as easily perform a genderfeminine activity without this making the activity gender-masculine. For example, that David Bowie wears
lipstick does not thereby make the practice itself a gender-masculine practice.
202

Kenneth Dover notes that penetration (whether by a woman or a man) is gendered feminine by ancient
Greek social norms: “The imposition of a woman’s role on a subordinate by a dominant male underlies a
curious Athenian treatment of adulterers. An adulterer caught in the act could be killed by the offended
husband or guardian of the woman, but as an alternative he could be subjected to painful indignities, his
public hair being burnt off and a large radish being forced up his anus (Ar. Clouds 1083f.; cf. Lucian
Peregrinus 9). Since women commonly reduced their pubic hair by singeing, the punishment of an
adulterer symbolized his transformation into a woman and subordinated him lastingly, in the eyes of
society, to the man whom he had wronged, for whose penis the radish was a substitute” (Greek
Homosexuality [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978], 105-106). See also Derrida’s
suggestion: “Isn’t the value of receptacle also associated, like passive and virgin matter, with the feminine
element, and precisely in Greek culture?” (“Khōra,” 97).
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Kahn states, “From this meaning of ‘neat arrangement’ the transfer is an easy one to the wider
decorative sense of kosmos as ‘finery, rich adornment’…Poetry too may be thought of as an elaborate work
of ‘adornment,’ and later writers speak of song as a kosmos epeōn” (Anaximander and the Origins of Greek
Cosmology, 220).
204

“Women’s work,” such as weaving, is also identified for the sake of dismissing the claim that there are
any skills that women are naturally better suited for than men: “‘Do you know of anything that is practiced
by human beings in which the class of men doesn’t excel that of women in all these respects? Or shall we
draw it out at length by speaking of weaving and the preparation of pancakes and preserves—just those
activities on which the reputation of the female sex is based and where its defeat is most ridiculous of all?”
(455c4-d1, Bloom, modified). Weaving in particular will return as an important analogy for dialectic in the
Statesman dialogue as well, which I will treat in the final chapter.
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could be seen as an implicit claim that such subservient arts, even if not practiced by
women or concerned with their affairs, are nonetheless “womanish.” 205
The move to natural analogies, which assume a relation to natural production,
inaugurates another set of gendered forms. Trying to articulate the way that the third
kind interacts with that which it allows to appear in generation, Timaeus grasps for an
image from the realm of generation itself. These analogies, like the others, are thus
doomed to inadequacy, appearing like a kind of circular argument. In essence, Timaeus
is attempting with these natural analogies to account for generation by means of an
appeal to generation. Similarly, Timaeus was trying with the technical analogies to
account for formlessness by means of formed things. Let us take each analogy in turn,
now with a view to their (en)gendered status.
The third kind is first called a “mother” of becoming. Timaeus indicates that she
receives forms as from a male source and that she gives birth to the things of becoming as
her offspring (ekgonon). As a form without form, this mother must offer no form of her
own, “For if it should be similar to any of the things that come on the scene, on receiving
what was contrary to itself or of an altogether different nature, whenever these things
arrive it would copy them badly by projecting its own visage alongside the thing copied”
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Despite ingenious arguments and hopeful retrievals of Plato’s philosophy as feminist or proto-feminist
(See: Arlene Saxonhouse, “Eros and the Female in Greek Political Thought,” Political Theory 12, 1
[February 1984], 5-27; Wendy Brown, “‘Supposing Truth Were a Woman…’ Plato’s Subversion of
Masculine Discourse,” Political Theory 16, 4 [November 1988], 594-616; C. Jan Swearingen, “Plato’s
Feminine: Appropriation, Impersonation, and Metaphorical Polemic,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 22, 1
[Winter, 1992], 109-123; and Gregory Vlastos, “Was Plato a Feminist?” in Feminist Interpretations of
Plato, Nancy Tuana, ed. [University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1994]), one must nevertheless
acknowledge the persistent representation of a prevailing contemporary misogyny in the dialogues, in
particular the multiple instances when men are berated for behaving like women. See: Apology, 35a-b,
Phaedo, 117d-e, Republic, 387e-388a, and Timaeus, 90e-91a.
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(50e1-4). Thus, she is sexless, a virgin mother, so virgin as to be innocent of all
distinction. 206 Instead she must provide a harbor for the forms’ arrival into appearance:
For this very reason, let us speak of the mother and receptacle of that
which has been born visible and in all ways sensed as neither earth nor air
nor fire nor water, nor as any of the things that have been born composites
or constituents of these. On the contrary, if we say that it’s some invisible
and shapeless form (eidos)—all-receptive, but partaking somehow of the
intelligible in a most perplexing way and most hard-to-capture—then we
won’t be lying… (51a4-b1)
Given the third kind’s mysterious identification with and distinction from form, it is
interesting to note that, immediately after this discussion, Timaeus decides in favor of the
real existence of the forms (the original hypothesis). This decision is made on the basis
of a hypothetical argument about the way that true opinion and intellect differ in their
generation. This seems to reflect the fact that the “form” of the third kind must be
posited prior to the possibility of knowing any other form.
Timaeus grounds the metaphysical hypothesis of the existence of the forms on a
hypothetical argument that if intellect and true opinion are different, then, likewise, the
forms “in every way are” (53d3). The implicit argument seems to be that if intellect is as
we say it is (namely, changed through teaching, has the true logos, and is participated by
divine natures) and if true opinion differs from it, then these two affections of the soul
must also have different objects. The result of this argument, it seems, is to determine
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In his essay, “Khōra,” Derrida remarks at several points that chōra is the ground of sexual difference
rather than characterized by it: “The hermeneutic types cannot inform, they cannot give form to khōra
except to the extent that, inaccessible, impassive, ‘amorphous’ (amorphon, 51a) and still virgin, with a
virginity that is radically rebellious against anthropomorphism, it seems to receive these types and give
place to them” (95); “…khōra does not couple with the father, in other words, with the paradigmatic
model. She is a third gender/genus (48d); she does not belong to an oppositional couple…The ‘mother’ is
supposedly apart. And since it’s only a figure, a schema, therefore one of these determinations which
khōra receives, khōra is not more of a mother than a nurse, is no more than a woman. This triton genos is
not a genos, first of all because it is a unique individual. She does not belong to the ‘race of women’
(genos gynaikōn)” (124); “This necessity (khōra is its sur-name) seems so virginal that it does not even
have the figure of a virgin any longer” (126).
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that there may be a knowable aspect of the third kind, but it will be entirely different in
kind from its “offspring” (sensible, generated beings).
Having “cast his vote” 207 on the existence of the forms with the assertion that true
opinion differs from intellect because they have “come into being separately and are in a
dissimilar condition,” Timaeus finally names this third kind with the term chōra (51e1-2).
Because he has voted for the forms, Timaeus abandons his analogical method for the
moment. He instead names the third kind and attempts to purge it of its materiality in
order to make it intelligible. But Timaeus has not altogether left his analogical strategy
behind. The name that he assigns to the third kind when he reintroduces the threefold
distinction, chōra, has an analogical pedigree. Chōra is the idea that subtends not only
the relations within the analogues of all its prior analogies, sensible beings as analogues;
it is the relation that stands as the middle term in the analogy between these beings and
their abstract, intelligible counterparts. In the simplest sense, chōra is that which makes
any and all relationality possible. Without such “making room,” there could be no “this,
here” or “that, there,” not because chōra is itself a “this” or a “that,” as was improperly
stated early in the second account, but because pointing to something presupposes the
distinction between the gesture and the thing thus signaled. 208 This distinction is cradled
by relation, and that relation is chōra.
Timaeus has made a shift by introducing the idea of chōra. It is as though he had
considered the failures of the analogies and said to himself about the third thing, “It’s like
those things, but even more; it’s like the very being-like of those things.” In identifying
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“Psēphon,” 51d3, 52d2.
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See Theaetetus, 157b, where Socrates ruminates on the absurdities suggested by a relative notion of the
causes of elements.
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the third thing as chōra, Timaeus has taken the form of the analogies, what makes them
work as comparisons of relations (i.e., relationality), and made it the principle of all
material relations. The problem of both the technical and natural analogies was that they
were themselves composed of relations and could not thereby represent the form of
relation itself. Having isolated chōra as the relationality of the relation, Timaeus has
indeed cast the third kind as intelligible even though, by his own account, it is in its
nature without intelligence, the other of nous.
Naming the third kind “chōra” could not have happened, however, before
Timaeus confronted the issue of the legitimacy of the intelligible within the account from
necessity. 209 After attending to the argument from persuasion that lends credence to the
case for the existence of the forms, Timaeus adjudicates the inadequacies of the first
account by an appeal to persuasion. Having safeguarded his next move to name the form
of the third kind and to formalize thereby the matter of the second account, Timaeus is
free now to use his analogies without fear of inadequacy, since their relations will have
been grounded by the principle of relationality itself: chōra.
Since Timaeus has now established that the three kinds are “being, and chōra, and
becoming,” he returns to the analogy of the nurse, no longer a threat, and even introduces
a new analogy, that of the sieve. This image, taken again from the realm of “women’s
work” and from agriculture, provides a happy blend of technical and natural production.
Winnowing describes an action determined by someone with ends constrained by the
material’s limitations on the range of possible productions. But the end in mind, the form
of the product aimed at, is located neither in the intellect of the winnower nor in the
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Andrew Lazella’s thoughtful explanation of this puzzling digression was very helpful in determining
how I might figure its imposition between the flood of analogies and the naming of the third kind.
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matter of the grain. The forms that result (here, the differentiation of chaff and seed)
occur in their coming together in activity and in motion. This is perhaps the most lucid
analogy for the third kind yet. It provides a sort of structural account of the mediation
that the mother provides as the seat (hedra) for the child. Chōra is passively moved, yet
her very power of receptivity210 allows for the transmission of that same motion to the
things seated within her:
And because she’s filled with powers neither similar nor equally balanced,
in no part of her is she equally balanced, but rather, as she sways
irregularly in every direction, she herself is shaken by those kinds and,
being moved, are always swept along this way and that and are
dispersed—just like the particles shaken and winnowed out by sieves and
other instruments used for purifying grain. (52e1-7)
The power of chōra is the power to disperse and mingle other, diverse powers, according
to the self-expression of the natures of those powers. Chōra is called an instrument
(“organon”) for the separating of unlikes and the collecting of likes. 211 But this
separation and collection is in no way imposed upon those things; it is merely a
responsive facilitation of the self-organization of the things that appear within her staging
of forms’ appearance. By submitting to the determinations that come to be within her,
chōra enables the self-determination of the elements in their oppositions and
combinations. Recall the early image of the third kind as ekmageion, a smooth, receptive
surface that also reveals a reflective imprint (of a seal, for example), standing solid and
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The “power of receptivity” may seem paradoxical, but consider the idea of “active listening” as an
example of passive activities.
211

Compare this to the Stranger’s description of the methods of assimilation and differentiation in the
Statesman, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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rigid at the same time as it may easily be remodeled. Her reflective quality is a marker of
her ambiguous status as both responsive and resilient. 212
Since chōra provides the framework within which likenesses may be related
alongside the differences with which they are coordinated, chōra is essential for allowing
these relations to appear, thought not through imposition. Indeed, Timaeus claims that
without chōra the elements would be “without measure (ametrōs)” 213 and “not
proportional (alogōs)” (53a8). Thus, chōra realizes the measure, proportionality, and
rationality latent in the mixture of forms with things. Being the account/reason (logos)
for the appearing of the intelligible relations of forms, chōra is the image of the analogy
that founds all imaging. Chōra appears not only to mediate the father and the son, being
and becoming; she is also the form of all mediation, in that her image is a reflection of
the relationality of all relations. Because chōra is the account that grounds all appearance
(which we have already found to be analogically mimetic), and because this takes shape
as a mediation of mediation, the account of chōra is analogical. In this way, chōra
determines the thought of Timaeus’ cosmology as analogical not merely in its exposition
but also in its reliance on this fundamental figure, itself an image of relationality, an
image of analogy.

Luce Irigaray’s comments upon both the image of the cave-womb (hystera) as well as chōra provide a
more thoroughgoing account of the significance of reflection, what she refers to as “specularity.” In
addition, Irigaray argues that the feminine is compelled and subordinated (as an instrument) to establish the
ground of the hierarchy that performs that subordination by means of that feminine instrument: “The
feminine, the maternal are instantly frozen by the “like,” the “as if” of that masculine representation
dominated by truth, light, resemblance, identity. By some dream of symmetry that itself is never ever
unveiled. The maternal, the feminine serve (only) to keep up the reproduction-production of doubles,
copies, fakes, while any hint of their material elements, of the womb, is turned into scenery to make the
show more realistic. The womb, unformed, ‘amorphous’ origin of all morphology, is transmuted by/for
analogy into a circus and a projection screen, a theater of/for fantasies” (Speculum of the Other Woman,
trans. Gillian C. Gill [Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985], 265).
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Again, compare this to the Stranger’s suggestion that the mean (to metrion) is essential to both the
philosopher’s and the statesman’s tropoi. This will be argued in some detail in the subsequent chapter.
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With the account of chōra, Timaeus seems to have overcome the difficulty of
mediating being and becoming, such that he may continue to provide a more detailed
treatment of the generation of all things. He begins by explaining the origins of the
proportionalities chōra brings to light, accounting for the generation of those primary
material principles (stoicheia) according to their fundamental proportions, 214 which are
likened to the structural relations constitutive of various geometrical solids:
Now, in keeping with the correct account—and the likely one—let that
solid which was born in the form of the pyramid be element and seed of
fire; and the second in order of birth let us call element and seed of air,
and the third of water…And in particular, with respect to the proportions
(analogiōn) concerning their quantities and their motions as well as their
other powers, one must think that when these had been perfected by the
god with precision, wherever the nature of necessity—willingly and upon
being persuaded—yielded, there he joined them together everywhere in
due proportion (ana logon). (56b3-6, c3-7)
The material transposition of the rational structures of proportions (the making tangible
of the invisible properties of numbers) is made possible by chōra’s mediation and
facilitation. Thanks to the receptive, transmissive action of chōra, Timaeus’ new account
is freed of its entanglement with becoming and able now to order the elements of
becoming according to the logos it allows to arise out of those elements themselves. That
is, the account of how each thing is ordered toward the best by nous, the story that
Socrates so urgently desired to know in his youth, is now possible, and Timaeus’ final
speech is to “make good” on the interest (tokos) Socrates had promised when he began
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Before he assigned the elements to their three-dimensional solid forms, Timaeus had already invoked
(for the first time) the idea of proportion (analogia) as the most divine of bonds among things: “Hence, in
beginning to construct the body of the all, the god proceeded to make it out of fire and earth. But it’s not
possible for two things alone to be beautifully combined apart from some third: some bond must get in the
middle and bring them both together. And the most beautiful of these bonds is that which, as much as
possible, makes itself and the things bound together one, and proportion (analogia) is suited by nature to
accomplish this most beautifully” (31b6-c4).
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his imaging of the good two days earlier in the Republic. 215 Moreover, the “fraudulent,”
or “bastard,” logos was not in the end to be avoided but rather pursued so as to legitimate
the final and chief (kephalēn) account. However, because of this paradox—namely, that
the account of the best, which mediates nous and anankē, is made possible by an account
that could never account for itself, that has no paternal logos—Timaeus’ cosmology is
incapable of accounting for itself entirely. It is weighed down by its insufficiency in the
face of the threat of methodological recursion. That the cosmology was possible on
account of the structure of analogy and a purification of matter from the logos indicates
that the form of the logos of the generation of all things needs its own account, an
account that can account for the path of the logos, a methodology. And, although
Timaeus often makes reference to his own logos and its need to be receptive itself to the
shape and character of its contents, unlike his hypothesis of the forms, he seems unable to
theorize this any further. Clearly, Timaeus’ tentative methodology relies on the original
metaphysical analogy with which we began our considerations. I will now turn to the
way that logos is manifest not only in the relations suggested here but also in the form of
relation itself, by the structure of analogy.

3 – Cosmology as the Mirror of Metaphysics,
or the Soul Reflected in the Image of a Virgin

Let us return to the initial source of Timaeus’ discourse, both to his account of
how it must proceed as well as to a reading of how that account actually does proceed.
Whereas metaphysics must only give an account of the whole, cosmology is the first step
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The true interest (tokos) on the account, then, was not the account of the generation of the sensible
world but the account of the reason for this generation, a logos that is in fact a complete logos and a final
reason.
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toward giving an account of the origin of that whole: “And for us who somehow intend to
make speeches about the all—telling the way it was born, or even whether it was without
birth—it’s a necessity, unless we’re utterly deranged, after we’ve called upon both gods
and goddesses, to pray that all we say be above all to their mind/taste and, following that,
to our own” (27c4-d1). As we have noted before, the telling of origins requires an
invocation because its subject is so remote as to be subject to the admonishment offered
in the Republic, that in order to be a useful remedy (pharmakon), a story at such great
chronological remove from us should at least be made as much like the truth as possible
so as to make it as beautiful as possible (382c-d ). As an “origin story,” this discourse is
also implicated in self-reflection and, therefore, stands as the reflective moment of
metaphysics itself. Metaphysics is constitutionally incapable of providing this reflection
because it concerns what is static and atemporal (the forms, being) and is thus itself a
static and atemporal logos. Indeed, we have seen that the first account (that from nous) is
the same as those in both the Republic and the Phaedo, failing also in the same way to be
capable of offering a view of itself, except through recourse to the alien and bastard
discourse of images.
The problem of metaphysics’ incapacity to account for itself and its need for an
origin is already noticed in the Phaedo when Socrates claims that in order to respond to
Cebes’ argument that the soul is perishable he will be forced to provide an account of all
genesis (95e10). This problem of genesis is also central to the Republic as the discourse
of the ideal city founders on the question of its practical/phenomenal generation (the
three waves of Book V), to which in fact Book VI and its account of the good is to
provide the beginning of an account of the genesis of the philosopher-king. Indeed,
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Timaeus begins with a recapitulation of the Republic, a reference to the forgotten history
of Athens, and with the explicit desire to “build” the human being, just as the Republic
built the city. All of this leads, then, to consider the necessity of an account of how such
accounts are rendered.

3.1 – The Recursion of a Methodo-logos
Recalling our analysis of the Republic, it is clear that the search for the good is
key to understanding any account of being and its relation to appearance. This reading
demonstrated in addition that Plato’s use of images to articulate not only the good but
also its relation to what it produces and sustains is integral to the form that his
metaphysics takes and that this form is itself analogical. The Phaedo revealed the
interplay of similarity and difference in determining the relation, or logos, of being and
becoming. This reading also made it possible to evaluate more precisely the role of the
good in the search for an account of being. In so doing, the search for the good was
interpreted as requiring an attempt to reflect on the soul by means of logos.
Taking a look at this trajectory, it appears that self-reflection is, as it were, the
after-image of metaphysics—what is left when our eyes close and we begin to dream the
origin of the possibility of our own account. Why is this? All along, the problem to
which we have seen images and analogies respond is how to account for mediation (for
instance, the mediation of similarity and difference or that between being and becoming)
without subsuming the account under one of the poles of the mediation (being or
similarity). While the images are themselves incomplete and insufficient, their
performance of the logos enacts the relation that must be preserved in order to
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sufficiently account for the metaphysical paradoxes. Again and again, the form of this
relation demonstrates itself to be analogical, regardless of the specific mimetic vehicle
(image, metaphor, allegory, etc.). We have also seen that this tactic is not explicitly
acknowledged as integral to the metaphysical account but that it suffuses the completed
ontological structures and informs the concern for logos as the mediating principle of the
soul’s relation to the good. This relation itself relies on the soul’s relation and reflection
upon itself: care for the soul is an expression of the soul’s relation to the good and this is
achievable only by way of the soul’s self-reflection.
Now, what remains to be addressed is the relation of analogy and analogical
thinking to the soul’s reflection on itself. In considering the difficulties that a
metaphysical account (and any totalizing thought) faces we will see the way that analogy
is necessary to self-reflection, in the same way that it is to metaphysics. Any account that
attempts to be complete faces the paradox that it cannot account for its own origin. As
Richard Robinson puts it:
Plato has recourse to the dramatic and literary form of the dialogues to
construct this special style of account which exhibits its own inadequacy.
It is particularly in evidence when he deals with analogous expressions
like order, good, and unity. For among other logical idiosyncrasies, these
notions behave in so obviously self-reflexive and “recursive” a manner
that we can expect to find them operative everywhere. 216
There is thus a blind spot in any reflection on the “whole.” Even if I am able to explain
the reason that difference is intertwined with similarity, I must somehow give an account
of the way my account is itself incorporated into this account, at which point there must
be an account for the account. This, as we have seen, is the form that analogy takes, a
relation of relation. As a result, analogy is at least formally required by any account of
216

Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 47.
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the whole. This difficulty is the same as that of self-reflection, and it can be expected that
it must be navigated in every totalizing discourse.
This problem of reflection is in evidence already at the heart of Plato’s
metaphysics in its dependence on a mimetic structure, the model-copy metaphysics of the
Republic and Phaedo. But the fact that his figuring of the problem comes by way of
representation (often lamented as the failure of Platonism) is less a failing of Plato’s
figuring of the problem than a reflection of that problem within the thinking of that
problem. As we have noted before, since there are two disturbances of the eyes—that
produced by moving from darkness to light and that from light to darkness—one must not
dismiss someone who appears confused (518a2-b1). Interrogating the confusion
embedded in logos, then, may well be our only form of solution.

3.2 – The “Man” in the Mirror
The difficulty inherent in self-reflection is beautifully rendered in the Alcibiades I
dialogue. Though the dialogue lacks unequivocal proof of authenticity, its central image,
that of the pupil/doll/virgin (korē), 217 is vivid and useful for considering the way that the
soul’s reflection on itself is key to any philosophical reflection and is illustrative of the
paradoxes within which logos must dwell. 218 A brief detour through this distinctive
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In his treatise, Greek Metaphor, Studies in Theory and Practice, William Bedell Stanford criticizes a
poet for relying on “wornout images; thus when Donne in Exstasie writes, ‘And picture in our eyes to
get\Was all our propagation’ he only exploits the latent metaphor in the Greek use of korai (and the Latin
pupulae, pupillae) for the eyes—whence the English pupil which applies equally to the homunculus in the
classroom and to where little figures are reflected in the eye” ([Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1936], 31). It
seems important that the feminine connotation of korē appears to drop out in the transmission of the cluster
of meanings associated with the Latinate equivalent, pupil, replaced only with the strangely neutered
(though masculine in form), homunculus.
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In the lecture course Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault agrees with Raymond Weil (“La
place du Premier Alcibiade dans l’oeuvre de Platon,” L’Information littéraire 16 [1964], 74-84) that the
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imaging of self-reflection will provide a helpful model for looking at the role played by
another utterly reflective image, the chōra of the Timaeus.
The Alcibiades I is protreptic: Socrates informs Alcibiades that he has only just
now gotten leave from his daimonion to admonish him for not caring for his soul. 219
Socrates claims that it is only with him that Alcibiades will achieve what he wants in his
incipient political life in Athens. Socrates’ aim is to show Alcibiades that he does not
know enough about himself to be certain his political career will succeed, and one of the
ways he attempts to do this is by arguing that since the body is merely a tool for the soul,
the soul, therefore, needs the most care and its virtue is guided by a greater art. Having
established that the only true lover of Alcibiades must be the one who loves his soul and
that Socrates is that true lover, he admonishes his now pliant comrade to take his
medicine and take care of his soul. Socrates claims here that knowledge of the soul is the
only true knowledge of oneself, and, citing the Delphic oracle so dear to his philosophic
mission, Socrates illustrates his point by recasting the dictum as if it were speaking to the
eye:
Soc: Look for yourself: if it said to our eye, “See yourself,” as though it
were giving advice to a person, how would we understand what it
counsels? Wouldn’t it be to look into this—into what, while looking, the
eye is likely to see itself?
Alc: Clearly.

curiosities of the Alcibiades I are not evidence of forgery (a question introduced by Schleiermacher) but of
revision. Along with a number of puzzled interpreters, Foucault claims that the dialogue is an early
dialogue that is later revised, accounting for the apparent jumble of terminology and concerns of early and
later Plato (Graham Burchell, trans. [New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005], 73). Jean-François Pradeau
offers a review of the debate: “Introduction” and “Appendix I” in Alcibiades [Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,
1999], 24-29; 219-220.
219

Socrates claims that his daimonion never tells him what to do but only restrains him when he is about to
do something wrong (Apology, 40c1-3). His desire to correct Alcibiades must have been just such a case.
Alcibiades’ eventual reaction in the Symposium may be evidence of why his daimonion was right to have
held him back (213c-222b).
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Soc: Let’s think, then—what is there that while looking into it we may see
at the same time both it and ourselves?
Alc: Obviously, Socrates, into mirrors and those kinds of things.
Soc: What you say is correct. And isn’t there something of this kind in the
eye with which we see?
Alc: Of course.
Soc: So, did you have in mind that the face of the one who’s looking into
the eye appears in the vision of the one opposite, just like in a mirror—and
indeed don’t we call it a doll/pupil (korē), being a sort of idol of the one
looking?
Alc: That’s right.
Soc: So, an eye gazing at an eye and looking into what is its best part, that
by which it may see, in this way may see itself.
Alc: It appears so.
Soc: But if it were to look into other things that a person has or into
something else that exists besides that which happens to be the same, it
will not see itself.
Alc: That’s right.
Soc: If an eye is trying to see itself, shouldn’t it look into an eye and into
that place of the eye in which the excellence of the eye happens to come
about—and this is where sight is?
Alc: So it is.
Soc: So, dear Alcibiades, if a soul too is trying to know itself, shouldn’t it
look into a soul, and most of all into that place in it, in which the
excellence of the soul comes about—wisdom—and into whatever else
through which the same excellence happens?
Alc: It seems so to me at least, Socrates. (132d6-133b11, my
translation) 220
The analogy is apt and not unique to this dialogue. The intellect is the eye of the soul,
knowing with clarity when it is bathed in the light of knowledge and truth, shrouded in
ignorance when it is immersed in the darkness of mere opinion. These are all metaphors
well established in the Republic, recurring elsewhere throughout the dialogues. What is
especially interesting about this passage is that it directly addresses (and provides a
paradoxical solution) to the problem of self-reflection; it renders visible the blind spot as
the pupil.
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Based on the Greek text inVolume 201 of the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
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Looking back at the eclipse analogy analyzed in our previous chapter, we may
now see another analogue to the images in water cast by the darkened moon, whose
invisible face is the condition of our capacity (and interest) to witness the spectacle of the
sun with out harm. So too, the reflection of oneself in another’s pupil allows one to see
what cannot otherwise be seen without harm, which nevertheless does not at the same
time show anything about the pupil or eye of the other person. But why is Alcibiades’
original proposition—that to see his eye he would use a mirror or other reflective
object—insufficient? Especially given our connection of this kind of reflection to the
watery images of the eclipse analogy of the Phaedo, why does Socrates reject this
option? At a purely strategic level, Socrates is trying to get Alcibiades to realize he needs
another person to help guide him in recognizing his own ignorance and to cultivate his
wisdom and virtue. The analogy of the mirror would just reinforce Alcibiades’
narcissism, encouraging him to remain self-absorbed to achieve all he desires. However
sensible his response appears, this does seem to reveal the latent inclination behind
Alcibiades’ recommendation to use a mirror, the symbol of vanity. Beyond the strategy
Socrates is implementing, it seems that the mirror is not entirely adequate for other, more
philosophical reasons. While images of all sorts arise in the Republic, the discussion of a
mirror image in Book X will shed light on its meaning in Alcibiades I.
In the context of discussing the works of the poets, Socrates asks Glaucon how he
could go about producing every thing, both natural and artificial. Perhaps a little dull
from the marathon conversation, Glaucon requires some prodding, and Socrates suggests,
“You could fabricate them quickly in many ways and most quickly, of course, if you are
willing to take a mirror and carry it around everywhere; quickly you will make the sun
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and the things in the heaven; quickly, the earth; and quickly, yourself and the other
animals and implements and plants and everything else...” (596d5-e1, Bloom). In this
case, Socrates is illustrating how poetry and its proponents are able to reproduce anything
in logoi, just like holding a mirror up to reality. But, of course, the mirror’s reflection is
not the same thing as what it reflects; it is only a reflection. And just as in the Phaedo the
sketch of the beloved reminds the lover of his absence, it serves as a symbol of the real
but not of the thing itself. So, too, the logoi and the mirror’s image are symbols and
cannot offer response or satisfaction in place of the real things they image. 221
Socrates goes on, in Book X of the Republic, to order the different kinds of
images, following a rubric not unlike (if not as complete as) the divided line of Book VI.
Using the example of a couch, 222 Socrates explains that the mirror’s image of a couch
(and any painting, word, or other representation of it) is at a third remove from the real
couch, since the couch one reclines on is already at a remove from the form of the couch,
that which the couch maker conceives in order to produce the useful couch. The mirror
image, then, clearly corresponds to the least clear part of the divided line, the couch itself
to its more clear counterpart in the visible region, and the form to the most clear part of
the divided line. The third section of the divided line, the intelligible region of
hypotheses, diagrams, and mathematicals, is notably missing, but to this example could
be supplied reference to a blueprint or schematic for the couch, something which is
221

The lament over the insufficiency of written logos is of course highlighted in the Phaedrus, but it is
interesting that in the Republic the concern is less with different kinds of logoi (spoken and written) than
with different uses of logoi. This might argue, in fact, for the Phaedrus as a development of similar
problems in the Republic, such that within both discourses there is the added difficulty (and thus, a
paradoxical similarity between poetry and philosophy) of the faithless parricide of writing.
222

This seems to be a bit of a jab at Glaucon, who in Book II was especially concerned that their city in
speech not be a city of sows and that the people have couches and other furniture available to them (372d510).
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indeed optional. 223 With this included, the mirror image would be at a fourth remove. In
any case, the mirror image is the least of the lot.
This leads us back to our consideration of the mirror in Alcibiades I. Given that
the mirror image is the least useful, not only because it cannot respond (just like the
sketch of Simmias in the Phaedo) but also because it cannot be interrogated, this is
perhaps why Socrates rejects Alcibiades’ suggestion that the eye look in a mirror to see
itself. Alcibiades’ suggestion amounts to offering someone who asks for the anatomical
details about the liver a photograph of one. Though one would be hard pressed to say it
is not a liver, one might insist, nonetheless, that it is a photo of a liver, not a liver itself.
At the very least, having the organ in hand would be more useful for understanding how
it works. For the same reason, first-year medical students are required to perform whole
body dissections in order to understand the body they will in time heal. Having the
physical object in hand is far more informative.
We said earlier that the eye’s reflection in another eye’s pupil is better than a
mirror’s reflection because it, like the mirrored eclipse, is less harmful. If the eye were to
see itself at this level of the ladder of being (at the second remove from the true couch),
one would have to be plucked out for inspection by the other—a gruesome autopsy!
So, although looking at oneself in a reflection does not provide inaccurate
information, it is still an incomplete source in that it can only mimic relation and cannot
produce it. In self-reflection relationality itself obscures the medium of that relation. If
the self is to see itself completely, it needs an external source for that reflection, but one
223

In the following chapter, we will turn to the issue of method and, in particular, the role of analogy and
dianoia in dialectic. At that point, this third section and its quality as “optional” will need to be
reconsidered. As I argue in Chapter Two, philosophical analogy and the other hypothetical images occupy
the space of dianoia on the divided line, so the entirety of the example of the couches may well act as the
third section in reference to the discussion of the Republic.
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that absents itself and gives itself wholly over to the making of that reflection. If there is
a discernible medium, then the reflection is inadequate because it will be of another order
than the thing it reflects. However, if the medium is utterly self-effacing, it becomes the
principle of knowledge. Take, for example, the role of light in the analogy of the sun and
the good. Light is the analogue of truth, since it is that without which there can be no
visibility. But light also adds nothing to what is visible when seen. Light, a medium like
chōra, merely provides the condition for visibility. Likewise, truth is not some extrinsic,
magic ingredient, which when added to things makes them knowable. Truth is the very
principle of intelligibility without which nothing could be known, but, as such, it too does
not add anything to that which knows or to what is knowable.

3.3 – Pure Mediation
To return to the Timaeus, chōra functions as a medium in the same way that the
pupil (korē) does. The virgin (korē) remains such even as she becomes a “mother,” the
reflective surface that renders visible what is otherwise invisible, and the invisible
possibility of invisible visibility. Just as we noted that there was an “intelligible
visibility” in addition to “sensible visibility,” we note now that chōra acts as the invisible
backdrop of intelligible visibility, what safeguards that visibility as primary and
originary. As Derrida remarks, the mother in the “family scene” between being and
becoming is only barely recognizable, in the back, on the reflective surface of the scrim
behind the scene: “And if one looks hard enough as in those pictures in which a second
picture faintly can be made out, one might be able to discern her unstable form, drawn
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upside-down in the foliage, at the back of the garden.” 224 She is, thus, a sort of backlit,
horizonal limn, the cave’s dark wall that makes possible the reflection of logos to
itself. 225
Chōra reflects the structure of mediation that must be in effect (and is assumed by
Timaeus’ metaphysical analogy) between the eternal reason of nous and the persistent
necessity of materiality. Because these must be related to each other in order to give an
account of the ordered whole of what is (i.e., a cosmology), and because this relation
appears to rely on a relation of imaging, the culminating image (that which operates as
the mediator between these two impenetrable kinds) is itself an image but one that
provides a reflection of relationality itself. The work that chōra accomplishes extends
beyond its structure as an image and shows that the formal character of analogy has been
conceptualized by means of this “bastard” mother and matrix. Although the thought of
chōra is insufficient to the standards of nous, it is nevertheless essential to the completion
(or, at least, to the assertion of the possibility of a completion) of Timaeus’ cosmology,
and it provides the gateway for considering at an even more abstract level the structure of
all totalizing thought and its reliance on the thought of analogy.
We have seen quite a lot in the Timaeus that contributes to an understanding of
the role of analogy and its structure. So, why is analogy not given an explicit account
there? This is because to do so is to admit the failure of the account to be complete and
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“Plato’s Pharmacy,” 143.
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“And even in the cave there is no mirror. The cave itself is speculum, den of reflection…In any case, it
seems difficult to reproject the images reflected in and picked up by a speculum symmetrically, from
bottom to top, without any kind of curvature” (“Plato’s Hystera,” 285). In her “Korē: Young Virgin, Pupil
of the Eye” (Speculum of the Other Woman, 147), Irigaray also cites the problem of inversion noted by
Timaeus in his discussion of the optics of a concave reflective surface: “And if the mirror is turned
lengthwise to the face it makes the same entire face appear upside down, since it drives the lower part of
the beam up and, conversely, the upper part down” (46c3-6).
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accomplishable. That Timaeus’ cosmology becomes analogical in form and not only in
content gestures toward its topical relevance to its fellow later dialogues in their
preoccupation with methodology. Although Timaeus acknowledges the relation between
the subject of his discourse and the manner of that discourse, in so far as it is a
cosmology, he is unable and unwilling to provide an explicit conceptualization of the way
the analogical nature of chōra is bound up with his account. We recognize now, too, that
analogy is integral to philosophy’s need and capacity to account for itself, to look itself in
the eye. We must consider, then, what basis there is in Plato’s work for a
conceptualization of an analogical method.
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Chapter Five
The Weaving of Method in the Statesman

And since one cannot speak of that which
enables one to speak (being forbidden to speak
of it or to speak to it face to face), one will speak
only of that which speaks and of things that,
with a single exception, one is constantly
speaking of.
Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy”

1 – The Statesman’s Origins

At the beginning of the Timaeus, Socrates describes a condition that affects him, a
condition to which Timaeus’ speech is to be the beginning of a response. Timaeus’ feast
of speech was meant to satisfy Socrates’ craving, by offering a gift in return for the
banquet of words lavished upon his listeners of the day before, when Socrates retold the
conversation of the Republic of another day earlier. To describe the peculiar desire he
has, Socrates says it is as if someone who has seen beautiful zōa (animals/figures) were to
wish to see them moving and engaged in some competition (19b6). That is, Socrates’
city in speech of the Republic is a sort of zōgraphon, an image of and from life, which he
now wants to see in action. He wants to witness that static beauty become actively
engaged in the dynamic of war: “Gladly would I listen to someone go through in speech
those struggles that a city engages in, those that are a contest with other cities” (19c2-4,
my translation).
But one cannot create cities if one does not first have humans to populate them.
So, Timaeus’ task will be first to “generate” the human. Doing this, however, requires in
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addition an account of the coming into being of everything visible. The Timaeus, then, is
a logos of the genesis of the humans who will go on to populate the historical Athens,
who contended against Atlantis, the story that Critias briefly outlines in the Timaeus but
then promises to explain later (which begins the incomplete Critias). We have seen
already that the Republic and the Timaeus are accounts (logoi) that appeal throughout
their exposition to images and illustrations in their construction. While the Republic
reflects on the program of proper breeding and rearing of the guardian class and the
Timaeus provides a probable account of the constitution of the living human body,
neither provides a definition or statement of the manner (tropos) by which the statesman
(politicos) will govern. The Statesman dialogue is an attempt to provide just this. While
the Republic offers an account of the coming to be of the philosopher-ruler, it offers no
account of the philosopher’s ability to recognize in himself the thinking that makes him a
ruler. This is the point of the third wave of paradox: how would the philosopher ever be
made to be a ruler? We are told it is under compulsion (“anankasai” (519c9), “anankē”
(519e4)), but it is not enough to be forced to serve. The just city will not exist before that
class recognizes in itself the right and duty to rule. The philosopher must choose the fate
of rulership, and he can only do so if he knows what about his soul makes him a ruler as
well as a philosopher. The kinship between the statesman’s craft and that of the
philosopher makes the investigation of either into an investigation of both.
In addition to providing an account of the philosophical judgment required of the
statesman, something missing from the Republic, the Statesman also provides an account
of the philosopher’s judgment about the statesman. While the Republic offers an account
of the place of philosophical thought, and identifies philosophers as the most proper
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kings, it does not reflect upon the very action by which Socrates and his students provide
this account. There is nothing in the Republic to account for the function or role of their
“city in speech.” In what way does this linguistic image accomplish the task of
illuminating the character of justice, both in the soul and in the city? I see this as the task
of the Statesman: to provide an account of the means by which the statesman uses
philosophy and to apply that same analysis to his own attempt to philosophically
determine the role of the statesman.
For this reason, the search for the statesman allows us to investigate both the
methods of the statesman and the methods of the philosopher. The Statesman dialogue
serves as a reflection on statecraft and political methodology as well as on the method of
providing a methodology, that is, a philosophy of method. 226 The Eleatic Stranger,
whose discussion dominates the Statesman, is often engaged in a recursive enterprise, not
merely offering reflections on the methods appropriate to the statesman’s craft but also
reflections on the methods he himself uses in order to illuminate those very methods.
The Statesman dialogue is, therefore, a logos on the method of providing a logos of
method. Furthermore, the Statesman reveals the analogy that relates the statesman and
philosopher exemplified by the Stranger’s own investigation.
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I would not go so far as to claim that the Statesman dialogue itself serves as the “missing” dialogue on
the philosopher, promised at the beginning of the Sophist. In a lecture series presented at the Collegium
Phaenomenologicum in July 2004, John Sallis argued that the Theaetetus is that missing dialogue on the
philosopher. Seth Benardete is more moderate when he says, “The Statesman seems to be doing double
duty, for itself and for the absent Philosopher. Perhaps the Statesman, then, comes closest to putting in
writing what Plato chose not to put in writing” (The Being of the Beautiful: Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and
Statesman [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984], III.104). Hereafter, The Being of the Beautiful. Jacob
Klein, on the other hand, argues that the triology (Sophist, Theaetetus, Statesman) serves as a whole to
determine that the philosopher and the statesman are a single identity: “The question raised twice, at the
beginning of the Sophist as well as at the beginning of the Statesman, whether the Sophist, the Statesman,
and the Philosopher constitute a triad, may be considered as answered: They are but two” (Plato’s Trilogy:
Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], 200). Hereafter,
Plato’s Trilogy.
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1.1 – Two Threads: Worth and Likeness
The Statesman dialogue begins with the older Socrates declaring his indebtedness
to Theodorus for introducing him to the Eleatic Stranger and to Theaetetus, who spoke
the day before concerning the identity of the sophist. Theodorus responds that Socrates
“will be three times as indebted (opheilēseis tautēs triplasian),” once the additional
accounts of the statesman and philosopher are completed as well (257a3-4). 227 With this,
Theodorus, the geometer, blunders into a crucial error, one that illuminates one of the
primary themes of the dialogue ahead. Socrates chides Theodorus for according each
character (sophist, statesman and philosopher) numerical equality in his proportion
(analogia), when their worth is by no means equal (257b2-4). Theodorus has accorded
numerical equality where the judgment of each kind’s worth cannot be sufficiently
assessed by means of quantitative relations—bare counting makes each kind look equal,
whereas they are clearly not. The relation that holds between mathematical proportions
and comparisons of worth, between quantitative and qualitative relations, will remain an
important theme of the ensuing dialogue.
Following upon this, Socrates, who speaks only briefly at the beginning,
introduces another important theme when he notices that Theaetetus and the younger
Socrates appear to share a kinship (oikeiotēta) with him: the first shares a physical
likeness, and the second a nominal one (258a1). In the Theaetetus dialogue, which
occurs two days prior to that of the Statesman, Theodorus remarks that Theaetetus looks
quite similar to Socrates with regard to the features of his face and his astute mind and
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My translation in consultation with Harold North Fowler’s translation in the Loeb Classical Texts
edition, Vol. 164 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925) and the Oxford Classical Texts edition
of the Greek manuscript (Platonis Opera, Vol. I [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995]). Unless
otherwise noted, translations are Fowler’s.
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courageous spirit. In that conversation, Socrates asks Theodorus to invite Theaetetus to
sit with him “so I can look at myself and see what kind of face I have” (145 d). This will
remind us of the injunction Socrates gives Alcibiades to inspect his soul by looking at its
reflection in the soul of another. We concluded that this imperative might even be
directed at philosophy itself, to behold its own activity of logos through logos itself.
Indeed, the Statesman will be that dialogue wherein the philosopher comes to gaze upon
himself, in the form of his most reflective and similar kind: the statesman. Likenesses are
clearly key to this reflectivity, but neither aesthetic likeness nor nominal likeness on its
own is sufficient. Where there is similarity there is also difference, and one kind of
similarity does not denote identity of kind or of quality. Socrates has thus introduced the
notion that likeness must be sought out but not without its comparison to other forms of
likeness, which through their juxtaposition actually reveal difference. 228
In what follows, I track these threads of the dialogue, as they are carefully woven
by the Stranger. The complexities of this fabric are numerous, but I will most closely
attend to their bearing on a nascent methodology. There are a number of determinations
of the fate of method in this dialogue, the most important of which is its thematization by
the Stranger mid-way through the dialogue. The dual methods the Stranger identifies at
that point are differentiation and assimilation. This seemingly isolated and clear
articulation is of course complicated: first, by the fact that the Stranger offers
demonstrations of at least three methods within the dialogue (division, myth, and
example) and, second, by the fact that the Stranger also offers analyses and evaluations of
these methods while they are in use. The Stranger thematizes methods for the acquisition
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This is why it is somewhat inaccurate to refer to Platonic metaphysics as mimetic. Simple likeness is not
descriptive of this Plato’s thinking; it is, rather, a likeness of likeness itself.
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of knowledge based on aesthetic grounds, but how can any method like this transport us
toward something more noble and invisible? Furthermore, how, on this basis, is there to
be knowledge of method?

2 – The Failures of the Method of Division

2.1 – Methodical Abstraction
When the Stranger begins his search for the statesman, the second in a trio of
searches promised at the beginning of the conversation of the Sophist dialogue, it seems
that he has a very different approach than that of Socrates in the Republic. The Stranger
proceeds in a rigidly orderly fashion, using his method of division, which he had already
amply demonstrated in the prior day’s search for the sophist. In the Sophist, it is clear
that the results of the method of division that the Stranger employs are inconsistent: the
definition of the sophist in terms of his use of elenchus appears also to fit the description
of the philosopher or, at least, Socrates. The Stranger is not unaware of these difficulties.
Speaking to the young Theaetetus in the Sophist, the Stranger introduces an important
simile:
“Who then? Do we say these are the ones who make use of this art? For I
am afraid to say ‘sophists’.”
“But why?”
“Lest we confer a great honor on them.”
“But what you just now explained is close in likeness to such a one.”
“And a wolf to a dog; the wildest to the tamest. For the cautious, it is
most of all necessary always to be on guard about resemblances. For this
kind (genos) is the most slippery.” (230e5-231a9, my translation)
The Stranger reminds us of the problem of images that pervades the Republic. The just
man is easily mistaken for the unjust and vice versa; here too, the philosopher is mistaken
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for the sophist. Similarity alone is not sufficient to determine the identity of a genos. A
special difference is also needed. These issues are addressed directly by the conversation
that the Stranger takes up in the search for the statesman.
The Stranger begins trying to locate the statesman by using the same method of
division that he uses in the Sophist. He starts with two classes that act like a hypothesis,
an initial, stipulated division: those who have knowledge (epistemonōn) and those who
do not. Unlike Socrates’ argument to Anytus in the Meno, where he claims that virtue
must not be teachable since virtuous statesmen like Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles
seem incapable of teaching it even to their own sons (93c-94e), the Stranger never makes
reference to any specific examples of actual statesman in his own divisions. And,
whereas, in the Euthyphro, in order to identify the proper end of pious service to the gods
Socrates refers to a variety of different skills whose aim is always particular to its actions
(medicine, ship building, carpentry, farming and military strategy, 13d-14a), the Stranger
never makes reference to likenesses or analogous examples that would guide the choices
required by his method of division. 229 That is, the Stranger’s method, as opposed to
Socrates’ dialogical, hypothetical, dianoetic discourse, occurs purely according to nous,
moving from one class to the next, slowly refining the definition by careful separations.
It would appear that the method of division operates according to the description of
dialectic offered in the Republic: “making no use of anything sensed in any way, but
using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too” (511c1-2,
Bloom). That is, it is purely theoretical, having no contact with the sensible political
reality it seeks both to describe and prescribe. In a sense, the failure of the Republic, to
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Importantly, however, the Stranger does make reference to exemplary uses of the method he himself
employs, both in the Sophist (the diairēsis of the angler) and in the Statesman (the diairēsis of weaving).
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which the Timaeus was to be a response, lay in just such idealism. The Timaeus is
conceived as bringing the polis “down to earth” so as to provide a real ground for the
production of the city in speech. Yet, the Timaeus never goes so far as to identify the
manner (tropos) of the statesman’s rule, which, as we have noted, is why the Statesman
dialogue is needed. The Statesman, then, has inherited the problems that attend an
abstract account: it can neither account for the genesis of what it names nor can it account
for its own genesis. Let us now look more closely at the Stranger’s description of his
method and the definition that he and the young Socrates first propose for the statesman.

2.2 – Diairēsis
During the course of the conversation of the Statesman, having already proceeded
some distance in their divisions, the Stranger pauses at an opportune moment to instruct
his pliant interlocutor regarding their path. While trying to determine what things the
statesman herds, he stresses that divisions are not to be made too quickly or too slowly
and that the best way to accomplish the task is to find the middle that divides each group
in half:
We must not take a single small part, and set it off against many large
ones, nor disregard species in making our division...just now, you thought
you had the right division and you hurried our discussion along, because
you saw that it was leading towards humans. But, my friend, it is not safe
to whittle off shavings; it is safer to proceed by cutting through the middle,
and in that way, one is more likely to find classes. (262a10-b9, Fowler
modified) 230
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This echoes Socrates’ claim in the Phaedrus that “This, in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind
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The Stranger is motivated to pause in their dividing of classes in order to reflect on the
very method they are using because his young friend has made the naïve error of jumping
to the conclusion before having sufficiently distinguished each class. The young Socrates
responds well to this instruction, changing his mind about the division he had made
inappropriately. Instead of splitting the group of things herded into those that are human
and those that are non-human animals (his original, erroneous attempt), young Socrates
agrees with the Stranger that the group of animals that are herded must first be divided
into those that live on land and those that live in water. 231 In what follows, however, we
will find that the insistence on this very division, rather than following young Socrates’
intuition, ultimately results in the definition being incapable of distinguishing many types
of animal herders from the stately herder of humans.
One can hardly blame the young Socrates for having wanted to get to the end
more quickly. In addition to the exhausting (if not exhaustive) account of the sophist
offered in the previous day’s conversation, the Stranger has on the day of the Statesman
dialogue already subjected the young Socrates as well as the other attendees of the
conversation (Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodorus) to two sets of laborious distinctions
meant to uncover the definition of the statesman. Both of these attempts to locate the
statesman seem to fail to identify what they seek completely. We may say, in fact, that
the hunt for the statesman encounters three waves of difficulty, just as the ideal city of the
Republic encounters three waves of paradox, whose final, greatest paradox has to do with
how to effect a commingling of the philosopher and the statesman. In the Statesman, the
first two “waves” are reflections on the first definitions of the statesman and have to do
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with being unable to distinguish the statesman from others. The third wave is a reflection
on the inadequacies of the method of division itself. While evaluating the definitions’
failure to identify the judgment that sets the statesman apart from pretenders, the Stranger
suggests that his method of division, proceeding on the basis of difference alone, is itself
unable to employ the very judgment that sets the statesman apart from the rest.

2.3 – Waves of Error in the Method of Division

2.3.1 – The First Wave: Absurdity
The Stranger makes it clear that there are two ways to complete the division of
classes to find the statesman. He first provides the longer one and then the shorter one.
Both share the initial set of distinctions that claim the statesman practices an intellectual
epistēmē that gives orders for the generation and nourishment of land-walking herds
(258b-261e). By the shorter way, the Stranger cuts the class of walkers into the
quadruped and biped and, again, the biped class into the feathered and featherless (266e67). By the longer way, on the other hand, the Stranger divides the class of walkers into
the horned and hornless, which is itself further divided into those that interbreed and
those that do not (265b-e8). Finally, the non-interbreeding, hornless walkers that the
statesman herds have two rather than four feet (266b3). Both divisions seem tenuous at
this point, especially given that the options are that humans are either, as Kenneth Dorter
asserts, “bald bird[s]” or “leg-challenged pigs.” 232 These definitions are not exactly
incorrect, but they are ridiculous. Just as in Book V of the Republic the suggestion of
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women being raised and trained in common with men introduced the specter of absurdity
(atopia), the first wave of difficulties for the definition of the statesman threatens a
similar indeterminacy. First, humans appear to be only slightly different from pigs and,
consequently, the statesman seems to share his definition with the pig herder:
“Our human kind shares the same lot and runs in the same heat as the most
excellent and at the same time most easy-going of creatures.”
“Yes, I see that; it is a very strange (atopos) result.”
“But is it not reasonable that they arrive hindmost/most pig-like (hustata)
who are the slowest?” 233
“Yes, that is true.”
“And do we fail to notice this further point, that the king appears in a still
more ridiculous light, running along with the herd and paired in the race
with the man of all others who is most in training for a life of careless
ease?” (266c3-d1, Fowler, modified)
Again, this discussion begs comparison with the second incarnation of the “city in
speech” in Book II of the Republic, whose rusticity Glaucon derides, “If you were
providing for a city of sows, Socrates, on what else would you fatten them than this?”
(372d5-6, Bloom). What first distinguishes the city of pigs from the luxurious city,
which Glaucon desires, is the finery of the food and the fact that one consumes this food
while seated on furniture. Again, Glaucon seems to think that the absence of such
civilizing tools, which thereby requires that the inhabitants of this city eat from the
ground, renders humans no better than pigs.
The second version of the division, which takes a shorter route, avoids this first
wave of difficulty by dividing the class of “walkers” immediately into the “quadruped”
and the “biped.” It fails, however, in that it unnecessarily duplicates an earlier step when
it goes on to divide the “biped” into the “featherless” and the “feathered,” which had
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already been invoked immediately before the shorter path began. 234 Worse still, although
the division itself is shorter, it is only shorter by a single step, and the digression required
in order to account for the difference between the shorter and longer accounts unduly
lengthens the entire conversation. The Stranger himself notes the difficulty of revising
inaccurate cuts when he says even earlier, “Let us, then, not make our division as we did
before, with a view to all, nor in a hurry, with the idea that we may thus reach political
science quickly, for that has already brought upon us the proverbial penalty…of having
made less speed, because we made too much haste and did not make our division right”
(264a9-b5).
In each case, the method of division fails to take account of the qualitative
distinctions between things (the better and worse), favoring instead the quantitative
distinction of classes that divide the larger group roughly evenly. Young Socrates
attempted to use a qualitative distinction when he divided humans and all other animals.
We might assume he wished not to associate humans with any other kinds of animals
because humans are the superior kind. As the Stranger says, the method of division must
not attend to differences of this sort: “…this method of argument pays no more heed to
what is dignified (semnoteron) than to what is not, and no less honor to the small than to
the great, but always goes on its own way to the most true” (266d7-10, Fowler modified).
The method was not used incorrectly; the method purposely fails to be capable of
accounting for qualitative distinctions. We must conclude, then, that the method of
division is not sensitive to quality. That is, even if we know and can delimit the
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differences between a shepherd and a pig farmer, the differences within each group
(difference not of kind but of quality—better and worse) are invisible and cannot be
given an account. The Stranger recognizes the limitations of his method’s blindness to
qualitative measures. He notes that their definition so far does not point to the king, the
more noble leader, any more than to other herders: “Then how can our discourse (logos)
about the king be right and free from error, when we pick him out alone as herder and
tender of the human herd, while countless others dispute his claim?” (268b10-c2). The
Stranger finds it necessary to abandon division temporarily in favor of a myth that will
illuminate the peculiar problems that face his analytically defined statesman. 235

2.3.2 – The Second Wave: Pretenders to the Throne
At the end of his first set of definitions, the Stranger announces that their account
is “not entirely complete” (267c11-d1). He says that this shepherd of humans will be
contesting with a slew of practitioners of other arts, all of which are aimed at tending to
the care of humans. Just as in the Republic the prisoners of the cave contest over who
best knows how to interpret the shadows and give praise and honor to those who can
predict their sequences (516c7-d2), and the sailors of the ship of state will contest over
who is best suited to lead once the ship owner is enchained (488a7-d4), the definition of
the statesman as tending to the nurture of the human herd remains open to the claims of
the practitioners of many different arts. These technicians will all be able to claim that
they, no less than the statesman, govern over and rule the tending of humans. Even more
235
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than before, we can see the truth of the Stranger’s claim that the method of division pays
no heed to social class differences, since physical trainers, physicians, cooks, animal
herders, and merchants all have equal claim as overseers of the care and maintenance of
humans (267e8-a2). Moreover, each of these might also argue that in so far as they tend
to all the city’s inhabitants, they also see to the needs of the statesman as well (267a3-4).
The context of Book II of the Republic again seems to call for some comparison.
Recall that the longer division defining the statesman suggests that the statesman tends to
pigs just as Glaucon claims that Socrates’ modest, self-sufficient city, having no furniture
by which they might keep their food out of the dirt, makes its inhabitants look like pigs.
In the Republic, we see that the proliferation of jobs that arise to provide the things that
are “needed” to care for humans’ excessive desires are the same jobs that, in the
Statesman, come to challenge the supremacy of the statesman as the greatest caretaker of
humans. While Socrates’ rustic and healthy city does have need of various flock herders
as well as merchants, both of which are mentioned here in the Statesman, it is Glaucon’s
luxurious, “feverish” city that requires physicians, trainers, and cooks, which are all
named as challengers in the Statesman (373b-c). In addition, in the feverish city there is
need for swineherds, for apparently pigs are a luxury commodity, perhaps because they
eat the waste that is produced in the fulfillment of the extravagant tastes of the feverish
city. 236 In the Republic, the city of necessity must increase the number of jobs to be filled
in order to allow each craftsperson to have the time available to perfectly execute his/her
craft as well as to be ready at the right time to execute it. In this way the city is made to
have a far better quality in all its products, but, at the same time, the city must have
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additional specialized occupations in order to provide the tools and goods that will
supplement unmet needs produced as a result of the restricted activity of each specialized
worker. With reference to the Republic, then, we see that the problem of distinguishing
the statesman from the other caretakers in the city emerges only where the concern for
the proper fulfillment of a job has already been outranked by the desire for unnecessary
things. In this way, both quality and excess are concerns implicit to the problems that
face the initial definition of the statesman, and these are precisely the issues that
influence the Stranger’s definition of the statesman that is produced by the method of
division. In addition, the first account from division also seems to have ignored the role
of generation and provision necessary to human flourishing. That is, because the tending
was not specified as separate from feeding, the farmer has as much right to rule as the
cook. This error will be obliquely illustrated by means of the myth of the “reversed
earth.”

The myth of reversal
Using a strategy not unlike Socrates’ contrived “city in speech” of the Republic,
the Stranger seeks to demonstrate the precise nature of the failure of his definitions to
distinguish the statesman from his rivals by reference to a myth. The myth will show that
the statesman they identified first was assumed to be divine, superceding all other
caretakers in so far as he attends to all needs at all times directly. In addition, it will
show that they had assumed that the needs that this caretaker attends to were nothing
more than ordering and guiding their interactions with laws, ignoring the need to tend to
their provisions. As the Stranger puts it in the myth, there was an assumption of
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abundance, as though degeneration never occurred—as if, in fact, time moved
backwards. This is why the Stranger’s myth tells of a time before ours, a time when
Kronos ruled over all things, directing the motions of the heavens and the earth according
to his own divine order: “Sometimes the god himself travels along with the whole
(world), and makes it revolve as it makes its way, and sometimes he lets go, whenever
the periods of time appropriate for it are finally reached ” (269c5-d1, my translation).
While the god is turning the earth and the heavens, humans have no part in their own
generation or sustenance. Rather than the process of change moving from birth towards
death, all things in the time of Kronos are produced out of the prior decay of the time
before the god returned to his guiding task. 237 Everything in the time of Kronos is the
reverse of our experience of continual corruption; everything proceeds from decay
towards flourishing. In the time of Kronos, humans are sprung directly from the earth,
regenerated from the decayed matter that makes up the soil that was the site of their
dissolution. 238 These reanimated dead are “born” out of the ground, already wholly
formed, beginning old and growing younger and younger. Growth no longer requires
resources or capital; the earth’s prior waste, expense, and decay act as the basis for all
further generation. In the time of Kronos, generation comes at no cost. The decay of the
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prior age serves as the basis for all future generations. In contrast to the account of the
sun and the good of the Republic, this myth presumes that the world of becoming serves
as the real capital of its own generation. There is, therefore, in this myth no need for the
good, since the god maintains all motion and generation directly.

The failures divulged by the myth
Having woven an elaborate myth, the Stranger now notices that the second wave
of error is indeed a bit more complicated than the first. While we were aware in advance
of the myth that the statesman could not be distinguished from other artisans who tended
the care and nurture of the human herd, now the Stranger highlights a further and more
serious error. Not only have we failed to distinguish among the high and low forms of
caretaking, we have also failed to distinguish between the divine and human among the
class of caretakers. This time the method of division’s insensibility to qualitative
differences has actually produced a classificatory error. Having not attended to the divine
shepherd’s exalted status, the definition failed to accord that art its own class. These
errors, however, can be addressed by the method of division itself. The divisions must be
amended in order to account for these oversights. First, the issue of whether the
statesman actually cares for humans can be addressed by specifying the human herder’s
art as one that governs the tending (angelaiokomikēs) rather than the feeding (threptikou)
of humans. In addition, the statesman can be distinguished from the divine herder by an
additional division between the use of force and the use of persuasion in ruling. The
Stranger explains that without this further division, the tyrant appears equally fit to rule
as the true statesman. It is interesting to note in addition that the divine herder also
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appears to share camp with the tyrant. According to the myth, the god does indeed
directly and forcibly guide the motions of the earth and heavens, doling out dominion of
the parts of the earth to the several gods, whose reign is also absolute. The issue of
confusing the divine and the human, the exalted and the base, appears not to have been
completely addressed by this amendment to the definition of the statesman.
The myth is excessive not just in its length but in its aspirations as well as its
pretensions. It was thought to need to be magnificent and exalted, like the king it was to
describe. Still further, it exceeds the boundaries of decency: it describes the undead and
fetuses as occupying a single line of causality—how monstrous! The myth reveals that
what is at stake in reversal is not merely an inversion of all prior values but a shattering
of the very basis of value itself. While the myth is able to describe the absence of value
present in the first assessment of the statesman, it nevertheless accomplishes this at the
expense of all other values. That is, although the myth describes a world that operates at
no cost, the myth itself does so at the cost of the possibility of evaluating any distinction
between good and bad. Hence, we learn through the myth that the goal of the statesman
is not to eliminate the difficulties that attend the indeterminacy of generation but
somehow to find the divine standard or logos according to which one might measure the
better and worse, in order to steer toward the mean and away from excess. Recall that in
the Republic the entire account of the degeneration of the justice of a soul as well as that
of a city’s constitution is attributable to the lack of properly calculating and assessing the
nuptial number:
Although they are wise, the men you educated as leaders of the city will
nonetheless fail to hit on the prosperous birth and barrenness of your kinds
with calculation aided by sensation, but will pass them by, and they will at
some time beget children when they should not. For a divine birth there is
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a period comprehended by a perfect number; for a human birth, by the first
number in which root and square increases, comprising three distances and
four limits, of elements that make like and unlike, and that wax and wane,
render everything conversable and rational…This whole geometrical
number is sovereign of better and worse begettings. And when your
guardians from ignorance of them cause grooms to live with brides out of
season, the children will have neither good natures nor good luck. (546a7d3, Bloom)
The statesman, like the philosopher-king and guardian, must be capable of identifying the
abstract principles of proportion (analogia) 239 that define the ideal state of human
interaction and generation. This requires the mingling of two separate forms of
judgment: a relative aesthetic judgment and an absolute judgment of the intelligible.
Logos, then, is the means by which each of these approaches is mediated. What remains
to be addressed is precisely what is known by this logos when it is sufficiently awake,
aware of the knowledge that dreaming affords us, carrying its truth into the light of day.
Looking back now, we may see that the first and second waves are of a piece, and
this is perhaps the reason that the Stranger himself only reflects upon only two errors.
The absurd consequences of the definition of the statesman (that he might be a pig farmer
or any other common tradesperson) are similar to the problem of confusing the statesman
with a god. In each case, the definition provides no way to account for what actions
make one a better or worse herder. A divine herder would surely be the best and a lowly
swineherd the worst caretaker of humans, but neither of these is the statesman. What is
lacking in both is attention to rank and superiority, not merely of the artisan but also of
the subject of his technē. That is, what makes the swineherd ignoble is less his actions
and more what he tends. What makes the god divine is the fact that he can “run the
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whole world,” taking over all care for generation. Again, it is no accident that we have
been called to return to the Republic. The first two waves of paradox in the Republic
represented problems with the material conditions of the ideal city: how are the women to
be incorporated into the physical training regimen without scandal, and how are women
and children to be “held in common?” The literal generation of the city is at stake in
each, and thus it is the negotiation of this generation that is also at stake in understanding
the peculiar art that the statesman must practice. In what way this may be accomplished
is precisely what is missing, and the account must in some way incorporate the
statesman’s own understanding of better and worse, since this, too, will be fundamental
to the proper care of the polis.

2.3.3 – The Third Wave of Error: Tropes of Method
When the Stranger describes the final error disclosed by the myth, he claims it is
not nearly as great a problem, calling it the lesser (brachuteron) error (275a6). 240 The
error consists in having not completely stated the statesman’s manner (tropos) of ruling.
By referring to the greater and the less, the Stranger seems to be alluding to the very
distinction we have already encountered numerous times. Just because there is some
sense of the statesman’s craft and we have therefore partially completed the task (a
quantitative measure) does not mean that what remains is not the more important task (a
qualitative measure). What might otherwise be read as a gaff on the Stranger’s part we
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may instead take as a sort of inside joke to the attentive reader, since measuring worth is
the crux of the passages that ensue.
We may begin by noting that the myth sent to supplement the failures of the
diairēsis is itself out of step with the statesman and the art that accords with that role.
Although the Stranger offers the myth in order to highlight two errors in their prior
account of the statesman, it also reaffirms the problem that the Stranger has yet to address
directly: lack of proportion. Because, by its own profession, the method of division cares
not for what is proper, it is out of proportion. Moreover, the myth that allows for us to
see this blindness of diairēsis is itself out of proportion and excessive:
…We too, at this time, wishing to make quick progress, and also to make
clear in a grand style the error of our previous course, and, moreover,
fancying that the use of grand examples (megala paradeigmata) was
proper in the case of a king, have taken up a marvelous mass of myth and
have consequently been obliged to use a greater part of it than we should.
So we have made our discourse too long, and after all have never made an
end of the tale… (277b1-c5)
Whereas the definition was overly abstract, the myth was overly colorful, even busy.
They both failed to bring a proper blend of elements from which the whole picture of the
statesman could be constructed.
The Stranger explains these problems by reference to two kinds of artistic errors.
First, he notes that the myth is bulky, full of too many unnecessary things, just like a
statue that has too many overly large adjuncts that “delay the completion” of the work
(277a7-b1). He says somewhat paradoxically that because they wanted to move quickly
through their exposition in order to provide an account that had a magnitude sufficient to
their subject matter, they had amassed a “grand example (megala paradeigmata),” which
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ended up being unwieldy and overdrawn. So, the myth failed to suit the needs of their
discussion because it said too much and at the same time did not come to completion.
The Stranger goes on to liken the problems of the myth to difficulties that arise in
the field of artistic representation, this time that of painting: “our speech simply/artlessly
(atechnōs), like an animal/painting (zōion), though it seems likely to have its external
outline adequately, has not yet received the vividness as it were that’s in pigments
(pharmakois) and the mixture of colors” (277c1-4). 241 We might note, first of all, that
with this comparison, the Stranger has alluded to the same comparison Socrates used
when he asked for a depiction of his city engaged in war, namely a zōion. Thus, the
Statesman dialogue seems to have attempted to make good on the promise made to
Socrates at the beginning of the Timaeus. 242 Given this comparison, the Stranger
explains that the problem with the myth is that it has not provided a means for properly
blending all the color it has added to the sketch. Drawing the analogy out, then, we can
see that the Stranger’s definitions by means of division seem to have given us the
skeleton of the statesman, the abstract forms that apply to this figure, but disregarded the
flesh of the statesman. Indeed, the initial division failed to recognize the humanity of the
noble herder, making it seem as though generation and corruption were of no concern to
this divine ruler. But such issues must be distinguished from the statesman’s duties, not
ignored. While the myth brought the definition to life, it perhaps animated the definition
too much, distracting us from our task. Because the myth acted as a kind of picture of
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life (zōion), it was able to ground the abstract nature of the initial definition. 243 But in so
far as the myth is a work of mimēsis, while entertaining (a handcrafted plaything,
“paidian enkerasamenous” (268d8)), it also threatens to introduce a number of
unnecessary and distracting elements. Like colors, these elements are necessary for a
complete (teleōs) view, but they are nonetheless meaningless without a rational order
imposed by the composer.
The Stranger cautions that, although the myth was useful, what is more
appropriate to the zōion (living thing) is to proceed by way of lexis (speaking) and logos,
rather than (ironically) by painting and the other handicrafts (277c5-7). This depends,
quite importantly, on what can be understood by the audience. If one were unable to
follow logoi, then a picture or other artifact would be the more effective explanatory tool.
But is it merely a question of the student’s aptitude? The method of division, clearly on
the side of logoi, does not allow for a consideration of what is missing or incomplete
about it. On the other hand, the myth, a sort of painting of logoi, while offering a view of
what is missing from the earlier logos, is cumbersome and threatens to swallow the
original discussion with its sheer bulk. Both methods appear on their own to be
insufficient, incapable of offering a precise understanding of the statesman. The Stranger
affirms this difficulty when he claims, “It is hard to demonstrate (endeiknusthai) the
greater things (tōn meizonōn) without the use of examples (paradeigmasi)” (277d1-2, my
translation). The myth, referred to earlier as a paradeigma, stands in the place of
example. While it is a figure or depiction (zōion) that is not entirely appropriate to the
zōion (living thing) it describes, it is nevertheless necessary as a supplement to the logos
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that is appropriate to it. The myth, itself a zōion, is perhaps even inadequate to itself,
requiring a zōion, some sort of model or figure to account for its effects. In both cases,
though, paradigm and logos are incomplete without the other.
Applying this to the Republic, we find that it too cannot stand on its own. Its
exemplary city, itself an analogy for the soul, is in need of a further account. As we
noted at the beginning of this chapter, by accounting for the generation of the human
being, the Timaeus begins to provide this completion, and the Critias, too, contributes to
the completion of the project of the Republic by offering the noble model of Athens’
heroic past. But in none of these have we received an account of how, philosophically, to
blend all of these into a coherent, complete account. The Statesman attempts just that,
providing an account of the way that the philosophical statesman rules at the same time
as this very account describes the way our knowledge of this capacity is achieved: that is,
through examples.
Returning to the Statesman, we notice this reflective turn when the Stranger
claims that the problems with the myth reveal something about knowledge itself. The
myth, a kind of example, appears to convey some knowledge, but its truth is veiled by its
dream-like and fantastical contents: “…for it’s probable that each of us knows everything
as if in a dream and then again is ignorant of everything as it is in waking” (277d3-4,
Benardete). The suggestion of dreaming is evocative and requires some detailed
consideration. We are first reminded of the murky world of the cave, where what is most
trusted is only the barest of dreams compared to the truth of which these beliefs are only
a dull image. Similarly, in Book V of the Republic, the lovers of sights are compared to
those who love the sight of the truth and are said to be dreaming what the others see
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while awake (476b-d). In the Statesman, however, it appears that the bright light of logos
itself is not entirely transparent. Logos too needs some foothold on the reality we have
been raised on and to which we must return and live. The existing (as well as any
possible future) polis, after all, must be somewhere within the cave. Bringing these two
worlds together is the work of the statesman. To integrate the dream world in which we
live with the true world that we will never directly or completely know will require an art
that the Stranger now endeavors to describe. Any attempt at this, however, will require a
reflection upon the very possibility of method as well as the possibility of a logos of
method.

3 – Methodology

3.1 – The Example of Example 244
3.1.1 – The method of example
The Stranger has two problems: first, he must distinguish the statesman from
pretenders to the throne and, second, he must give an account of the statesman’s
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Many scholars have weighed in on the status of the term paradeigma in Plato’s work, especially its use
in the Statesman. Kenneth Sayre provides a succinct description of the three main uses of this term
throughout the Platonic corpus, remarking that its use in the Statesman is in the “dialectical sense”
(Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 73-74).
Victor Goldschmidt’s Le Paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne elaborates in more detail a similar
view. Stanley Rosen is the only author to carefully disentangle the multiple uses of the term in the
Statesman and their variety of meanings within that context. On the point of how to render “paradeigma
paradeigmatōn,” he argues persuasively that “the example of spelling is intended as a model of models”
(Web of Poltics, 84). For my purposes, I will err to the side of translating paradeigma as “example,” but it
should be noted that Plato appears to have chosen and used a word that essentially means its own opposite.
That is, whereas an example is taken from the sensible world, exemplars are the root of the intelligible.
This seems to me to be no accident: as we shall see, paradigm is a term that indicates the relation between
being and becoming by performing that relation. My decision is taken with trepidation, however, given
Derrida’s discussion of the aporia of translating pharmakon in the context of the Phaedrus, where he notes
that the act of translation decides in advance its meaning as either “poison” or “remedy,” not allowing for
the fact that the undecidability of the term is the subject of its use (“Plato’s Pharmacy,” 97-103).
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activities, i.e., what the statesman does that earns him this title. It is worth noting that if
the Stranger is able to complete the second, he will have also completed the first. He
announces that in order to accomplish this one must employ the method of example: “It is
difficult, my extraordinary friend, to demonstrate sufficiently any of the greater things (ta
megala) unless one uses examples (paradeigmasi). For each of us likely knows
everything as in a dream and again when awake, is unaware of it all” (277d1-4). The
reason the Stranger offers to explain the need for examples is not entirely clear and will
be worth taking some time to discuss, for it goes to the heart of the significance of this
method.
The problems with the Stranger’s primary attempts to define the statesman lead
him to discuss a basic difficulty about our understanding: the definitions by division
appear to convey some knowledge, but their truth is veiled by their incompatibility with
or inadequacy to the real world. While the Stranger’s definitions seem to fit the
statesman, they, like the younger Socrates, appear to share in name only in the original to
which they refer. The Stranger’s definition is a logos, and, like a name, it needs some
foothold on the reality to which it refers to be certain of its proper application. 245
Let us take an example to clarify. As any birdwatcher can tell you, it is necessary
to have a good field guide to ornithological taxonomy. It is also important to recognize
which key features to note in order to identify a bird: the tail and wings’ shapes and
markings; the beak’s shape and color; the body’s size, markings and color; and, of
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Clearly logos is not simply to be conflated with name, “onoma.” Because logoi refer to things, however,
they too contain an implicit denomination, staking a claim on the reality of which they speak. This analogy
of the Cratylus reflects the interplay of logos and weaving: “A name is a tool for the teaching and
discriminating of being, just as a shuttle is one of the web” (my translation based on the Greek of the Loeb
Classical Library edition, Vol. 167 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926], 388b13-c1).
Similarly, in the Sophist, the Stranger notes that logos comes about by weaving eidē (259e).
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course, the bird’s habitat and range. However, there is no amount of “book” knowledge
(which I compare to logos) that could give me the knowledge I now have of the call and
flight of a martin, having sat for hours watching and listening to these birds, abundant
near the lakeshore. I need to join my logoi with my sensual experience of the object of
investigation. Similarly, before I had learned anything about these birds, I can be sure I
had had many encounters with them, but at the time I could have never identified the
species nor even noticed that I had encountered something I was not yet sure of.
Our sensual experience of things is on its own unreliable and sometimes entirely
opaque, but however dreamy this reality may be it is nevertheless where we must
ultimately turn for it is the place where we must go on living. This is the philosopher’s
(and the Stranger’s) predicament: theory is sufficient to itself, but it does not always
make adequate contact with the “real” world. On the other hand, we cannot do without
theory, otherwise we would have no knowledge of what we do, in fact, know. Returning
to the context of the Statesman and Republic, we must acknowledge that the existing
polis and the potential statesman must, after all, be somewhere within the cave. To bring
these two worlds together, those of our living world and our more abstract thinking, is the
work of the statesman and of those who seek to know the statesman’s craft. Integrating
the dream world in which we live with the true world that we will never directly or
completely know requires a method that the Stranger now endeavors to describe. To do
this is to know what the Stranger calls the “greater things” (ta megala).
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3.1.2 – Learning letters
Notice that just now I was led to provide an example in order to clarify the
discussion of the significance of examples. The Stranger finds himself in a similarly
recursive operation: “My example, comrade, is itself in need of yet another example”
(277d9-10, my translation). Before he can even present his example of statesmanship, he
must give an example for the method of example, in order to account for the way it will
work. The example the Stranger provides for example is taken from the realm of
education: students learn to recognize the same letters (stoicheia) used in different
contexts and then learn how they are used differently in each case. 246 (Consider the
difference between a vowel on its own and in a diphthong: “ball” versus “bail.”) Two
things are at work in the procedure a grammar teacher uses. First, the student is led to see
the similarity between letters she knows in one context and their use in a different context
that she does not yet know. Secondly, however, it is essential to her progress that the
student be able to make true statements (“talēthē phrazein”) about the letters being used
as the ground of comparison (277e). The original context, the special case of which the
student has adequate knowledge, functions like an eidos, a species, however, that as yet
has only one member that is given by the senses. This particular context of the letters in
given syllables is then placed in comparison with other contexts of their use in order that
the student may recognize (“diaisthanontai”) the similarity of the letters among the
difference of contexts (ibid.).
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The perception of letters is a common image used in the dialogues. Because of the ambiguity in the term
stoicheia, which can mean both letter and element, the meaning of the reference is often different, as in the
Timaeus, where an extended discussion of the elements makes no reference to letters. There are, however,
three notable and comparable illustrations: Republic, 368d; Theaetetus, 202e-205c; and Sophist, 253a.
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According to the example of example, we surmise that the method to be followed
begins from an apprehension of dissimilarities. Furthermore, the example shows that the
best way to achieve the knowledge of what is similar is to place the instances about
which the student already has correct opinions next to those about which the student has
so far erred in respect to both opinion and speech (“doxē te pseudontai kai logō”) for
comparison (278a3). This is the process by which the similarities between the two
instances are demonstrated (“endeiknunai”) and by which the student is led up to
(“anagein”) the similarity that holds among all the instantiations of the letters (278a8,
b1). One begins in dissimilarity and proceeds toward similarity. By his own account, the
Stranger asks whether, by means of the example, “we collect together (suneilēphamen)”
the following account of example: “an example is formed when that which is the same in
some second unconnected thing is rightly conceived and compared with the first, so that
the two together form one true opinion” (278c4-8, Fowler, modified). 247 A true opinion,
then, moves from the dissimilarity that characterizes sensual experience toward the selfsameness of pure ideas. This collection forms a genos, a group that has the same nature,
“tēn autēn homoiotēta kai phusin en amphoterais ousan tais sumplokais” (278b2-3). 248
What makes the opinion true, though, is that the connection to sensual experience is
retained, i.e., that the genos has a relation to its individual, “dreamy” instances. All this
seems to conform to the association that the Stranger made between the method of
example and the dream-like knowledge it offers.
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I have altered the translation of “suneilēphamen” and “doxan,” which are otherwise misleadingly
translated as “definition” and “idea.”
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This is the source of Robinson’s interest in the relation of Plato’s use of paradigm in the Statesman to
Aristotlian epagogē (Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 213). Robinson goes on to argue here that the Stranger’s
account of paradeigma acts as Plato’s explicit justification of his use of an inductive analogical method.
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3.1.3 – The Weaving Example
Given his example, the Stranger must now choose quite carefully, as he is in the
position of the grammar instructor who teaches the students their letters. If the instructor
were to choose as the example instances where the students are uncertain and incorrect in
their judgments, there would be no truth upon which to build additional instances.
Similarly, the Stranger must choose an example that is not only appropriate both for
showing the way to distinguish the statesman from his rivals but also for demonstrating
the method that the statesman himself uses in properly governing the polis. The
Stranger’s contribution, then, is to draw our attention to something that we already
understand, whether we have considered it in any detail or not, but that we have never
considered as an opportunity for thinking through the work of the statesman. The
Stranger says that he will choose an example that is “at hand” (procheiron), and he
chooses the art of weaving (hyphantikē) (279b2-3). The word play between procheiron
and weaving, which is not only a handicraft (cheirotechnē) but a craft whose skill resides
almost entirely in the hands (only tatting would be more “handy”), reveals that the
Stranger has not chosen something merely convenient. He has instead carefully chosen
something because of the way it, as a craft, is structured. While the Stranger has not
himself constructed the art of weaving, he has carefully woven the exemplary nature of
this example. We see, then, that the example is exemplifying more than just the target
the Stranger has chosen but the Stranger’s own choices—another point of recursion. As
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Melissa Lane states, “it is evident that both method and definition relevant to the art of
statecraft [will] have been provided by the example of weaving.” 249
Recall that the Stranger needs the example of weaving to demonstrate two things:
first, the way that the target art can be distinguished from those that vie for its more
authoritative role and, second, the very art by which the statesman is rightly given the
authority to rule. The Stranger carefully articulates the work of weaving, dividing it from
all other arts just as he had the statesman’s craft. In a sense, the Stranger reconstructs
(and exemplifies) the difficulty encountered by the logo-centric method of division by
performing a series of divisions in order to give a logos of his example. Distinguishing
weaving from shoe-making and rug-making and other “protective” (alexēteria) arts is
easy enough for the method of division, and the Stranger demonstrates this clearly
(279d4-5). These “kindred” arts are not the ones who pose the greatest threat to
determining the identity of weaving (280b). Those arts upon which weaving depends and
from which the divisions have not sufficiently distinguished it represent the greatest
threat to its being adequately defined. For example, while shoe making is not weaving in
so far as it deals with different fabric, different tools, and different activities, the arts of
carding wool and spinning thread are both closely related to weaving and have not yet
been eliminated in the Stranger’s divisions. This particular problem introduces to the
discussion the need for the distinction between necessary and sufficient causes,
something the Stranger could have used earlier: “Those arts which do not produce the
actual thing in question, but which supply to the arts which do produce it the tools
without which no art could ever perform its prescribed work, may be called contributing
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Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61.
Hereafter, Method and Politics.
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causes (xunaitious), and those which produce the actual thing are causes” (281e1-5,
Fowler, modified). This is the only way to eliminate those arts that contribute to the art
of weaving by providing its materials and tools but that are nevertheless subordinate to it.
Because the carder’s and the spinner’s arts are necessary but not sufficient for the
production of clothing, they are merely contributory arts that can now be distinguished
from the art of weaving itself. If we go on to apply this example to statecraft, we see that
the farmer, the baker, the animal herder, and even the literal weaver all contribute to the
art of statecraft the materials necessary to the art of governing, while none, however, are
rulers by dint of their craft.
Having distinguished the pretenders from the true art, let us go on to the second
task the example is to accomplish: to act as a model for understanding the work of the
statesman. In his discussion of the differences between the contributing arts and the art
of weaving, he comes to discover that all of the wool-working crafts can be divided into
two kinds: those that combine (sumplokē) and those that divide (dialytikē) (281a3, 6). On
the one hand, the carder is set with the task of distinguishing the wool from any foreign
materials caught in its strands—an art of purification that is also clearly an art of division.
On the other hand, the thread spinner must bring the strands of wool together, twisting
them into a single thread, making this art one of collection. 250 Finally, the weaver takes
the product of these two crafts and puts them to use, stringing the loom with the threads
of the warp, and weaving the fabric with the threads of the woof, which runs opposite to
the warp. The weaver has the task of binding these two opposed planes together into a
single web, recognizing their difference and, by so doing, working to combine them.
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The spinner’s art is yet again complicated by the fact that there is a spinner both of the woof and the
warp, the softer and the stronger threads of the fabric (282e-283a).
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If we take the example now to apply to statecraft, as the Stranger intends, we find
that the special task of the statesman, which makes it superior to (though reliant on) the
other crafts of the state, is that it is able to recognize and preserve a reference to the
differences among the kinds of products, arts, and producers. As a result, each of these
(artworks, arts, and artisans) can be carefully woven together by the statesman to produce
a tightly integrated whole, a whole that is nevertheless composed from distinct and
different threads. The Stranger elaborates this by saying that the statesman’s primary
duty is to oversee the formation of the characters of the members of the state. 251 And this
is what the Stranger will say, but he does not discuss the application of the art of weaving
to the statesman’s craft just yet. Instead, the Stranger pauses for what appears to be a
lengthy digression on his own method. We must note before moving forward that the
Stranger prescribes this art to the one searching for the logos of the statesman. 252 If the
dialogue were merely about the statesman (rather than about the process of his
identification) this section would be superfluous. On account of this, then, we will have
to follow very carefully the connections between the statesman’s tropos and the method
of discovering that tropos.
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The Athenian Stranger in the Laws is a bit more specific in his use of this analogy: “Now just as in the
case of a web or other piece of woven work, woof and warp cannot be fashioned of the same threads, but
the material of the warp must be of superior quality—it must be tough, you know, and have a certain
tenacity of character, whereas the woof may be softer and display a proper pliancy; well, the illustration
shows that there must be some similar distinction made between citizens who are to fill magistracies, and
those who have been but lightly tested by education…” (A. E. Taylor, trans. [New York: E. P. Dutton and
Co., 1960], 734e6-735a4). We will discuss the relation to education later, in the fourth section.

252

Martin Heidegger highlights the reflective turn that also happens in the Sophist, marking this as a
definitive Platonic dynamic: “Because of this peculiar linkage of investigative thinking with
methodological thinking in Plato, we can expect that, along with the determination of the essence of the
sophist, or of the philosopher, we will also learn something important about the mode of treatment itself,
i.e., about logos” (Plato’s Sophist, Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, trans. [Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2003], §38a, 174).

228

3.2 – The Art of Measuring
Following the example of example and the example of weaving, the Stranger is
finally prepared to address the tropos of the statesman, but it does not appear that he does
this immediately. At the heart of the Statesman dialogue, 253 the Eleatic Stranger
describes an art indispensable to his aim of warding off the impatience (described as a
kind of illness, nosos) that could befall someone attempting either to make or to follow a
line of reasoning by diairēsis. At this point of the dialogue, the Stranger, the young
Socrates, the listeners, and surely Plato’s reader are at risk of such a sickness.
To temper the disposition of the one practicing or undergoing the method of
division, one must also consult the principles of metrētikē. This art could most
commonly be termed measurement, but one should hesitate to assign this as its translation
because this term seems most commonly to indicate a quantitative standard according to
which one might objectively judge the weight, amount, length, number, or size of
something. In keeping with this, the Stranger specifically states that this type of
measuring is only one of two and the subordinate at that: “One part comprises all the arts
which measure number, length, depth, breadth, and thickness in relation to their
opposites; the other comprises those which measure them in relation to the moderate, the
fitting, the opportune, the needful and all the other standards that are situated in the mean
between the extremes” (284e3-8). The distinction that the Stranger has finally drawn
here is the one that has dogged his trail all along, namely, that between quantitative and
qualitative differences. With this we finally see the Stranger’s explicit recognition that
253

Although its universal significance in each dialogue is questionable, in a dialogue wherein questions of
absolute, mathematical comparison, proportion, and mean are at issue the mathematical center of the
dialogue is perhaps worth noting. By my rough calculation, that point in this dialogue (284b) occurs in the
midst of the digression concerning the art of measurement, in particular, at the point of the discovery of the
need for a mean against which to determine all relevant comparative relations.
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the “objective” measurement of quantity cannot account for those qualities that do not
admit of such abstraction, a problem that the myth illuminated by imperfect means. The
purpose of the myth, then, is perfected by the conceptualization of the mean.

3.3 – To Metrion
We have found that the cure to the illness of impatience relies on practicing the
art of metrētikē, but upon what does the art of measurement base its judgments? There
are two arts of measurement, but do they use the same standard? Risking anachronism,
we may look to Aristotle for some assistance on these points. In the Nicomachean
Ethics, he employs a similar distinction to the one described by the Stranger when he
considers the mean “in the thing” and the mean “relative to us”:
Now in everything continuous and divisible it is possible to take a greater
amount, a lesser amount, or an equal measure, and these either on account
of the thing itself or in relation to us, and the equal measure is a certain
kind of mean between excess and deficiency. By a mean that belongs to
the thing, I am speaking of what holds a position equally apart from either
of the extremes, which is one and the same thing for everyone, but the
mean in relation to us is what neither goes too far nor falls short, and this
is not one thing nor the same thing for everyone. (1106a27-35, Sachs
translation)
A pound of lamb is equal in weight to a pound of beef, but a pound of either would be
excessive for a child, or an old man, yet, on the other hand, it would be appropriate for
someone who is training and attempting to gain muscle mass. What is “suitable”
(another translation of metrion) for someone’s health depends less on the quantity of the
thing and more on the quality of the person. As Aristotle goes on to say, this mean is
“determined by a proportion (analogia)” (1107a1-2). In this way health is a single
proportion that applies to all, but the determination of different quantities of food varies
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according to the condition of a person’s body. Take the example of recommended daily
dietary allowances. These vary depending on a person’s weight, gender, age and other
factors. For example, let us say that a 45 year-old man (A) has a recommended daily
calcium allowance of 600 milligrams and that a woman age 53 (B), on the other hand, has
a recommended allowance of 1200 milligrams per day. Each person’s condition and
regimen is completely different from the other’s, but the relation between their conditions
and their regimens share the common goal of health. Health, then, is the proportion that
makes possible the analogy that accounts for this relative mean:
A : 600 mg calcium :: B : 1200 mg calcium
While it seems clear that the relative mean is proportional and, therefore, also
structurally analogical, it is not as clear that the absolute mean (and thus the concept of
metrion as a whole) is analogical. If, however, we consider a numerical whole, the
middle point (metrion) with respect to that whole is a reflection of the relation between
the least and the greatest as well as a relation to the whole. This is why the mean is not
the same as the average, which only relates the individuals of the set to each other rather
than to the whole as well. This reflection sheds some light on why the Stranger belabors
the point that they must admit that excess has a relation not only to deficiency but also to
the mean: “Then we must assume that there are these two kinds of great and small, and
these two ways of distinguishing between them; we must not, as we did a little while ago,
say that they are relative to one another only, but rather, as we have just said, that one
kind is relative in that way, and the other is relative to the standard of the mean” (283e812). 254 If this is the case, then there is a relation between the extremes of the set, which is
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The Stranger goes on to relate this discussion to their conversation in the Sophist because in each case
the need to recognize the relation of relations requires five things: in the Sophist, being, motion, rest,
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mediated by their own relations to the mean. This precisely mimics the structure of
analogy that we have found to recur in Plato’s thinking. In fact, only if this structure is
analogical is it possible to hold without contradiction that the great and the small are “two
kinds,” for, without it, we are led to say that the great is greater than the mean, which is
greater than the small. As a result, the great would be greater than itself.
Let us take a simple example in order to illustrate these conclusions. The mean of
the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is three. 255 Three is equally greater than one as it is the lesser of
five. This shows already that the mean is able to mediate the relative qualities (greater
and lesser) with an absolute quality (equal). The “great” (or excess) is represented by
five, and the “small” (or deficiency) is represented by one. The relation (or proportion)
between the small and the great is the same as the relation between the mean and the total
of the set: 1:5 :: 3:15. In this way the greatest and the smallest, which are opposed to
each other, are related to each other by means of another relation to something that they
have in common when they are taken as part of a whole. If they were not mediated by a
relation to the mean, three, then five would be great because it is greater than one and
because it is greater than the mean. But if it is great because of three, the cause of its
being great is something that is itself great, since three is greater than one. This would
produce the contradiction that the cause of five being great is that it is greater than what
is itself great (three). If, on the other hand, the greatness of five is put into a relation with
the smallness of one by reference to each number’s relation to the mean, determined by
sameness, and otherness, and, in the Statesman, the mean, excess, deficiency, the relation of excess to the
mean, and the relation of deficiency to the mean. The mean moderates the relation between excess and
deficiency but in so doing introduces an additional set of relations (the two between the extremes and the
mean). This is also why, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to both deficiency and excess as
extremes: “for the extremes are opposite both to the mean and to one another” (1108b14, Sachs
translation).
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This is an example of an arithmetic mean, but the formal qualities I outline would apply to all types of
means.
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their participation in the whole set, its greatness is thereby mediated by the same
principle by which the one is small, namely three. Greatness and smallness, then, are
brought into a relation by reference to the mean, itself a relation.
This entire conversation of the mean in the Statesman seems to be an elaboration
of the discussion that begins the final argument in response to Cebes in the Phaedo at
100e-105b. Beginning with the sophistic presumption that the great and the small must
be relative only to each other, Socrates goes on to describe the way that the odd and the
even are related to individual odd or even numbers by reference to a third thing (the one
and the two, respectively). One is the value, or logos, that makes sense of every odd
number and two the logos that makes sense of every even number. This alone goes some
distance to proving that the metaphysics of the Phaedo is indeed analogical, since the
relation between forms and their instances relies in the end upon just such an appeal to
proportion.
Clearly, the Statesman’s themes (and the theme of the mean in particular) have a
broad ranging applicability to other Platonic texts. At many points the Republic is
concerned both with the virtue of moderation as well as with measure. In fact, in the
prologue to the sun and the good analogy, Socrates asks Adeimantus if he thinks their
discourse up to that point had been sufficiently precise, and when Adeimantus replies that
they were satisfactory “within measure (metriōs),” Socrates states that “a measure in such
things, which in any way falls short of what is, is no measure at all. For nothing
incomplete is the measure of anything” (504b-c). But this reminds us to return to the
basis for the conversation about the mean in the first place. It was necessary to consider
the mean in order to judge the propriety of the discourse that the Stranger provided on the
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statesman. Although we have not yet seen the ramifications of the mean for the
discussion of the statesman, we can forecast that it will serve to demonstrate the role of
analogy not only for the statesman, whose philosophical skill lies in using this mean, but
also for the philosopher, whose skill in using analogy is itself productive of the
knowledge of the statesman. Before this is possible, however, the Stranger will develop
an explicit methodology that will allow us to avoid the hazard of losing focus in our
search for the statesman.

3.4 – A Twofold Method: Finding Similarity and Difference
Within the context of his discussion of the art of measurement, which depends on
knowledge of the relations of excess and defect to the mean, whether absolute or
relatively determined, the Stranger explicitly advocates a method of classification that
proceeds by means of an oscillation from the recognition of similarities to that of
differences and back again. The comment comes up because the young Socrates remarks
that the two kinds of metrion are as different as they are vast (284e9-10). The Stranger
remarks that this is true but that most people fail to make the distinction, instead
confusing the one type with the other: “And this is in fact the very thing stated now, for
in a certain manner everything artful has partaken in measurement. But on account of
their failure to make it a habit to examine and divide according to species, they straight
off combine into the same—in the belief that they’re similar—these things that are so
greatly different” (285a3-6, Benardete). Again, the discussion of excess and deficiency
and the art of measurement was intended to act as a palliative for the interlocutors’
concerns about the adequacy of their logos on the statesman. We must, therefore, attempt
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to provide an interpretation of the way this logos on method reflects upon the methods
that the Stranger has followed so far.
In describing the first method, the Stranger claims that when what is first known
of similarity are sensible commonalities (“aisthētai koinōnian”), what is called for is
persistence in seeing all the differences of kinds: “tas diaphoras idē pasas hoposaiper en
eidesi” (285b2). Contrariwise, when dissimilarities (“anomoiotētas”) 256 predominate the
vision, one must focus upon gathering related things (ta oikeia) together into groups
based on similarities. Here the Stranger has introduced a distinction between the method
that orders things according to an eidos and that according to a genos. The first method is
that of differentiation, which produces a definition according to a special (species)
difference, and the second is that of assimilation, producing a kind according to kinship
(genus). Because two methods are proposed and each stands on the opposite side in
terms of its beginning point, the methods are driven to conduce to each other: if the
method of assimilation leads one towards seeing similarities among differences, it places
one in the position to perform the method of differentiation, which again must return to
the method of assimilation. In light of this, we may conclude that the Stranger does not
advocate two different ways of attaining similar kinds of knowledge but rather offers two
sides of a single method, each of which balances the effects of its opposite, producing a
more complete knowledge. Indeed, the logos or definition of something must include
both its similarity and its special difference: the genos produced by the method of
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In so far as similarity and difference are opposites, I take it that “dissimilarity” indicates nothing more
than lack of similarity, or, simply, “difference.” I will maintain the distinction of terms if only to indicate
the distinction in the Greek between anomoiotēs and heteros.
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assimilation and the eidos produced by the method of differentiation. 257 Let us reflect
finally on the way that this methodological recommendation relates to the Stranger’s own
use of example.

4 –Weaving Logoi

We have already seen that the Stranger made use of example in order to explain
example. We too have been made to consider examples in order to understand the
purpose of the Stranger’s methods. What is it about the quality of example that makes it,
as the Stranger says, necessary for understanding the “greater things?” Part of what
example is able to do is to negotiate between the dissimilarity from which our perceptions
begin and the self-sameness that characterizes our knowledge of the world. These two
must be related in some way and not merely as a way to get from one to the other. The
“dream world” of our everyday experience is nonetheless the world that is real for us; we
can never merely escape it toward the sameness and coherence of knowledge itself. We
are always brought down to earth and must somehow live in reference to both, and if we
are to improve our lives here, we must certainly be able to reconcile our knowledge with
the experiences on which that knowledge is based but which it nonetheless disowns.
It is for these reasons that example was the Stranger’s response to the hyperbole
of his myth. The myth appealed to our imaginations but not in measure. In his
introduction of the example of examples, we hear from the Stranger that any method of
explanation must be suited to the person who is going to hear it. Logoi are better than
257

This seems to accord with the third definition of logos offered in the Theaetetus, which seems the most
complete, if not altogether faultless: “Logos was the interpretation of your difference” (209a6, my
translation).
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handcrafted representations but not absolutely. The choice of which is best depends
entirely on the audience of the explanation. Consider an example from academic life: a
paper given in prose on an interpretation of scientific data from a deep space probe is
likely to be less effective as a mode of presentation than a graphic depiction and
modeling of the data might be. 258 This is because of the nature of the subject but also
because of the conventions of the group and their expectations and conventions. On the
other hand, one who attempts to “model” philosophical theories (graphically or
physically) may be subject to scrutiny for oversimplification or even for a lack of
expressive ability. This, however, is not true of all philosophical styles. In fact, the
variety in this opinion among different groups of philosophers provides still further
evidence that the disposition, habits, and skills of an audience have everything to do with
the way that a subject ought to be explained. 259
What is valuable about the method of example, then, is its pedagogical
sensitivity, and this is made possible by reference to the characteristic work of
analogy. 260 That is, the one who uses examples must attend to the difference between her
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Max Black investigates the role of mathematical models in scientific investigation and their theoretical
limitations in Models and Metaphors (223 ff).
259
This appears to stand in direct contrast to the doctrine of the Timaeus whereby the subject of the
discourse determines the form of the logos (the “eikōs logos,” 30b), and it may well. However, were we to
attempt to reconcile the two we can maintain consistency by noticing that one might first perform the
Stranger’s appraisal to determine whether logoi are appropriate, and only after this go on to model the
precision of the logoi to the degree of precision of the subject under discussion.
260

Robinson remarks that this passage on example “is an acceptable justification of Plato’s use of
analogy…but what it primarily justifies is the use of examples in teaching, not in suggesting new
propositions to oneself or in proving such propositions” (Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 213). Melissa Lane,
however, argues that the use of examples need not merely be an education of the ignorant by the
knowledgeable: “Such an objection misconceives the role of example as presented in the text…it is not
guaranteed that an example will succeed on the first go, as the Statesman’s trial and eventual correction of
shepherding as an appropriate example for statecraft shows. The fundamental point is that a sharp
separation between teaching and gaining knowledge presupposed by the rejection is misplaced when it
comes to Platonic dialogues” (Method and Politics, 68).
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epistemic state and that of her potential audience, in an effort to bring these together in a
similar understanding. The Stranger’s description of the method of example showed how
the dissimilar and the similar are to be held together in a mutual oscillation that allows for
their relation to appear for us, giving neither the ultimate authority. I assert that the way
example operates, as the Stranger has described it, is structurally the same as analogy.
What is especially valuable about analogies is the way that they transport someone from
an area with which they are familiar and about which they can make true statements and
have true opinions to a subject about which they have no knowledge. My brother was
once able to bring to light for me the principles of multi-dimensional physics by asking
me to imagine an ant walking on a twisted thread. The ant on the string is an analogue
for the relations between time and space, and example functions in the same way: certain
relations that were known but not yet put into relation suddenly stand out as similar to the
relations among other things that have hitherto not been seen to be similar. Thus, in both
example and analogy, similarity arises out of difference, and both maintain the relation
between the former, known instance and the newly acquired “general rule.” These
procedures all maintain a relation between what is different and what is the same. This is
the unique ability of any analogy: what is the same is shown within difference, and
cannot be seen otherwise. This whole description seems to apply quite easily to the
example of example that the Stranger articulates, and the fact that the example comes
from the realm of education now appears to be no accident.
We are now beginning to see the way that the weaving example has also provided
a view of the tropos, or way, that the statesman rules. A portion of the statesman’s job
lies in recognizing the difference of individuals’ characters so that this may be taken into
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account in decisions about reproduction (310b2-5). The statesman must recognize the
character of individual souls and take care that the courageous be mixed with the prudent
so as to bring about a moderate offspring that has both qualities in balance:
For indeed the whole business of the kingly weaving is comprised in this
and this alone—in never allowing the self-restrained characters to be
separated from the courageous, but in weaving them together by common
beliefs and honours and dishonours and opinions and interchanges of
pledges, thus making of them a smooth and, as we say, well-woven
fabric… (310e7-311a1)
Transcending the eugenics program of the Republic, the Stranger suggests in the
Statesman that the ruler’s objective is not merely to purify each class but to achieve a
balance by mixing seemingly opposed and, thus, extreme virtues (like courage and
gentleness), 261 such that all classes might have simultaneously strong-willed and careful
contributors to the state:
As for the rest of the people, those whose natures are capable, if they get
education, of being made into something fine and noble and of uniting
with each other as art required, the kingly art takes those natures which
tend more towards courage, considering the their character is sturdier, like
the warp in weaving, and those which incline towards decorum, for these,
to continue the simile, are spun thick and soft like the threads of the woof,
and tries to combine these natures of opposite tendencies and weave them
together. (309a9-b7)
The true statesman, then, is attentive to the mean that is in fact the ideal of each extreme
and is achieved by their harmonious communion. This mean must be that towards which
all of the statesman’s actions and decisions must be aimed. This is why the statesman has
the finest form of calculating ability, an ability to distinguish among different kinds as
well as among the better and the worse and the hierarchy that holds among kinds. Of
course, none of this is possible if the statesman is not intimately involved in the education
of the citizens, whereby he might come to know their characters best: “Do we not know,
261

See Statesman, 306a-308b.
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then, that the statesman and good law-giver is the only one to whom the power properly
belongs, by the inspiration of the kingly art, to implant this true opinion in those who
have rightly received education…?” (309d14). We are now in a better position, given the
cave allegory of the Republic to discuss the relation of this discourse on the statesman to
the philosopher’s tropos.

4.1 – The Philosopher and the Political Art
Because the philosopher shares with the statesman this art of distinguishing kinds
and their relations and of combining those differences in order to achieve some whole
that is unified and coherent, they have a lot in common. We might speculate that this is
the reason that the true statesmen of the Republic must be philosophers or that the
philosophers be made statesmen. More importantly, though, we must notice that the aim
of the philosopher and the aim of the statesman are different only by degree. While the
statesman applies his method for the sake of producing better souls that will go on to
execute the necessary work of the polis, the philosopher applies his method for the sake
of producing better souls, which can thereby do the statesman’s work. It is perhaps no
accident that the art of weaving is used as the analogue in Cebes’ counter-argument
against Socrates in the Phaedo, where the soul is said to be woven and worn many times
before it wears out. Thus, as the statesman’s work stands above the craftsmen’s, so the
philosopher’s stands above the statesman’s. This is by no means universal, however.
Since the philosopher relies upon the polis as the ground for his own emergence into this
method, the philosopher is only conditionally superior to the statesman. 262 Indeed, since

262

I am indebted to Jeremy Bell for his thoughtful comments on this point in response to an earlier version
of this argument.
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the statesman and philosopher are ideally the same person, we must admit that the
hierarchy is formal only. In any case, we may conclude that there is a continuous
analogy between the art of weaving, statecraft and the philosopher’s inquiry.
Consequently, these are all to be held in a dynamic relation with each other. It is not a
question of choosing whether one will be a weaver, a political person or a philosopher.
These are in no way mutually exclusive, and, while quite distinct and different, they
reveal a common thread of similarity. 263

5 – Analogical Methodology

The Statesman dialogue is a methodological discourse, that is, a discourse about
the true statesman’s tropos of governing and about the way of discovering this manner.
The Stranger’s missteps in his search for the statesman, in retrospect, appear to have been
purposeful. The loss of footing in the method of division required a reflection upon its
inability to take stock of the real conflicts involved in the determination of authority and
rulership. To highlight these flaws, the Stranger struck out in a different direction,
crafting an elaborate myth of generation without decay that went beyond all bounds of
decency and reason. This direction, too, appears to have been chosen for its
characteristic failure, in particular, its lack of proportion.
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This recalls the Republic’s assertion that justice is “minding one’s own business,” and that moderation is
respected when each person keeps to his own work. Rosen repeats a similar claim in his discussion of what
is good with respect to a cloak maker and the statesman: “A properly produced cloak is an expression of
technical proficiency but also of political responsibility. A cloak is good and noble if it is well made and
fits properly; but it is noble and good in another sense entirely because it allows the maker and the user to
express their appropriate roles as citizens” (Web of Politics, 126).
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Having crafted a crucial aporia, one especially concerned with philosophical
methodology, the Stranger embarks on a palintropic discourse that attempts to provide an
account for the proper manner of giving an account. This logos of logos unsurprisingly
turns up a series of figures of analogical relation: the example of example, the mean, and
the application of the example of weaving not only to the statesman but also to the
investigator of the statesman. This analogy between the art of the statesman and the art
of the hunter of the statesman reveals the reason that the statesman and the philosopher
must be correlated, as the Meno suggests, the Republic demands, and the Critias assumes.
For our purposes, the Statesman has served as a site for examining the point at
which Plato comes closest to articulating a theory of the philosopher’s use of analogy.
What we discover, however, is that any theory of method must, because of its reflexivity,
incorporate an analogical structure within its account. The Stranger seeks a method for
determining the appropriateness of illustrations and explanations to his discourse, which
itself goes on to appropriate the analogical structure of such illustrations. Finally, beyond
the internal meaning of the dialogue, we may affirm something further about Plato’s
thought. While Plato nowhere provides an extended examination of analogia, the
Statesman is evidence that Platonic methodology is not merely suffused with analogies;
the account for how to give accounts is itself necessarily analogical.
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Conclusion

This entirely accords with Plato’s Socratic
attitude, which provides the positive only in
actually carrying it out and not by making it the
direct theme of reflection.264
Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist

I
Plato’s dialogues do not offer us a direct account of the philosophical form of
analogy, yet analogies abound in his thought. They seem to appear everywhere, as if
every claim of the dialogues has an analogy as its mascot. One can see this in the fact
that Plato scholars often refer to these arguments according to their image alone: the
“cave,” the “second sailing,” the “chōra,” the “example of example,” etc. Even when the
term analogia and its variants do turn up in the dialogues, it is by way of another analogy
to the quantative proportions of mathematics. That is, analogia (as mathematical
proportion) is yet another analogy for analogy. As this occurs, however, the implicit
structure of that proportionality informs the ideas expressed through it, such that they
become analogical. And when the thinking becomes analogical, we are able to see a
picture of the philosophical form of analogy. This transformation of the thought of the
dialogues is itself mirrored in reflections upon the method of philosophical investigation,
where still more analogues of analogy appear: the divided line, logos as reflection, the
eikōs logos, and the philosopher’s art of weaving. We are thus surrounded by analogy at
the same time as its direct account is not forthcoming from the dialogues.
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§76e, 368.
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II
Providing an account of the philosophical role of analogy in Plato’s dialogues,
then, required analyses that were attentive to the dynamic interaction between the way
something is expressed and what is expressed. Let us review some of our findings. We
have argued that analogy is the necessary structure of an account of mimetic metaphysics
in so far as it is capable, as nothing else is, of mediating difference and similarity in the
relation of being and becoming without subordinating one to the other. Because Plato
does not thematize this mediation, however, Platonism remains rigidly hierarchical; being
is the dominant form, the logos of becoming. That is, Platonism is the story told through
the analogy, and, without a direct reflection upon the work that analogy accomplishes,
analogy remains merely a tool subordinated to what is expressed through it. If we attend
to the form of the account that makes such claims possible, we notice the paradoxical
reliance of Platonism upon its other, of being upon becoming, and of logos on analogia.
This betrayal is evident also in the equivocity of logos in the dialogues. Sometimes it
indicates the purified account according to the ideas, unmediated by discursive thought
(as in the Timaeus, where it is associated with nous), and sometimes it refers specifically
to that discursivity (as in the Phaedo, where it is likened to images in water). This
particular equivocity reveals the overall reliance of the dominant intelligible upon the
subordinated sensible, of theory upon hypothesis, and of the literal upon the figurative.
At each point, however, this dependence is obscured. This is because these very images
are built to reflect the independence of what they image from that image. For example,
the sun is the image of the good, an image that founds the theory that identifies images as
inferior and inadequate to the purity of what it images.
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III
Despite the dizzying nature of these conclusions, let us consider the consequences
such an interpretation has for an understanding of Platonism. It is imperative to stress
that the present work is not premised on a denial of Platonism. 265 By Platonism I mean
both the explicit (metaphysical, psychological, political, etc.) theories espoused, whether
consistently or not, within the dialogues written by Plato, and the legacy of that thinking
as it comes to be systematized by later thinkers. I do not dispute that Plato’s thinking is
profoundly hierarchical and teleological: that the forms are the reality of which their
instances are mere images, that the guardians are the true rulers over the many, that the
soul is the proper ruler of the body, and that virtue is the true aim of action. What has
been suggested by my analysis is that the dialogues display the manner in which those
theories are articulated and interact with each other and that this manner is indicative of a
structure that informs and supports all such theories. That structure is analogy. Such a
claim does not change the meaning of Platonism, but it does change the way that we
understand Platonism’s claims. Because its theory rests upon a foundation by means of
which that very foundation is repudiated, Platonism is not the closed and complete
system that it purports to be. It encloses the whole only by obfuscating its origin, just as
265

Such denials do exist and constitute the majority of the interpretations resistant to those that evaluate the
argumentative consistency of Plato’s work. Such Platonic “revisionists” (e.g., Drew Hyland, John Sallis,
David Roochnik, Jacob Klein, Ronna Burger, Seth Benardete and Gunther Figal, among others) are
influenced to some degree by Leo Strauss as well as by Heidegger and Gadamer’s readings of Plato. Each
of these thinkers treats the dialogues as living texts, whose meaning is not determined in advance. In their
readings of Plato (as well as that of Konrad Gaiser and Hans Krämer of the “Teubingen school”), however,
there is often an assumption that because the dialogues’ content is ambiguous, there is therefore a hidden
doctrine that is unambiguous. Albeit tempting, most contemporary scholars no longer fall into this trap
(with the notable exception of the prevalence of a discourse of “unwritten teachings,” led in the United
States by the otherwise quite apt Mitchell Miller). Although my argument relies on attending to the
distinction between the tacit and the explicit philosophy of the dialogues, I wish not to be confused with
arguing that analogy is a hidden doctrine. None of my claim rests on the assertion that Plato intended for
the philosophy of analogy to be hidden, and this would be a conclusion unwarranted by my study.
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the Timaeus fails to adequately account for that which allows for an account of the origin,
chōra. By reading the dialogues as the event of Platonism, we discover that analogy acts
as the silent witness to the limits of systematic thinking.
In addition to offering a reflection on the basis of the accepted “doctrines” of
Platonism, we may also respond to the critique of inconsistency leveled against Plato. As
such, I also intend to respond to the false binary of interpretations of Plato’s work: those
that are already convinced of Platonism’s claims and therefore seek to justify them, and
those that are not and seek to nullify them. As I have noted, I intend to steer between the
two poles because I believe that there is a remainder left over when Platonism is
subtracted from the dialogues. As we have already seen in Chapters Two and Three, the
hypocrisy that Plato is charged with (i.e., of denigrating images while at the same time
using them) ignores at least one important clarification that is offered in the accounts of
the Republic and the Phaedo. There is an important difference between images for
thought and images tout court. Images for thought are constructed by the author of the
thought and serve as an active reflection, responsive to the logoi of the thinker, whereas
sensible images, like the picture of Simmias, trigger primarily passive recollective
responses. These, like the physical diagram Socrates uses to assist the slave in the Meno,
are helpful for those who do not yet have any true opinions upon which to draw, but they
are not ends in themselves: “They make the arguments for the sake of the square itself
and the diagonal itself, not for the sake of the diagonal they draw” (510d7-e2, Bloom).
The cave allegory of the Republic suggests that the true philosopher will delve into the
realm of sensible images only in order to draw someone else toward the intelligible
images to which they refer. These intelligible images, on the other hand, act as the
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springboard of the philosopher into dialectic and are not eschewed but instead essential to
clearing a path toward the forms themselves.

IV
Clearly, then, there is an explicitly theorized place in the dialogues for the use of
analogies, namely in paideia. But is a didactic sense of dianoia the only way to
understand the role of analogy for philosophy? Clearly this is the intent of these passages
of the Republic, confirmed by the Seventh Letter’s claim that logoi are weak and can only
attempt to reach the being of things in their mediated way. 266 What I have argued here,
however, requires us to note that one may not “kick away the ladder” of analogy so easily
as this. 267 Whereas images do not necessarily insinuate their own particularity into the
theory they reflect, an account of the relation between images and what they reflect must
itself reflect the logic of analogy, which is of a relation of relations. While the superficial
reading of the role of analogy in Plato’s thought is that of a didactic crutch, what we
ourselves have learned in investigating analogy is that its presence in any account that
seeks to be complete comes to shape the structure of that account. In so doing, Plato’s
thought not only uses analogies it becomes analogical.
Taking this conclusion one step further, we might make the following claims
about the function of discursive thought for philosophy. Completeness and selfsufficiency are the ancient and persistent dreams of philosophy. It is not enough,
266

“…dia to ton logon asthenes” (342e4-343a1).
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This refers to Wittgenstein’s famous claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that his text itself
must be abandoned but that this is only possible after having used it: “My propositions are elucidatory in
this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He
must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly” (C. K. Ogden, trans. [New York: Cosimo
Classics, 2007], §6.54, 608).
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however, merely to dismiss these dreams as childish and pernicious fantasy. The drive of
thinking is always thrust toward such ends, and there is no stopping it. This was Kant’s
insight about the speculative urge of reason when he said that “human reason has a
natural propensity to overstep all these boundaries.” 268 However, recognizing the ways
that thought limits itself through its very expression of infinite autonomy opens for us
additional avenues of critique. This study of analogy is just such an avenue, and its
critical capacity is not limited to Plato’s thought. Since Plato’s philosophy is at the
beginning of a long heritage of the philosophical work of analogy, the critical perspective
we have developed here will be all the more useful as a tool for evaluating the work that
analogy accomplishes for other thinkers. Such applications would contribute to a more
complete understanding of the effect analogy has as a non-thetic ground of thought. In
addition, we may have discovered something even more important and, ultimately quite
Socratic. Given his proposal that in order to avoid the pitfalls of direct investigation one
should use logoi as the reflections of truth, we may hope that achieving an understanding
of analogy is a step toward acquiring the technē of logos that would prevent misology.
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“Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic,” Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood,
trans. and ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 590.
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